Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 11 July 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-3811-B
• Parties: Jane DOE, individually and as next friend of minor T.W., Plaintiff, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

194 F.Supp.3d 551

Jane DOE, individually and as next friend of minor T.W., Plaintiff,

v.DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-3811-B

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed July 11, 2016

Lori A. Watson, Lori Watson PLLC, Hal Mark Browne, Law Offices of Hal Browne PLLC, Plano, TX, for Plaintiff.

Dianna D. Bowen, John David Giddens, Kathryn E. Long, Thompson & Horton LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JANE J. BOYLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant's 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Original Complaint (Doc. 14). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I.BACKGROUND¹

This case arises from the alleged sexual harassment and rape of Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Doe") disabled minor daughter, T.W., by a classmate at Justin F. Kimball High School ("Kimball"), a school in the Dallas Independent School District ("DISD" or the "District"). T.W. suffers from cerebral palsy

and static encephalopathy, which has left her severely impaired. Doc. 11, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–10, 12 [hereinafter "FAC"]. In 2013, T.W. began ninth grade at Kimball, where she had a special educational program as a result of her disability, including a class called Functional Life Skills ("FLS"). Id. ¶¶ 7, 11. One of T.W.'s FLS classmates was V.A., a 20-year-old male special needs student. Id. ¶ 14. Shortly after the semester began, V.A. began inappropriately touching T.W., including grabbing her buttocks and genital area. Id. T.W. reported this behavior to her teacher, Ms. Jones ("Teacher"), but the school took no action. Id.

Throughout the fall semester of T.W.'s freshman year, school officials received numerous complaints about V.A.'s behavior. Two girls reported that he had groped them, and a male student complained that V.A. had physically threatened him. Id. ¶¶ 15–17. The school responded by separating those students from V.A. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. The administration was also aware that V.A. had previously engaged in sexual misconduct at another school, and that he could not attend classes at the DISD magnet school because of the need to monitor him closely at all times. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.

V.A.'s harassment of T.W. continued throughout the semester, and on several occasions he attempted to pull T.W. into the FLS classroom's bathroom.² Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. V.A. also voiced an interest in "humping"³ T.W. to another student, who reported it to T.W.'s case manager, Monica Gray ("Gray"). Id. ¶ 21. On December 3, 2013, T.W. informed Gray of V.A.'s persistent harassment, including an incident in the lunchroom that day where V.A. hugged and kissed T.W. despite her request to stop. Id. ¶ 23. Gray, in turn, relayed these complaints to Vice Principal Waters ("Waters") and Principal Jones ("Principal"), and also attempted to call Doe but was unable to reach her. Id. ¶ 25. Additionally, Gray sent a letter home with T.W. regarding the allegations of harassment, which she also provided to Teacher and Waters. Id.

Kimball officials responded by holding two meetings about T.W.'s complaints: one on December 3 and one on December 5. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Doe missed the first meeting—attended by Waters, Teacher, Gray, and another teacher—because Gray was unable to reach her that day. Id. ¶ 25. Doe, T.W., Waters, Principal, V.A., and V.A.'s parents attended the second meeting. Id. ¶ 26. During this meeting, T.W. recounted all the harassment she had endured from V.A., and it came to light that V.A. had previously been removed from Kimball and placed in a private school because of his behavior.⁴ Id. ¶¶ 26–27. When confronted with the statement about wanting to "hump" T.W., V.A. did not deny making it. Id. ¶ 28. None of the school officials disclosed the other complaints they had received about V.A.—Doe found out about these reports from Gray, who had not been allowed to attend the December 5 meeting. Id. ¶ 29.

As a result of these meetings, administrators relocated V.A.'s seat to the back of the FLS classroom. He now sat away from T.W., but adjacent to the bathroom that all FLS students were required to use.⁵ Id. ¶¶ 30–32. No one from Kimball informed Doe that V.A. would sit directly in front of the restroom into which he had previously attempted to pull T.W. Id. ¶ 31. Despite this relocation, V.A. continued to touch T.W. inappropriately and try to force her into the restroom for the rest of the semester. Id. ¶ 34. Teacher rejected T.W.'s requests to use another bathroom because a school rule required FLS students to use the one in the classroom. Id.

After the school's holiday break, V.A.'s harassment resumed and T.W. continued to report these incidents to Teacher. Id. ¶ 37. One day in late January 2014, two teacher's aides were supervising the classroom because Teacher was attending a meeting.⁶ Id. When T.W. went to use the restroom, V.A. not only groped her, but followed her into the bathroom and pushed her down on a cot,⁷ where he raped her. Id. ¶ 38. T.W. did not report the rape until a few weeks later, in part because V.A. had threatened her during the assault. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. Doe immediately reported the rape to Kimball's administration, as well as the police and Texas Family and Protective Services ("CPS").Id. ¶ 41. A medical examination revealed evidence of sexual penetration. Id. ¶ 44.

In response to Doe's report, school officials held another meeting, which Doe, her husband, T.W., Waters, and Principal attended.⁸ Id. ¶ 42. At this meeting, T.W. described the rape, and Principal and Waters assured Doe and her husband that they would investigate. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. Over the next few weeks, school administrators and CPS questioned T.W. "extensively"—and without her parents' knowledge or permission—about the rape. Id. ¶ 45. In addition, one of the teacher's aides who had supervised the class at the time of the rape, Ms. Camacho ("Camacho"), tried several times to convince T.W. that the rape had not happened. Id. ¶ 46. Kimball did not suspend V.A. or take any steps to ensure that he did not contact T.W., leading Doe to keep T.W. at home and request that she be transferred to another school.⁹ Id. ¶ 47.

T.W. eventually changed schools, but by that time had fallen behind in her studies, causing her grades to suffer. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. She has endured "lifelong psychological damages" as a result of the rape and has also lost "educational benefits as a direct result of...Defendant's actions." Id. ¶ 52. Doe asserts causes of action under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, for violating T.W.'s right to educational opportunities and benefits, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) interfering with Doe's right to direct T.W.'s upbringing; (2) violating Doe's and T.W.'s rights to familial association; (3) violating T.W.'s right to bodily integrity; (4) failing to protect T.W. from V.A.'s sexual assault; and (5) retaliating against T.W. for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech. Id. ¶¶ 54–103. Doe also asserts state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and gross negligence. Id. ¶¶ 104–107.

DISD moves to dismiss Doe's claims. Doc. 14, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss. Doe has responded, and DISD has replied. Doc. 15, Pl.'s Resp. in Opp. [hereinafter "Pl.'s Resp."]; Doc. 16, Def.'s Reply Br. in Supp. [hereinafter "Def.'s Reply"]. Doe also requested a hearing on DISD's Motion, which the Court held on June 21, 2016. Doc. 17, Mot. for Hearing; Doc. 18, Elec. Order; Doc. 20, Elec. Order. The Motion is now ready for review.

II.LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)—Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

At any stage in the litigation, any party may move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter-jurisdiction. King v. Life Sch. , 809 F.Supp.2d 572, 576 (N.D.Tex.2011). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, [it] must dismiss the action." Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ). This is because "[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," and "without jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims." Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ). "[T]he burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Id. (quoting Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.2001) ).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) —Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. , 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit , 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.2004) ). The Court will "not look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted based on the alleged facts." Spivey v. Robertson , 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir.1999).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (qu...