Doe v. Mass. Inst. of Tech.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2022
• Docket Number: 22-1056
• Citation: 46 F.4th 61
• Parties: John DOE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

46 F.4th 61

John DOE, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 22-1056

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

August 24, 2022

Philip A. Byler, with whom Nesenoff & Miltenberg, LLP was on brief, for appellant.

Joshua Adam Engel and Engel & Martin, LLC on brief for Education Law Attorneys, amici curiae.

Justin Dillon, KaiserDillon PLLC, and Cynthia P. Garrett on brief for Families Advocating for Campus Equality, amicus curiae.

Benjamin F. North and Binnall Law Group, PLLC on brief for Stop Abusive and Violent Environments, amicus curiae.

Scott A. Roberts, with whom Mark Macchi and Hirsch Roberts Weinstein LLP were on brief, for appellee.

Eugene Volokh and First Amendment Clinic, UCLA School of Law on brief for Prof. Eugene Volokh, amicus curiae.

Before Thompson, Selya, and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

A writer is free to assume a nom de plume. That is why Mark Twain and Bob Dylan are better known than Samuel Clemens and Robert Zimmerman. But, as a rule, litigants in federal court must publicly reveal their true names. In this appeal, we tackle a question of first impression in this circuit: when is it appropriate for a party to a civil suit in federal court to appear under a pseudonym? This important question pits the individual's desire for privacy against the public's need to access judicial proceedings. After determining the appropriate standard for adjudicating motions for leave to proceed under pseudonyms, we vacate the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion and remand to the district court for application of the discerned standard.

46 F.4th 64

I

Drawing upon the complaint, we briefly rehearse the facts (largely undisputed for present purposes) and travel of the case. In 2013 — during his first year of college at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) — plaintiff-appellant John Doe formed a relationship with a classmate whom we shall call "Jane Roe." This relationship included episodic sexual intercourse and lasted until the summer of 2014. But even after the couple broke up, they occasionally had consensual sex during the fall 2014 semester.

On the evening of February 26, 2015, Jane went to John's residence for help repairing her computer and agreed to spend the night in his bed. The pair fell asleep. At some point in the early morning hours on February 27, they had sexual intercourse. John says that he observed Jane "fully conscious, alert, and with wide open eyes" and that she provided a variety of nonverbal cues throughout the interaction, thus signaling her effective consent. Afterward, though, Jane asked John what had happened. John replied that sexual intercourse had taken place. A few months later, Jane told John that "the sex they had when she was asleep was not okay."

In January of 2016, Jane filed a formal complaint with MIT's Title IX office alleging nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse occurring on February 27, 2015. That office launched an investigation, which involved interviewing both John and Jane (as well as other students) and reviewing documents. On their own initiative, the MIT investigators added a second charge against John for sexual harassment arising from conduct during the 2013-2014 school year (when John and Jane were still in a relationship). In a written report, the investigators found John responsible for both charges. Following its receipt of the investigators' report, MIT designated a panel of three faculty members drawn from its Committee on Discipline (the Committee) to consider the matter.

On April 25, 2016, the panel held a hearing. John denied responsibility, but two days later the chair of the Committee informed John by letter that MIT had found him responsible for nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse on February 27, 2015 and sexual harassment during the earlier period. The Committee's letter also informed John that he would be expelled.

John appealed the Committee's findings and sanction. He argued that, given Jane's nonverbal signals throughout the encounter — which, he said, fit the pattern established in their history of consensual intimacy — he reasonably believed that Jane was awake and had effectively consented to sexual intercourse on February 27, 2015. He also argued that expulsion was unwarranted because, although he maintained that he reasonably "thought [he] had effective consent" from Jane, he took "responsibility for making a terrible judgement call." MIT denied the appeal a few weeks later and expelled John just prior to his anticipated graduation.

On December 16, 2021, John — by then married and working as a software engineer in New Jersey — filed suit against MIT in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. His suit invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.¹ The complaint alleged breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and denial of basic fairness. Its gist was that MIT's investigation was infected by "[r]adical feminist anti-male bias" to the

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point of presuming "that the female complainant's story was ... true" and that John's story was false. John sought monetary damages, including damages for reputational harm, "past and future economic losses, loss of educational opportunities, and loss of future career prospects."

On the same day that he filed his suit, John filed an ex parte motion to proceed by pseudonym because "requiring him to reveal his identity would result in significant harm to [him], including the exact damages he seeks to remedy in this matter." Five days later, the district court denied the motion in a minute order. John moved for reconsideration. On the very next day, the district court denied the motion but stayed the case to facilitate John's anticipated appeal of the denial of his motion to proceed by pseudonym. This timely appeal followed.

II

As a threshold matter, we first address our appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily — insofar as court cases are concerned — our jurisdiction is limited to "appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States" in this circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Giving the phrase "final decisions" a "practical rather than a technical construction," the Supreme Court has permitted immediate appellate review of a "small class" of orders "which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Such collateral orders are "too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id.

The collateral order doctrine applies when three conditions are satisfied: the order must "conclusively determine the disputed question"; it must "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action"; and it must "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) ). Two salient principles gloss these requirements. For one thing, an issue is "important" in the relevant sense if it is "weightier than the societal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment principles." Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Assoc., Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 399 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) ). For another thing — with respect to the third condition — "the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’ " Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009) (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53, 126 S.Ct. 952 ). The focus of the inquiry is not on the facts of the case but, rather, on "the class of claims, taken as a whole." Id.

Every one of the nine courts of appeals to consider the question has held that an order denying a motion to proceed by pseudonym is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Doe v. Coll. of N.J., 997 F.3d 489, 494 (3d Cir. 2021) ; United States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 95-96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ; Doe v. Vill. of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 375-76 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2011) ; Raiser v. Brigham Young Univ., 127 F. App'x 409, 410 (10th Cir. 2005) ;

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Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000) ; James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 236-38 (4th Cir. 1993) ; Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1981). Although we have not yet passed upon the question, we have held, in an analogous context, that "[u]nsealing orders usually warrant immediate review under the collateral order doctrine." Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1987) ).

Today, we join the consensus of our sister circuits and hold that orders denying motions to proceed by pseudonym are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Such orders conclusively determine the pseudonym question, and that question is quite separate from the merits. Additionally, such an order typically resolves an issue of considerable importance because litigants wishing to file under fictitious names often allege that disclosure of their identities would inflict grievous harm upon them. And this concern is hardly a private matter: the public has a substantial interest in ensuring that those who would seek justice in its courts are not scared off by the specter of destructive exposure. Cf. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 410 (3d...