Doe v. Lawrence Hall Youth Servs.

• Decision Date: 26 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1–10–3758.,1–10–3758.
• Parties: John DOE, a Minor, by his Father and Next Friend, Richard DOE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. LAWRENCE HALL YOUTH SERVICES, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

966 N.E.2d 52

John DOE, a Minor, by his Father and Next Friend, Richard DOE, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.LAWRENCE HALL YOUTH SERVICES, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 1–10–3758.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Jan. 26, 2012.

Edmund J. Scanlan, Chicago, for Appellant.

Robert Mark Chemers, Richard M. Waris, Edward J. Aucion, Sara Jane Brundage, Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago, for Appellee.

Justice FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff John Doe, by his father and next friend Richard Doe, appeals from orders of the trial court dismissing with prejudice various counts of his complaint against defendant Lawrence Hall Youth Services pursuant to sections 2–619 and 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/ 2–619, 2–615 (West 2008)). We affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant is a residential private school providing services to children with severe emotional, behavioral, and learning challenges. Its program is a 24–hour–per–day, 7–day–per–week therapeutic treatment program. Defendant is registered and funded by the Illinois State Board of Education and operates its school pursuant to the Illinois School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/24–24 (West 2010) ). In September 2007, defendant voluntarily accepted minor plaintiff John Doe into its school and residential treatment program. Later, during the years of 2008 to 2009, defendant employed Linda Pithyou as a teacher in its treatment, education, and residential program. During her employment, Pithyou allegedly engaged in an improper sexual relationship off school grounds.

¶ 4 Defendant maintained rules and regulations for children in its program, including establishing curfews and prohibiting alcohol and drug use both on-site and off-site. Nonetheless, according to the complaint, on numerous occasions between December 2008 and January 27, 2009, Pithyou picked plaintiff up at Lawrence Hall and consumed alcohol and marijuana with him. She also drove him to retail stores where she purchased clothing and cellular telephones for him. From January 27, 2009, to February 23, 2009, Pithyou on various occasions engaged in oral sex and intercourse with plaintiff.

¶ 5 In April 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging negligent supervision (count I) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count II) in connection with the alleged sexual misconduct perpetrated by Pithyou while plaintiff was a resident student at Lawrence Hall. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice.

¶ 6 Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint in December 2009, and defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619. This is the motion at issue here. After hearing oral arguments by both parties, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.

¶ 7 In the amended complaint, plaintiff again alleged both negligent supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress.¹ He alleged that defendant employed Pithyou and that Pithyou was his teacher. He alleged that he violated the school's regulations regarding curfew and the consumption of alcohol and drugs by sneaking out to meet Pithyou, who would take him away from Lawrence Hall and purchase and consume alcohol and marijuana with him. He also alleged that Pithyou would engage in oral sex and intercourse with him. Further, plaintiff alleged that "various employees of defendant" observed him coming home after curfew intoxicated and under the influence of drugs. He alleged:

"[N]umerous employees and agents of defendant's comprehensive treatment, educational and residential program were aware that minor plaintiff was receiving gifts from defendant's agent and employee, Linda Pithyou, as well as staying out all night, staying out past curfew with defendant's agent, and was coming back to [defendant's] facility under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs."

He argued that defendant had a special relationship with plaintiff as a voluntary custodian and protector and that, as a direct result of the special relationship, defendant had a duty to protect plaintiff "from a criminal attack by a third person, its employee and agent, Linda Pithyou." He argued that, even though defendant had this duty, it was nonetheless guilty by and through its agents, servants, and employees of one or more of the following negligent acts and/or omissions:

"(a) failed to report suspicions of abuse pursuant to 325 ILCS 5/4 ;

(b) failed to supervise the minor plaintiff, JOHN DOE, to ensure compliance with its curfew regulations;

(c) allowed the minor plaintiff, JOHN DOE, to remain outside its residential treatment centers over night, despite no prior authorization to do so;

(d) failed to enforce its policy regarding consumption of alcohol and/or use of recreational drugs;

(e) failed to properly supervise the minor plaintiff, JOHN DOE, by failing to discover that its employee, Linda Pithyou, was picking up the minor plaintiff, JOHN DOE, in a car after school hours and returning him after curfew;

(f) failed to establish policies for its teachers regarding boundaries with the at-risk children, including the minor plaintiff, JOHN DOE, that they are servicing, including having no private outside contact with these children without prior express approval;

(g) failed to properly monitor the activities of its agent and employee, Linda Pithyou, regarding outside contact with its protectees, including the minor plaintiff, JOHN DOE;

(h) failed to appreciate the grooming techniques being employed by its agent and employee, Linda Pithyou, toward the minor plaintiff, JOHN DOE; [and]

(i) failed to train its staff in its comprehensive treatment, education and residential program of the potential for abuse of its protectees by defendant's agents who are grooming them by virtue of buying them gifts."

He alleged that, as a direct and proximate cause of one of the aforementioned acts, plaintiff suffered various injuries. He asked for judgment against defendant and a sum in excess of $50,000 plus the costs of the lawsuit.

¶ 8 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint or, in the alternative, to dismiss the first amended complaint pursuant to sections 2–615 and 2–619. Defendant contended that plaintiff's amended pleading was legally insufficient because: (1) it failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where defendant could not be held legally responsible for the intentional acts of a former employee which were outside the scope of her employment responsibilities as an educator; and (2) defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to protect him from illegal, criminal, or sexual conduct by a teacher that occurred off of school grounds.

¶ 9 Alternatively, defendant contended that, pursuant to section 2–619, plaintiff's claims were barred by the Illinois School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/24–24 (West 2010) ), which provides immunity from liability for negligence and requires the plaintiff to prove wilful and wanton misconduct in order to recover. It argued that, because Pithyou acted completely outside the scope of her employment with defendant, there can be no claim under a respondeat superior argument. Defendant contended that plaintiff's complaint, which alleged negligent supervision by defendant, was insufficient because it related to the conduct of the school and the school children, which is protected under section 24–24.

¶ 10 In May 2010, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss count II of the first amended complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress and took the negligent supervision count (count I) under advisement. Soon after, the court issued a memorandum order granting the motion to dismiss count I. The court found that: (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply because the sexual misconduct by Pithyou was not within the course and scope of her employment; and (2) the Illinois School Code provided immunity to defendant against claims for negligent supervision. Regarding the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court reasoned:

"In this case, there is no evidence that the Defendant, independent from the actions of Linda Pithyou, condoned, benefitted or encouraged Pithyou in acting outside the scope of her employment with the minor plaintiff. Rather, the case law on this matter establishes that since criminal sexual abuse/assault is personally motivated, it is outside the scope of employment. There is no evidence to indicate that the acts of Pithyou fell within the scope of her employment. The matters alleged in this case fall in the category of intentional tortious acts designed to carry out an independent purpose by Pithyou and they thus were not within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant Lawrence Hall Youth Services. In proceeding to sexually assault and offer drugs to the minor Plaintiff, John Doe, Pithyou was advancing a completely personal objective. The sexual assaults could advance no conceivable purpose of Defendant. This Court finds that Linda Pithyou acted for personal reasons only and thus her acts were beyond the course and scope of employment and could in no way be interpreted as an act in furtherance of the business interests of Defendant Lawrence Hall Youth Services."

¶ 11 Regarding the applicability of the Illinois School Code to the case at bar, the court found:

"The evidence clearly demonstrates that defendant was registered by the Illinois State Board of Education at the time of plaintiff's alleged injuries and thus was operating the school pursuant to the Illinois School Code. As such, defendant is protected by Section [34–84a] * * * in loco parentis status to teachers, certified education employees and other staff for matters relating to the conduct of the schools and school children. This Court finds that defendant stands in the shoes of an in loco parentis and thus, the statute confers immunity from

...