Doe v. Dunning

Decision Date22 April 1976
Docket NumberNo. 43907,43907
Citation549 P.2d 1,87 Wn.2d 50
PartiesJane DOE, Individually and on behalf of her minor child, Respondent, v. Harry DUNNING, Manager of Seattle-King County Bureau of Vital Statistics, et al., Appellants.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., James A. Humphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellants.

Barbara A. Isenhour, Legal Services Center, Seattle, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff 1 seeks a certified copy of the record of birth, a conventional birth certificate, for her child who was born out of wedlock. With the concurrence of the child's father, the child was given the mother's surname. Named as defendants are those persons responsible for administrating the issuance of certificates of birth. In a declaratory judgment action, the trial court ordered the issuance of a conventional birth certificate to plaintiff. In so ordering, the trial court declared that the defendants are required to issue upon request conventional birth certificates to all applicants, without regard to the circumstances of their birth. We affirm.

The issuance of birth records in general is governed by RCW 43.20.090, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The state registrar shall, upon request, furnish an applicant with a certified copy of the record of any birth . . . registered under the provision of law, or that portion of the record of any birth which shows the child's full name, sex, date of birth, and date of filing of the certificate . . . Provided, That a certified copy of the record of any birth may not disclose the fact of illegitimacy of birth, nor of information from which it can be ascertained . . .

The certificate of live birth, customarily, is filled out by the doctor and the hospital staff with the aid of the mother at the time of birth. This certificate is then filed with the appropriate registrar. There are two parts to this certificate. The first portion of the certificate contains, among other information, the name of the child, date and place of birth, the name of the father and the maiden name of the mother. It is this portion of the certificate, which contains nonconfidential information, that constitutes the conventional birth certificate referred to in RCW 43.20.090. The second portion of the certificate is labeled 'Confidential Information for Medical and Health Use Only.' Included in this portion of the certificate is a designation of whether the child is legitimate. The information included in this confidential section of the birth certificate is not subject to the view of the public or for certification purposes except upon court order. RCW 70.58.200.

In addition to authorizing the issuance of a certified copy of the record of birth, RCW 43.20.090 also authorizes the issuance of a birth record certification card (commonly referred to as a birth registration card). This is a card the size of an ordinary credit card which evidences the name of the child, the date of birth, the child's gender, and place of birth. The principal difference between the information contained on this card and that contained on the conventional birth certificate is that no reference is made to the names of the father and mother.

This case arises because of the unwritten policy of the registrar to not issue a conventional birth certificate for an illegitimate child who bears the mother's surname. In such situations, the registrar issues a birth registration card. If the child bears the surname of the father, however, a conventional birth certificate is issued regardless of whether the person is legitimate. A person of legitimate birth may obtain, upon request, either a conventional birth certificate, or a birth registration card, or both. The above policy concerning the issuance of conventional birth certificates and birth registration cards is an attempt by the registrar to comply with the above quoted proviso of RCW 43.20.090, I.e., not to disclose the fact of illegitimacy nor information from which it can be ascertained.

The registrar's policy is premised upon the assumption that a conventional birth certificate which discloses the father's name but which shows the child to bear the mother's surname is indicative of a probability of illegitimacy. This conclusion is based upon the widespread custom of a child being given its father's surname. The plaintiff challenges this conclusion, contending that traditional name patterns are changing as more women insist that their surnames be given equal status with men's.

The purpose of the statutory proviso is clear--to avoid disclosure of illegitimacy or information from which it can be ascertained. The only question is whether the registrar's policy carries out that purpose.

We conclude that disclosure of the fact that a child bears the mother's surname is not necessarily a fact from which illegitimacy can be ascertained. As long as the state make no affirmative statement about the status of the child's legitimacy, there will be no concrete evidence on the birth certificate from which to ascertain that the child was born out of wedlock.

While we have been furnished no statistics, it is common knowledge that in today's society more women are interested in retaining their surnames upon marriage and that they have a legal right to do so. See, Spencer, A Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 665 (1973); Spitzer, Wives, Bobies, Names and the Common Law, 27 Wash.St.Bar News 10, at 4 (December 1973); Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 Wash.U.L.Q. 779.

Under well established principles of common law, a person is free to adopt and use, absent a statute to the contrary, any name that he or she sees fit so long as it is not done for any fraudulent purposes and does not infringe upon the rights of others. 57 Am.Jur.2d Name §§ 1, 10 (1971); Attorney General Opinion, Jan. 30, 1928. This common law right applies as well to the surnames of married women. While it may be that it is considered customary for a woman to take her husband's surname upon marriage, it is custom only and not a legal requirement. Custer v. Bonadies, 30 Conn.Sup. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (1974); Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972); State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961); Dunn v. Palermo, Tenn., 522 S.W.2d 679 (1975); But cf., People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill.App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).

Other states have statutorily recognized the right of a married woman to retain her own surname upon marriage. Under a 1975 statute, each married party in Hawaii is allowed to declare which surname each will use as a married person. It may be the person's own surname, the spouse's surname or a hyphenated combination of the two. Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 574--1. An earlier version of that statute required the wife to take the husband's surname. Should the necessary states ratify the federal Equal Rights Amendment, it is doubtful whether any state could compel a woman to change her legal surname upon marriage. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 940--41 (1971).

As more women exercise their right to retain their own surname after marriage, the likelihood that children will be given a surname other than the paternal surname increases. There are generally no statutes requiring married parents to give their child the father's surname; although customarily parents do, they have a choice and can freely exercise it. Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, supra at 804,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Doherty v. Wizner
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 27 Diciembre 2006
    ...at 391, 52 P.3d 1067 (quoting State ex rel Spence-Chapin Services, 101 Misc.2d at 489, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 300). 35. See Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash.2d 50, 54, 549 P.2d 1, 3 (1976) (The function and use of a surname to identify children as being part of a distinct social and economic unit is not se......
  • Secretary of Com. v. City Clerk of Lowell
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 4 Agosto 1977
    ...in maiden name). In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 472, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975) (court order for change to maiden name). Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash.2d 50, 52, 549 P.2d 1, 3 (1976) (right to use maiden name). Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis.2d 138, 152, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975) (same). See Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d......
  • Donald J. v. Evna M.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 19 Junio 1978
    ... ... (Secretary of Com. v. City Clerk of Lowell (Mass.1977) 366 N.E.2d 717, 725; Doe v. Dunning" ... (1976) 87 Wash.2d 50, 549 P.2d 1, 3; Sobel v. Sobel (1957) 46 N.J.Super. 284, 134 A.2d 598, 600; Kay v. Bell (1953) 95 Ohio App. 520, 121 N.E.2d 206, 208-209; Pintor v. Martinez (Tex.Civ.App.1947) 202 S.W.2d 333, 335; Buckley v. State (1923) 19 Ala.App. 508, 98 So. 362, 363.) ...       \xC2" ... ...
  • Henne v. Wright
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 1 Agosto 1990
    ...States Cas. Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947, 948 (1910); Kay v. Bell, 95 Ohio App. 520, 121 N.E.2d 206, 208 (1953); Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash.2d 50, 549 P.2d 1, 3 (1976); see generally 57 Am.Jur.2d Name Secs. 2, 3 (1988); 65 C.J.S. Names Sec. 3 (1966), and that a child born out of wedlock rece......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT