Doe v. El Dorado Union High School District

• Decision Date: 23 June 2021
• Docket Number: C089531
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: JANE DOE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EL DORADO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

JANE DOE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EL DORADO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

C089531

California Court of Appeals, Third District, El Dorado

June 23, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super Ct. Nos. PC20180052, PC20180077

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

Appellants are two former students of the El Dorado Union High School District (the District) who allege they were sexually assaulted by one of the District's former teachers. After they sued the District for sexual harassment and negligence the District filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It argued that, under the District's claim-presentation regulation, parties seeking to sue the District first need to present a timely written claim to the District describing the nature of their claim and the monetary relief they seek. But because, the District went on, appellants failed to present the required written claim within six months of their being sexually assaulted, as required in the District's regulation, their suit is now forever barred. The trial court agreed.

We reverse the court's judgment. Much in the law has changed since the court issued its decision. Most relevant here, in a 2019 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, the California Legislature provided that a claim for childhood sexual assault “that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020 because the applicable... claim presentation deadline... had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020” and potentially even later. Because this law revives appellants' claims here even if they were previously barred by the District's claim-presentation regulation, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Because this case comes to us following a judgment on the pleadings, we assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations in appellants' complaints. (See People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.)

According to the two complaints in this case, Jane Doe and Jane Roe^[1] are both former students of the District who, when between 16- and 17-years old, were sexually assaulted by Daniel Mummy, a former teacher at the District. Over several months in 2016 and 2017, and during class hours, Mummy repeatedly hugged Doe and Roe, grabbed their breasts and buttocks, caressed their backs, and made sexual advances toward the two students. He continued this conduct until he was arrested after another student contacted the police. Mummy was afterward “charged with seven different misdemeanor []counts of molesting children and a serious felony charge of sexual battery by a person of authority.”

Before Mummy began assaulting Doe and Roe, the complaints alleged, the District “knew, or reasonably should have known, that Mummy had previously engaged in unlawful sexually-related conduct with minors at schools” in the District. But rather than take steps to prevent further sexual abuse of children, the District instead “ignored and/or actively concealed the sexual harassment and abuse... that had already occurred.”

Based on this conduct, Doe and Roe both separately sued the District in 2018 for sexual harassment and various counts of negligence. On the District's motion, the two suits were later consolidated.

Several months after appellants filed their suits, the District filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that appellants needed to present their claims to the District in writing before filing suit in court-something they had never done. The District reasoned that, as allowed under the Government Claims Act (the Act; Gov. Code, ^[2] § 810 et seq.), it had passed a regulation requiring those who seek money or damages against the District for any injury to present their claims to the District “no later than 6 months after the accrual of the cause of action.” And, it argued, because appellants had not complied with this process and no longer could comply with this process given the passage of time, both their complaints failed as a matter of law.

The trial court agreed. It thus dismissed appellants' claims without leave to amend.

Appellants timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I Legal Background

“Enacted in 1963, the Government Claims Act... is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.) It describes the circumstances when a public entity may be liable for injuries (§ 815) and, relevant here, it describes the procedures for bringing claims against public entities (§§ 900-935.9).

In general, the Act requires parties seeking money or damages against a local public entity, like a public school district to present their claims to the entity before filing suit. (§ 905; see also § 900.4 [defining “[l]ocal public entity”].) And it requires these parties to present their claims promptly-“not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action” for “claim[s] relating to a cause of action for injury.” (§ 911.2.) This prefiling presentation requirement is intended “ ‘to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.' [Citation.]” (McWilliams v. City of Long Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613, 619.)

But not all types of claims are subject to this requirement. Section 905 generally requires compliance with the Act's claim-presentation requirement for “all claims for money or damages against local public entities, ” but it then lists 15 categories of claims that are exempt from this requirement. One of those exemptions is for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.” (§ 905, subd. (m).) Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, as relevant for our purposes, describes “the time for commencement of” an “action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (a).) During the time of the alleged conduct here, it provided: “In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later....” (Sen. Bill No. 1779 (2002-2003 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1.)

The Legislature added this exception for childhood sexual assault in the wake of the California Supreme Court's decision in Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201. The court there found that monetary claims for “ ‘injury to person,' ” including those relating to childhood sexual molestation, were subject to the Act prefiling presentation requirements and so needed to be presented to the relevant governmental body within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. (Id. at pp. 208-210.) But following the decision, after commenters said requiring sexual assault victims to present their claims within six months of being abused was too short a period, the Legislature enacted section 905, subdivision (m) to exempt childhood sexual assault from the Act's claim-presentation requirement. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 640 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 2008, p. 1.) According to two bill analyses concerning this enactment, the “bill [wa]s intended to address the Shirk decision by expressly providing that childhood sexual abuse actions against public entities are exempted from government tort claims requirements and the six-month notice requirement.” (Id. at p. 2; Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 640 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 14, 2008, p. 2.)

But although the Legislature may have sought to exempt childhood sexual abuse actions from the Act's six-month notice requirement, many local governments favored retaining a prefiling notice requirement for these types of actions. And so, to maintain it, many of these local governments afterward enacted their own prefiling notice requirements. They purported to do so under section 935 of the Act, which, relevant here, provides: “Claims against a local public entity for money or damages which are excepted by Section 905 from [the Act's claim-presentation requirement], and which are not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto, shall be governed by the procedure prescribed in any charter, ordinance, or regulation adopted by the local public entity.” (§ 935, subd. (a).) In the view of these local governments, because childhood sexual assault claims were now “excepted by Section 905 from [the Act's claim-presentation requirement]” and “are not governed by any other [claim-presentation] statutes or regulations, ” local public entities now had authority under section 935 to establish their own procedures governing these types of claims.

After learning of this practice, the Legislature added in 2018 a new subdivision to section 935 to clarify that it does not authorize local governments to adopt claim-presentation requirements for “claims of childhood sexual abuse made as described in subdivision (m) of Section 905. This subdivision is declaratory of existing law.” (§ 935, subd. (f); Sen. Bill No. 1053 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2018, ch. 153, § 1.) According to several bill analyses for the amendment, although the Legislature enacted section 905, subdivision ...