Stand Up Mont. v. Missoula Cnty. Pub. Sch.

• Citation: 409 Mont. 330,514 P.3d 1062
• Decision Date: 02 August 2022
• Docket Number: DA 21-0533
• Parties: STAND UP MONTANA, a Montana non-profit Corporation; Clinton Decker; Morgen Hunt; Gabriel Earle; Erick Prather; Bradford Campbell ; Meagan Campbell; and Jared Orr, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MISSOULA COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Elementary District No. 1, High School District No. 1, Missoula County, State of Montana; Target Range School District No. 23; and Hellgate Elementary School District No. 4, Defendants and Appellees. Stand Up Montana, a Montana non-profit corporation; Jasmine Alberino; Timothy Alberino; Victoria Bentley; Wesley Gilbert; Katie Gilbert; Kiersten Glover; Richard Jorgenson ; Stephen Pruiett; Lindsey Pruiett; Angela Marshall ; Sean Littlejohn; and Kenton Sawdy, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Bozeman School District No. 7; Monforton School District No. 27; and Big Sky School District No. 72, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

409 Mont. 330

514 P.3d 1062

STAND UP MONTANA, a Montana non-profit Corporation; Clinton Decker; Morgen Hunt; Gabriel Earle; Erick Prather; Bradford Campbell ; Meagan Campbell; and Jared Orr, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.MISSOULA COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Elementary District No. 1, High School District No. 1, Missoula County, State of Montana; Target Range School District No. 23; and Hellgate Elementary School District No. 4, Defendants and Appellees.

Stand Up Montana, a Montana non-profit corporation; Jasmine Alberino; Timothy Alberino; Victoria Bentley; Wesley Gilbert; Katie Gilbert; Kiersten Glover; Richard Jorgenson ; Stephen Pruiett; Lindsey Pruiett; Angela Marshall ; Sean Littlejohn; and Kenton Sawdy, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.Bozeman School District No. 7; Monforton School District No. 27; and Big Sky School District No. 72, Defendants and Appellees.

DA 21-0533

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: May 25, 2022

Decided: August 2, 2022

For Appellants: Quentin M. Rhoades, Rhoades & Erickson, PLLC, Missoula, Montana

For Appellees: Elizabeth A. Kaleva, Kevin A. Twidwell, Elizabeth O'Halloran, Kaleva Law Offices, Missoula, Montana

For Amicus Montana State Legislators: Abby Jane Moscatel, Blacktail Law Group, PLLC, Lakeside, Montana

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Appellants Stand Up Montana (Stand Up) and the parents of several children attending public schools in Missoula and Gallatin Counties (Parents), appeal the orders entered by the Fourth and Eighteenth Judicial District Courts (collectively "District Courts," individually "Missoula Court" and "Gallatin Court," respectively), denying their requests for preliminary injunctions to enjoin the masking requirements of Appellees, school districts in Missoula and Gallatin Counties (collectively "School Districts" or "Districts"), which were part of policies adopted for the 2021-2022 school year by the Districts in response to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic. Though these appeals were initially filed separately, on Appellants’ motion they were consolidated because of their similarity in facts and law. We restate the issues as follows:

1. Did the District Courts manifestly abuse their discretion by denying Appellants’ requests to preliminarily enjoin the School Districts’ masking policies as likely to violate Parents’ and students’ rights of privacy and individual dignity?

2. Did the Gallatin Court err in its interpretation of § 40-6-701, MCA, and abuse its discretion by denying Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground the masking policies likely do not violate Parents’ rights?

We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Following the emergence of COVID-19 in the winter/spring of 2020, most of the School Districts, like many others around the state and country, utilized a hybrid educational model for the 2020-2021 school year that provided a mix of remote and in-person instruction. All of the School Districts adopted a policy of universal, or mandatory, facial masking for students, staff, and visitors who appeared in person during this period.

¶3 In the summer of 2021, the School Districts undertook consideration of what policies to pursue to ensure a safe return to full-time, in-person learning for the 2021-2022 school year. The Bozeman District established a task force to address the issue. Consideration by the task force and boards of the other School Districts was given to national and local health data, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines, recommendations from medical organizations, and guidance from the U.S. Department of Education and city-county health departments. Extensive public comment was invited and received, both by email and in-person presentations.

¶4 While the particulars of each District's policies, including those related to masking, differed slightly from district to district, they were all broadly similar.¹ Generally, the policies provided that all students, staff, volunteers, or visitors to the schools were required to wear face coverings, either disposable or reusable, while physically inside a school or on a school bus. Various activity exceptions were provided, including while: eating or drinking; engaged in sports or recess; giving a speech, lecture, or presentation (if separated from the rest of the class by at least six feet); communicating with someone who is hearing impaired; identifying themselves; or receiving medical attention. After adoption of the policies, the School Districts continued to monitor data and guidelines, and made their policies subject to regular review and revision as circumstances changed. It is undisputed that face coverings were made optional by the School Districts as the school year progressed.²

¶5 Stand Up and Parents filed complaints and motions for preliminary injunctions against the named School Districts shortly after the Districts’ adoption of these policies for the 2021-2022 school year, seeking to enjoin the masking requirements. Although Appellants’ complaints alleged several constitutional violations, they sought injunctive relief only on their claims based upon constitutional privacy, individual dignity, and parental rights. Hearings were held on the requests, although no witnesses were called by either party. Both District Courts issued orders denying Appellants’ motions. Appellants appeal the denial of their requests for issuance of a preliminary injunction pursuant to M. R. App. P. 6(3)(e).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 "We review a district court's grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for a manifest abuse of discretion." Driscoll v. Stapleton , 2020 MT 247, ¶ 12, 401 Mont. 405, 473 P.3d 386 (citing Davis v. Westphal , 2017 MT 276, ¶ 10, 389 Mont. 251, 405 P.3d 73 ). "A district court abuses its discretion when it ‘acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or in excess of the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.’ " Mont. State Univ.-Northern v. Bachmeier , 2021 MT 26, ¶ 26, 403 Mont. 136, 480 P.3d 233 (quoting Gendron v. Mont. Univ. Sys. , 2020 MT 82, ¶ 8, 399 Mont. 470, 461 P.3d 115 ). A manifest abuse of discretion is one that is " ‘obvious, evident, or unmistakable.’ " Weems v. State , 2019 MT 98, ¶ 7, 395 Mont. 350, 440 P.3d 4 (quoting Davis , ¶ 10 ). If, however, the district court's decision on a preliminary injunction is based on legal conclusions, we review those conclusions de novo to determine if the district court correctly interpreted the law. Driscoll , ¶ 12 (citing City of Whitefish v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Flathead Cty. , 2008 MT 436, ¶ 7, 347 Mont. 490, 199 P.3d 201 ). "Finally, ‘[i]n considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction, neither the [d]istrict [c]ourt nor this Court will determine the underlying merits of the case giving rise to the preliminary injunction, as such an inquiry is reserved for a trial on the merits.’ " Driscoll , ¶ 12 (quoting BAM Ventures, LLC v. Schifferman , 2019 MT 67, ¶ 7, 395 Mont. 160, 437 P.3d 142 ); see also Benefis Healthcare v. Great Falls Clinic, Ltd. Liab. P'ship , 2006 MT 254, ¶ 19, 334 Mont. 86, 146 P.3d 714 ("[O]ur analysis below is not intended to express and does not express any opinion about the ultimate merits of the individual issues or of the case .... Our task is not to resolve the substantive matters of law ... it is to inquire whether the [d]istrict [c]ourt manifestly abused its discretion.").

DISCUSSION

¶7 A preliminary injunction may be granted upon a party's demonstration of at least one of five enumerated subsections of § 27-19-201, MCA. While Appellants did not specify under which subsection they based their motions for preliminary injunction, the Missoula Court concluded their motion was based on § 27-19-201(2), MCA, while the Gallatin Court concluded their motion was based on both § 27-19-201(1) and (2), MCA. Appellants do not dispute these conclusions on appeal, and we therefore limit our analysis to these subsections, which provide that a preliminary injunction may be granted:

(1) when it appears that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief or any part of the relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually; [or]

(2) when it appears that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce a great or irreparable injury to the applicant.

Section 27-19-201(1), - (2), MCA.

¶8 District courts have broad discretion to grant a preliminary injunction pursuant to § 27-19-201, MCA, but the court must exercise that discretion "only in furtherance of the limited purpose of preliminary injunctions to preserve the status quo and minimize the harm to all parties pending final resolution on the merits." Davis , ¶ 24 (citing Porter v. K & S P'ship , 192 Mont. 175, 183, 627 P.2d 836, 840 (1981) ).

¶9 "In the context of a constitutional challenge, an applicant for preliminary injunction need not demonstrate [unconstitutionality] beyond a reasonable doubt, but ‘must establish a prima facie case of a violation of its rights under’ the constitution." Weems , ¶ 18, (quoting City of Billings v. Cty. Water Dist. of Billings Heights , 281 Mont. 219, 227, 935 P.2d 246, 251 (1997) ). "Prima facie is defined as ‘at first sight’ or ‘on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information.’ " Driscoll , ¶ 15 (quoting Weems , ¶ 18 ); see also prima facie, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). When considering a preliminary injunction granted under § 27-19-201(2), MCA, the loss of a constitutional right constitutes an irreparable injury. Driscoll , ¶ 15 (citing Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass'n v. State , 2012 MT 201, ¶ 15, 366 Mont. 224, 286 P.3d 1161) (MCIA I ).

¶10 "When determining whether an applicant has made a prima facie showing of constitutional injury or appears to be entitled to the relief sought, a court may determine with which level of scrutiny to evaluate the challenged [policy]." Driscoll , ¶ 18...