Doe v. Harris
| Decision Date | 30 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79 Civ. 589 (JMC).,79 Civ. 589 (JMC). |
| Citation | 495 F. Supp. 1161 |
| Parties | John DOE, Plaintiff, v. Patricia R. HARRIS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Samuel Lorenzo, New York City, for plaintiff.
John S. Martin, Jr., U. S. Atty. for the Southern District of New York by Nancy E. Friedman, Asst. U. S. Atty. and Borge Varmer, Regional Atty., Region II, Dept. of Health and Human Services by Marla Simpson, Asst. Regional Atty., New York City, for defendant.
Motion by plaintiff, for judgment on the pleadings, is granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
Motion by defendant, for judgment on the pleadings, is denied. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
This matter is remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Jurisdiction is based upon the Social Security Act. Id.
There is no dispute about the facts leading up to claimant's current psychiatric condition. Claimant began working as a New York City Police Officer in 1968, when he was twenty-eight years old. Approximately two-and-a-half years later, he started to display symptoms of psychiatric disorder. Because of his fears that "others were following him, that the Mafia were plotting against him, and that there was a plot to murder him and make it look like an accident," he was admitted to Bellevue Hospital Psychiatric Division in January 1971, and diagnosed as suffering from "schizophrenia, paranoid type."1 He stated at one point that he had tried to assist a woman who was having trouble with her car in a parking lot, but that she had attempted to run him over. He then concluded that the FBI had hired her to kill him.2 After approximately one week at Bellevue, he was transferred to a different hospital, where he remained for about another month.3 While at Bellevue, the claimant received 300 milligrams of Thorazine daily.4
After his discharge in early March, plaintiff continued to see a psychiatrist and receive medication as an outpatient,5 until his psychiatrist discontinued his medication and advised him to return to duty as a police officer. The record, unfortunately, does not specify when this occurred. By later October 1971, however, he had resurrected his fear that the FBI was after him, and that "someone was going to kill him," and consequently was re-admitted to Bellevue.6 Hospital psychiatrists again diagnosed his problem as paranoid-type schizophrenia, and resumed medication. According to one of the attending physicians, claimant suffered from "persecutory and grandiose delusions," and "his affect was flat and his insight and judgment were markedly impaired."7
After approximately a month, claimant was transferred to Rockland State Hospital, which recorded the following: 8 Claimant's overt symptoms eventually subsided, however. A notation into his record dated January 4, 1972, states: 9 The following day he was transferred to a Veterans Administration Hospital, where he remained for another week.
Unfortunately, the record below contains no evidence of what claimant did from the time he was discharged from the Veterans Administration Hospital to November 1972, when he submitted his resignation from the Police Department.10 The circumstances of that resignation, however, suggest that his psychiatric illness had not, in fact, permanently abated. Claimant wrote the following letter to his commanding officer:
I . . . want to make it clear that my life is in danger. Certain people (namely the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. or other agents or informers) are planning to murder me. They are going to make it look like an accident, a set up or planned accident, to wipe me out.11
The letter then named certain people who claimant believed were members of the conspiracy against him.
In January 1973, the Police Commissioner accepted claimant's resignation. Thereafter, claimant's attorney commenced a special proceeding in the New York State Supreme Court to set aside his resignation and reinstate him so as to enable him to receive a disability pension. On the basis of claimant's past psychiatric history and the content of his resignation letter, the Supreme Court found claimant to have been of unsound mind when he resigned, and therefore declared his resignation a nullity. The court ordered the Commissioner to reinstate him for the purpose of his applying for a disability pension.12
The record also contains little indication of what plaintiff did from the time of his resignation to approximately November 1974, when he began receiving his disability pension from the Police Department. After he started receiving the pension, he tried to work at two different jobs. For three months, he worked as a "helper" for a furniture mover, and thereafter he drove a taxi until he killed a passenger on May 5, 1975.
The record is unfortunately sparse in details about this incident. It appears that while plaintiff was driving his taxi, an altercation developed with an eighty-year-old passenger. After the passenger left the taxi, claimant ran him down and killed him. Claimant was arrested, indicted for second degree murder, and held in the Prison Hospital of the New York City House of Detention for Men at Riker's Island awaiting trial.13 Two psychiatrists who examined the claimant shortly after his arrest found him unfit to stand trial and in need of hospitalization.14 One of them reported that claimant ran the victim down because he thought he was harassing and intimidating him.15
More than a year later, on June 22, 1976, claimant was acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect. Pursuant to section 330.20 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law "C.P.L.", he was then committed to the custody of the commissioner of mental hygiene.16 Two days later, claimant was admitted to the Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center "Mid-Hudson".
According to a psychiatrist who first interviewed claimant at Mid-Hudson: "At the time of admission, he demonstrated a complete absence of psychotic symptomatology and was able to establish a very rational, meaningful dialogue with the examiner."17 Five days later, a "team leader," who was a social worker, noted the following:
Claimant became quite argumentative regarding the probable length of his stay here. It would appear that his lawyer suggested the insanity plea and is telling claimant he'll get an independent psychiatrist to testify for his release. He minimizes the seriousness of his crime, is resentful of the turn of events, and exhibits no remorse or insight whatsoever into the enormity of the deed. He appears to be in very good contact and it is the writer's feeling that he killed the passenger, not in a "panic", but in a complete loss of control due to anger. However, he is most resentful over his incarceration, completely disregarding the fact that he thus avoided a lengthy prison term.18
A psychiatrist's entry into claimant's record in August 1976 states that "his functionally psychotic disorder can be regarded as being in a state of remission."19 Nevertheless claimant remained hospitalized. Additional entries by the psychiatrist and a psychologist in February and March 1977 indicate no change in his "basic clinical condition," but note his lack of insight into his condition.20
In June 1977, claimant was transferred to the Manhattan Psychiatric Center "Manhattan". Manhattan's records on the claimant state that at the time of his admission there, he "had no active psychotic symptoms but did show residual symptoms of ambivalence of feeling, feeling of uncertainty and distrust of others and a somewhat hollow affect."21 Moreover, the general observations of the claimant were positive. He demonstrated good personal hygiene and grooming, participated well in group activities, although his "relations with others" were "not quite up to the average expected," and he planned to begin "prevocational training in air-conditioning and refrigeration."22
Claimant applied for disability benefits under section 223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423, on May 18, 1977, alleging disability from mental illness since May 5, 1975. The Social Security Administration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now of the Department of Health and Human Services) denied his application on June 13, 1977, and again after reconsideration on May 8, 1978. Thereafter, the attorney who continues to represent claimant in this action, requested a hearing on claimant's behalf. He waived a personal appearance, however, and sought a decision on the basis of evidence submitted.23
On September 7, 1978, Administrative Law Judge "ALJ" Mary E. Cerbone handed down a decision finding claimant not to have been under a disability within the meaning of the Act at any time since his claimed onset date. She expressly noted the Secretary's supplemental regulation regarding mental disorders, which provides:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hundrieser v. Heckler, 83 C 4360.
...gainful activity, not by measurements `on an imaginary scale with calibrations ranging from "mild" to "severe."'" Doe v. Harris, 495 F.Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y.1980) quoting from Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 298-99 (2d Cir.1964). See also Jones v. Schweiker, supra, 551 F.Supp. at 208. ......
-
Rivera v. Schweiker, 79 Civ. 6333-CSH.
...constriction of interests and seriously impaired ability to work with other people. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1598 (12.00 A). See Doe v. Harris, 495 F.Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y.1980). Additionally, the regulations regarding mental disorders do not require that the maladaptive behavior be manifest throughou......
-
Lebus v. Harris, Civ. No. C-80-1315 SW.
...period is needed before a disorder may be presumed to have sufficiently abated so that it is no longer disabling. See Doe v. Harris, 495 F.Supp. 1161, 1171 (D.Del.1980). Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether a claimant can engage in any substantial gainful activity during the symptom-free......
- Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College