Doe v. Moore

• Citation: 410 F.3d 1337
• Decision Date: 06 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-10279.,04-10279.
• Parties: John DOE, I, John Doe, II, John Doe, III, John Doe, IV, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James T. MOORE, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Secretary for the Department of Corrections, by serving James Crosby in his official capacity as Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, Fred O. Dickinson, III., in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Edward Bieluch, Sheriff, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Palm Beach County and as class defendant for all other similar local law enforcement officers in the State of Florida, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

410 F.3d 1337

John DOE, I, John Doe, II, John Doe, III, John Doe, IV, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James T. MOORE, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Secretary for the Department of Corrections, by serving James Crosby in his official capacity as Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, Fred O. Dickinson, III., in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Edward Bieluch, Sheriff, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Palm Beach County and as class defendant for all other similar local law enforcement officers in the State of Florida, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-10279.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 6, 2005.

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Cindy E. D'Agostino, Law Office of Cindy E. D'Agostino, Barbara Jean Scheffer, Mitchell J. Beers, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jason Vail, Tallahassee, FL, Fred H. Gelston, Fred H. Gelston, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before BIRCH, KRAVITCH and CUDAHY^*, Circuit Judges.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

In this putative class action, initiated by ten John Does and one Jane Doe (collectively "Appellants") on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, we determine whether Florida's sex offender registration/notification scheme ("Sex Offender Act") and DNA collection statute ("DNA Statute"), codified in relevant parts at FLA. STAT. §§ 943.043, .0435, .325, 944.606, violate the Appellants' constitutional right to due process, equal protection, travel, separation of powers, and freedom from ex post facto legislation. The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss because the Sex Offender Act and the DNA Statute did not offend any provision of the Constitution. We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

In response to the 1994 abduction, rape, and murder of a seven-year-old girl, Megan Kanka, by her neighbor, a convicted sex offender, Congress along with all 50 states enacted laws requiring sex offenders to register their residence with local law enforcement. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 1145, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). Concerned by Megan's murder and the high number of repeat sex offenders, states enacted these laws for the purpose of notifying the public about local sex offenders and to aid law enforcement in identifying and locating potential suspects in local sex-related crimes. See Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003).

The Sex Offender Act requires any sex offender to register with the local sheriff's office within 48 hours of their release from custody or relocation to a permanent or temporary residence in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(2). The Sex Offender Act defines a sex offender as a person who "has been [c]onvicted of committing, or attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit, any of the [following] criminal offenses ... in this state or similar offenses in another jurisdiction:" kidnapping of a child; false imprisonment of a child under the age of 13; luring or enticing a child under 12 into a structure, dwelling or conveyance for an unlawful purpose; sexual battery; procuring child prostitution; lewd and lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of a person under 16; lewd and lascivious battery, molestation, or conduct; lewd and lascivious offenses committed in the presence of an elderly person, battery, and molestation; promoting a sexual performance by a child; showing obscene material to a minor; possessing child computer pornography; transmitting child pornography; buying or selling a minor with knowledge the minor will be portrayed as engaging or appearing to engage in sex acts. § 943.0435(1)(a)(1).¹ Further, anyone moving to Florida who has been convicted of similar crimes or has been designated as a sex offender in another state will also be considered a sex offender in Florida. § 943.0435(1)(a)(2)-(3).

Upon registering with the local sheriff's office, a sex offender must provide the following:

name, date of birth, social security number, race, sex, height, weight, hair and eye color, tattoos or other identifying marks, occupation and place of employment, address of permanent or legal residence or address of any current temporary residence, ... date and place of each conviction, and a brief description of the crime or crimes committed by the offender.

§ 943.0435(2). Within 48 hours of his or her contact with the sheriff's office, the sex offender must "report in person at a driver's license office of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles" where he or she must identify themselves as a sex offender, obtain a driver's license or identification card, and submit to a photograph and fingerprinting. § 943.0435(3). The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV") will then send the photograph and any further information to the Department of Law Enforcement ("DLE") for public notification by publication to, among other things, the internet. § 943.0435(4).

If a sex offender changes residence, he or she must report to the DHSMV within 48 hours to obtain an updated driver's license or identification card. Id. When a sex offender moves out of Florida, he or she is required to notify the local sheriff's office 48 hours before leaving and give the address of his or her intended residence out of state. § 943.0435(7).

A sex offender must comply with the registration statutes for life. The sex offender, however, may be relieved of his or her registration obligation if he or she is pardoned or petitions a court 20 years after release from custody or supervision and, among other things, the court finds them to not be "a current or potential threat to public safety." § 943.0435(11).

The DNA Statute requires any person who is convicted of certain crimes and is incarcerated or on supervisory release to submit two blood or tissue samples for DNA testing. § 943.325(1)(a). Results of the testing identifying the person are kept on file with the DLE and used by law enforcement for identification in subsequent crimes. The crimes that currently require DNA collection are sexual battery, lewdness and indecent exposure, murder, aggravated battery, burglary, carjacking, home invasion robbery, robbery, robbery by sudden snatching, aggravated child abuse, aggravated abuse of an elderly or disabled person, and any felony involving the use of a firearm. § 943.325(1)(b).²

Here, Appellants allege in their complaint that they are all Florida residents required by Florida law to register as sex offenders and all have their photographs and identifying information posted on Florida's sex offender website. Further, the complaint alleges that five of the Appellants have "been found by their respective trial courts not to be likely to reoffend." Eight were required to submit blood or tissue samples for DNA analysis. Appellants filed their case in the district court seeking relief from the registration requirements. They claimed that the state violated substantive due process by infringing their liberty interest in good reputation, their right to travel, privacy, employment, and freedom of religious association. Further, they claimed the acts are unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because they have greater post-release reporting burdens than other convicted felons. The Appellants also argued that the acts violated the separation of powers doctrine because they nullify judicial sentencing. Finally, they argued that the acts were an unconstitutional impairment of contract because they altered plea bargains made by sex offenders who were sentenced prior to their enactment.

On 15 December 2003, the district court dismissed all of Appellants' claims. The court held that no fundamental rights protected by the United States Constitution had been affected by the Sex Offender Act, therefore the court would only apply a rational basis test to the substantive due process claims. The court concluded that the Sex Offender Act was rationally related to a legitimate government end. Similarly, the court applied the rational basis test to the equal protection claims of impermissible treatment of those in the sex offender classification. The court again concluded that the Sex Offender Act's separate classification did not violate the Constitution. Further, the court dismissed Appellants' claims for separation of powers and impairment of contract, finding no violation of the constitutional provisions. Finally, the court found no constitutional error in Florida's DNA Statute and upheld its validity with little discussion.

II. DISCUSSION

The Appellants appeal arguing that the district court erred when it dismissed their complaint. We review this motion to dismiss order de novo and view all factual allegations in the complaint as true and in a light most favorable to the Appellants. See Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir.2004). In order to succeed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the Appellants must show, among other things, that there was a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. See Skinner v. City of Miami, 62 F.3d 344, 347-48 (11th Cir.1995). Here, they argue that the complaint states a sufficient § 1983 claim that the Sex Offender Act violates their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, travel and separation of powers, and that the DNA Statute violates their constitutional rights to separation of powers, due process and to be free of ex post facto legislation. We do not agree.

A. Sex Offender Act

1. Due Process Claims

The United States Constitution guarantees that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision has...