Doe v. Maher
Decision Date | 01 June 1976 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 15579,15589. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Donna DOE et al., Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Edward MAHER, Individually and as Commissioner of Social Services of the State of Connecticut. Sharon ROE et al., Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Edward MAHER, Individually and as Commissioner of Social Services of the State of Connecticut. |
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David N. Rosen, Rosen & Dolan, Edward J. Dolan, New Haven, Conn., Frank Cochran, Conn. Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., Hartford, Conn., Stephen Wizner, New Haven, for plaintiffs.
Michael Anthony Arcari, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendant.
Before TIMBERS, Circuit Judge, and BLUMENFELD and NEWMAN, District Judges.
Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391, 393, 95 S.Ct. 2221, 2222, 45 L.Ed.2d 268 (1975).
In our original opinion, we upheld the constitutionality of Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 52-440b (1976 Supp.)2 against claims that it denied due process and equal protection, invaded the plaintiffs' rights to privacy and conflicted with the purposes of the Social Security Act. Upon remand, this court has received briefs and heard arguments on all the issues to aid it in its further consideration of the case.3
We have been instructed to reconsider two different aspects of federalism, abstention and pre-emption. We turn first to the issue of abstention.4
The fact that the adult plaintiffs in this action, with the exception of the intervenor, Linda Robustelli, are defendants in pending contempt proceedings instituted by the Commissioner under the authority of § 52-440b (1976 Supp.), raises a serious issue of abstention in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971),5 and its progeny. The intervention of Ms. Robustelli, who has been threatened with prosecution, but against whom no action is presently pending, cannot circumvent the issue, for while she may be entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief on a personal basis, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), she cannot, under the guise of representing a class, dispense with the Younger considerations for those members of the class who are presently being prosecuted. "The requirements of Younger are not to be evaded by artificial niceties." Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 833, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2209, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974) ( ). Cf. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. at 816 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 2191. However, in the opinion of this court Younger does not prohibit the issuance of an injunction or declaratory relief in this action. This conclusion is founded upon a determination that neither of the considerations which support the Younger doctrine apply in the circumstances of this case, and, in addition, a finding that the plaintiffs lack a state forum in which they can adequately present their constitutional arguments. The latter is an essential prerequisite to abstention under the Younger doctrine.
The first consideration which underlies the Younger abstention doctrine is the traditional reluctance of federal courts to interfere with pending state criminal prosecutions. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 91 S.Ct. 746; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926). This consideration does not apply to the present case, however, because the pending state proceedings are in the nature of civil rather than criminal contempt.6
Under § 52-440b, it is the Commissioner of Social Services, not a district attorney, who has a woman who refuses to cooperate with the Department of Social Services cited to appear before a judge of the court of common pleas. This factor alone has been held to distinguish civil from criminal contempt in this circuit. In re Kahn, 204 F. 581 (2d Cir. 1913). And see In re Guzzardi, 74 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1935).
The more general tests established by the Supreme Court to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt, Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); serve to strengthen the conclusion that contempt sentences administered under § 52-440b are primarily civil, for their purpose would be to coerce testimony, rather than to vindicate the dignity of the court. Compare Shillitani, with United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972). In order to constitute criminal contempt, the statute would have to be interpreted to require proof of an intent to obstruct justice and an imminent threat to the administration of justice. In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975).
Connecticut law recognizes and applies this distinction. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has recently stated:
Robertson v. Apuzzo, Conn., 37 Conn.L.J. No. 38, at 1, 4 (March 16, 1976).
These contempt proceedings are therefore not "more akin to a criminal prosecutions" than to civil actions and they are not "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). And the nature of the proceeding is not converted to criminal simply because, under the statute in question, the State is suing in place of the parent. The stated purpose of § 52-440b is to allow the State to institute and successfully prosecute a paternity action and to recover support for the child. Rather than a criminal prosecution, the action is instead more in the nature of a civil debt collection.7 The Welfare Commissioner is acting primarily as the guardian of the child, securing its rights, rather than as a criminal prosecutor or law enforcement officer "charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the state . . . who must decide when and how this is to be done." Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. at 243-244, 46 S.Ct. at 493, quoted in Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. 746. But cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 556-61, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
If these contempt proceedings can be said to be "in aid of and closely related to" any particular statute, it is the federal Social Security Act, and not any particular criminal law of the State of Connecticut. In these circumstances, the element of Younger which rests upon the traditional reluctance of courts of equity to interfere with a criminal prosecution simply does not "mandate restraint." Cf. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200.
The comity considerations inherent in our federal system provide the second rationale for the Younger policy of abstention. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746. As Huffman made clear, these considerations apply no less to an action because it is civil in nature rather than criminal. There, the Court stated that:
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 601, 95 S.Ct. at 1207. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).
However, given the nature of the plaintiffs' claims in this action, traditional notions of federal-state relations, rather than requiring abstention, impel this court to intervene, not only to protect the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, but also to enforce the congressional intent underlying the recent amendments to the Social Security Act.
Younger, and the cases which follow it, involved, in essence, an attempt by a defendant in a pending state court proceeding to remove the action to federal court, without congressional authorization, based solely upon the dual claims that his constitutional rights had been or were being violated, and the expressed or unexpressed belief that federal courts were somehow more sympathetic to constitutional rights. These arguments were conclusively rejected in Huffman:
However, the challenges mounted by the plaintiffs in the present case are not exclusively substantive,...
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