Doe v. First United Methodist Church

• Decision Date: 30 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-2392,92-2392
• Parties: , 89 Ed. Law Rep. 580 DOE, Appellant, v. FIRST UNITED METHODIST CHURCH et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 531

68 Ohio St.3d 531

629 N.E.2d 402, 89 Ed. Law Rep. 580

DOE, Appellant, v. FIRST UNITED METHODIST CHURCH et al., Appellees.

No. 92-2392.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 11, 1994.

Decided March 30, 1994.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. A cause of action premised upon acts of sexual abuse is subject to the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery.

2. A minor who is the victim of sexual abuse has one year from the date he or she reaches the age of majority to assert any claims against the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse where the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator and is fully aware of the fact that a battery has occurred.

On July 12, 1991, John Doe, appellant, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County against Timothy S. Masten, First United Methodist Church ("First United" or "church"), and the Elyria City School District, appellees. The following factual allegations formed the basis for appellant's complaint.

Appellant attended Elyria High School from 1981 through 1984. During that time, Masten was employed by the school district as a high school choir director. During that same period, Masten was also employed as a musical director at First United. Between 1981 and 1984, Masten allegedly initiated numerous homosexual contacts with appellant, without appellant's consent. The sexual conduct occurred both at church and at school. Appellant had not yet reached the age of majority during the period of sexual abuse.

After leaving high school in 1984, appellant began experiencing severe emotional trauma. In September 1989, appellant sought psychological counselling for the emotional difficulties he was experiencing. At that time, appellant was informed that his emotional problems were related to the sexual activity that had allegedly been forced upon him by Masten.

In his complaint, appellant sought recovery against Masten for battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellant sought recovery against the school district for its alleged negligence in hiring Masten and retaining Masten's services, thereby causing appellant's alleged physical and emotional harm. Appellant sought recovery against First United, claiming that the church had actual or constructive knowledge of Masten's sexual contact with underaged persons in general, and with appellant in particular. Appellant claimed that the church had been negligent and willful in failing to protect appellant from Masten's sexual conduct, thereby causing appellant's alleged physical and emotional harm. Appellant also set forth claims against the church and the school district asserting that these defendants were vicariously liable for the damages caused by Masten's sexual conduct with appellant.

The school district filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that appellant's claims against the school district were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10 and the one-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.111. The school district argued that the applicable statute commenced to run at the time the alleged abuse occurred. Since appellant did not commence suit until July 1991, the school district claimed that the applicable statutes of limitations barred the action. Appellant responded to the motion, arguing that his action against the school district was governed by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10, and that the statute commenced to run in September 1989 when appellant "discovered" the harm resulting from his sexual encounters with Masten.

On November 4, 1991, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed all claims against the school district. The trial court noted that since appellant was a minor at the time the sexual abuse occurred, the applicable statute of limitations did not begin to run until appellant's eighteenth birthday. ¹ For purposes of its decision, the trial court assumed that appellant had reached the age of majority by 1986 at the latest. Because appellant had not pursued his claims against the school district within two years after reaching the age of majority, the trial court found that R.C. 2305.10 barred the action. The trial court held that the discovery rule was not applicable to suspend the running of the statute through September 1989, when appellant discovered the harm caused by his sexual encounters with Masten. In its entry, the trial court specifically determined that there was "no just reason for delay" of an appeal from the dismissal of appellant's action against the school district.

Appellant appealed to the court of appeals. Meanwhile, appellant's action against Masten and First United proceeded at the trial court level. The following additional facts were revealed in appellant's responses to interrogatories. Appellant was born July 7, 1966. Thus, appellant reached the age of eighteen on July 7, 1984, presumably one or two months after graduating from Elyria High School. Between 1981 and 1984, Masten engaged in sexual conduct with appellant on two hundred to three hundred separate occasions. The incidents of sexual activity occurred at school, at First United and at Masten's home. After graduating from high school, appellant became preoccupied with his sexual identity and suffered from depression, guilt and anxiety. In September 1989, appellant sought counselling from Dr. Michael F. Pavlak, a psychologist. A document contained in the record in this case indicates that during appellant's initial consultation with Pavlak, appellant informed Pavlak of appellant's prior sexual involvement with Masten. ²

On November 25, 1991, Masten filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that appellant's claims against Masten, all of which arose from Masten's alleged sexual abuse of appellant, were time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.111. Masten urged that the statute began to run on July 7, 1984--the date of appellant's eighteenth birthday. Masten also urged that the discovery rule could not be applied to suspend the running of the statute through September 1989 when appellant discovered the extent of the harm caused by the alleged sexual abuse. On January 10, 1992, First United also filed a motion for summary judgment. First United argued that the claims against the church were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10, that the statute commenced to run on appellant's eighteenth birthday, and that the discovery rule did not suspend the running of the applicable statute of limitations.

By entry dated February 3, 1992, the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment and dismissed the action against Masten and First United. Applying R.C. 2305.10 and 2305.16, the trial court held that appellant was required to file his complaint against Masten and First United within two years after appellant reached the age of majority, i.e., by July 7, 1986. Because appellant had not pursued his remedies until July 12, 1991, the trial court held that R.C. 2305.10 barred the action.

Appellant appealed to the court of appeals from the dismissal of his action against Masten and First United. On motion, the appellate court consolidated that appeal with appellant's appeal from the trial court's November 4, 1991 decision dismissing the claims against the school district.

The court of appeals found that appellant's claims against Masten were governed by the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery set forth in R.C. 2305.111. Thus, the court of appeals held that even if a discovery rule was applied to suspend the running of the statute until September 1989, appellant's action against Masten (commenced in July 1991) was not timely filed.

The court of appeals found that appellant's causes of action for negligence against First United and the school district were governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10. In determining that appellant's causes of action against these defendants were time-barred, the court of appeals stated, in part:

"Although the offensive conduct at issue occurred repeatedly between 1981 and 1984, all of the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled until Doe's eighteenth birthday on July 7, 1984. R.C. 2305.16. Doe argues that because he did not discover the extent of his psychological injuries until he sought counseling in 1989, his cause of action did not accrue until that time.

" * * *

"This case does not involve any claim that Doe had repressed his memory of these incidents with Masten. When Doe turned eighteen he was fully aware of Masten's prior tortious actions. Although he might not have been aware of the full extent of his injuries at that time, he knew he had in fact been assaulted. Thus, there is no reason to toll the running of the statute of limitations. * * * "

Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the judgments of the trial court.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Dubyak & Goldense Co., L.P.A., Joseph A. Dubyak and Paul V. Wolf, Cleveland, for appellant.

Thomas P. O'Donnell, Cleveland, for appellee First United Methodist Church.

Warhola, O'Toole, Loughman, Alderman & Stumphauzer, Dennis M. O'Toole and Daniel D. Mason, Lorain, for appellee Elyria City School Dist.

Ulmer & Berne, Murray K. Lenson and Timothy M. Fox, Cleveland, for appellee Timothy S. Masten.

Licata & Crosby Co., L.P.A., Louis J. Licata and William M. Crosby, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Adult Support for Incest Survivors of Today.

Hermanies, Major, Castelli & Goodman; and R. Lanahan Goodman and Andrew P. Krembs, Cincinnati, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

The issue in this appeal is whether the causes of action asserted against Masten, First United and the school district were timely filed pursuant to...