Doe v. Edgar
| Decision Date | 30 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 82 C 2734.,82 C 2734. |
| Citation | 562 F. Supp. 66 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | John DOE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jim EDGAR, Defendant. |
Alan M. Freedman, Bruce H. Bornstein, Freedman & Bornstein, Larry A. Davis, Davis & Reibman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Roger P. Flahaven, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
This is an action brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for declaratory and injunctive relief by persons who have been convicted at least twice of driving under the influence of alcohol. Before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We grant defendant's motion.
We assume the facts as stated by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge the policy of defendant Jim Edgar, Secretary of State of Illinois, pertaining to persons with more than one conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol ("drunken driving"). Edgar's policy is to refuse to consider reinstating the driver's licenses of such persons or granting them restricted driving permits until five years after the date of the revocation of their licenses. Plaintiffs, as representatives of these persons, contend that Edgar's policy violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. They seek class certification.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Plaintiffs do not claim that they were stigmatized by their failure to obtain reinstatement of their driver's licenses or issuance of a restricted driving permit, nor do they claim in any other respect that a liberty interest was affected in this case. Thus, their due process claim is limited to the alleged deprivation of their property.
Edgar moves to dismiss this action, claiming that neither reinstatement of a driver's license nor issuance of a restricted driving permit are protected property interests within the meaning of the due process clause. The statutes providing for reinstatement or issuance of a restricted driving permit buttress Edgar's argument. Reinstatement is governed by Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 95½, § 6-208(b), which provides:
The restricted driver's permit provision, Ill. Rev.Stats. ch. 95½, § 6-205(c), provides:
Whenever a person is convicted of any of the offenses enumerated in this Section, the court may recommend and the Secretary of State in his discretion, without regard to whether such recommendation is made by the court, may, if application is made therefor, issue to such person a restricted driving permit granting the privilege of driving a motor vehicle between his residence and his place of employment or within other proper limits, except that this discretion shall be limited to cases where undue hardship would result from a failure to issue such restricted driving permit. In each case the Secretary of State may issue such restricted driving permit for such period as he deems appropriate, except that such permit shall expire within one year from the date of issuance.
The plain language of these statutes indicates that plaintiffs had neither a reasonable expectancy of a restricted driving permit nor a reasonable expectancy of reinstatement of their driving privileges. Both statutes place great discretion in the Secretary of State.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that they have a protected property interest because Edgar has established a set of procedures that plaintiffs must go through in order to qualify for reinstatement or a restricted driving permit. Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority for this proposition. The court in Rehbock v. Dixon, 458 F.Supp. 1056 (N.D. Ill.1978), examined the statute providing for restricted driving permits and concluded that, although a property interest was affected when plaintiff's license was suspended, no property interest was affected when plaintiff's application for a restricted driving permit was denied. Id. at 1061. Absent a protected property interest, plaintiffs' due process claims fail. The rationale of Rehbock applies both to plaintiffs' attempts to obtain reinstatement of their driver's licenses and to their attempts to obtain restricted driving permits. We dismiss plaintiffs' due process claims.1
Plaintiffs assert that the alleged policy as to reinstatement and issuance of restricted driving permits to persons convicted more than once (1) creates an irrational distinction between those drivers who have one drunken driving conviction and those who have more than one drunken driving conviction; and (2) creates an irrational distinction between drivers with more than one drunken driving conviction and drivers who have been guilty of other serious driving offenses. Edgar contends that there is no equal protection violation because (1) plaintiffs are seeking treatment similar to dissimilarly situated persons; and (2) the challenged classifications are rationally related to substantial state interests.
Plaintiffs' first contention is that they are members of a class of serious offenders, including those convicted of manslaughter or reckless homicide, driving on a revoked or suspended license, drag racing, and auto theft, and persons involved in accidents causing death or serious injury. We reject the argument that plaintiffs are similarly situated with such persons.
Plaintiffs cite Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir.1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 356, 98 S.Ct. 786, 54 L.Ed.2d 603. At issue in Miller was a Chicago ordinance which treated applicants for chauffeurs' licenses differently from persons already holding chauffeurs' licenses. Under the ordinance, applicants were denied licenses if they had been convicted of certain felonies, whereas licensed persons who committed one of these felonies did not have their licenses automatically revoked upon conviction. The Court held the different treatment accorded applicants and previously licensed persons irrational...
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People v. Lindner
...State's argument that where deterrence is the purpose, it need not be shown that the statute in fact deters anyone. (See Doe v. Edgar (N.D.Ill.1982), 562 F.Supp. 66, 70, aff'd (7th Cir.1983), 721 F.2d 619.) However, the proposition that the legislature might have thought that the loss of dr......
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Best v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr.
...are not similarly situated if their role in the commission of an offense was significantly different.”); Doe v. Edgar, 562 F.Supp. 66, 69 (N.D.Ill.1982) (rejecting the plaintiff's equal-protection claim on the grounds that the type of driving offense with which he had been charged was “fund......
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Doe v. Edgar, 83-1197
...Amendment. The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and the district court, 562 F.Supp. 66, granted the motion on December 30, 1982. On appeal from the district court's ruling, appellants raise all the constitutional arguments th......