Doe v. Morgenthau

• Decision Date: 08 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 88 Civ. 9192 (VLB).,88 Civ. 9192 (VLB).
• Parties: John DOE, held as Harold Adams, Plaintiff, v. Robert MORGENTHAU, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

871 F. Supp. 605

John DOE, held as Harold Adams, Plaintiff, v. Robert MORGENTHAU, et al., Defendants.

No. 88 Civ. 9192 (VLB).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 15, 1994.

Order on Reconsideration November 8, 1994.

John Doe held as Harold Adams, pro se.

David Mudd, Marc Scholl, Asst. Dist. Attys., New York City, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

VINCENT L. BRODERICK, District Judge.

I

This case involves claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prosecutors and other public officials. Chief United States Magistrate Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald, by Report and Recommendation dated May 5, 1992, recommended that motions for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 filed by two defendants, John Moscow and Beth Jacob, be granted and the claims against them dismissed. By memorandum order of February 5, 1993, I approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation and granted the motions. Plaintiff was given leave to and has moved for reconsideration. Reconsideration is granted and the former decision adhered to.

Plaintiff has also objected to a denial by the Magistrate Judge on August 3, 1993 of plaintiff's request for a further extension of discovery cutoff date. The objection is overruled.

II

The background of this case is described in the Report and Recommendation of May 5, 1993, which I approved and adopted. Despite the multiplication of claims, arguments and legal theories, the underpinning of plaintiff's numerous claims is that he had medical problems while in prison which state officials minimized in arguing to various judicial tribunals. Plaintiff claims that in some instances he was unable to get to court for scheduled hearings; he asserts that such instances were deliberate despite absence of evidence to support that supposition.

A variant of the latter claim is that because he was moved out of the state he was denied access to the state courts. There is no authority suggesting that New York courts will not hear claims of New York prisoners merely because physically held outside the state, or that this happened to plaintiff. Plaintiff also relies on refusal to dismiss some of his claims at the pleading stage as a ground for insisting that summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 should also be denied.

It is clear that plaintiff could and did attend some of the hearings, could and did file papers, and was able to submit his views to the courts in both ways. There is no support for any contention that he was denied access to the courts. Rather he encountered delays of the types commonly experienced in litigation generally.

As found by the Magistrate Judge in her May 5, 1993 Report and Recommendation at 7, n. 8, the state officials arguing to various courts never had or claimed to have direct knowledge of plaintiff's medical condition. Counsel for an adversary are not required to agree with the opposing party's contentions upon pain of being held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And if testimony (including statements made under penalty of perjury such as affidavits) is given, it is protected by absolute immunity to avoid what would otherwise be a chilling effect upon judicial efforts to obtain underlying facts. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir.1993).

Plaintiff's claims of denial of access to the courts are contrary to his ability to communicate in writing, never controverted, in-person hearings held, and through documentary submissions. Transcripts attached to plaintiff's application for reconsideration at 15 and following illustrate that plaintiff (there called "Jones") could and did contradict the state officials' arguments in open court. Similarly, he had and has access to his medical records, as exemplified by page 22 and following of that application. If he could not get to court, he was free to and able to request further hearings on that ground, which he never claims were denied him.

In short, whenever plaintiff's contentions are unsuccessful, he appears to argue that this must have occurred because of actionable conduct on the part of the adversary. Each procedural initiative based on such a perception which fails can be cited as another instance of the same misconduct on the part of the adversary, thus generating an exponentially increasing number of claims and arguments.

III

Rulings of a United States Magistrate Judge in the course of supervising discovery can be overturned only if "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). Moreover, a Magistrate Judge with close involvement in day-to-day aspects of a case is in the best position to evaluate what discovery will be useful in arriving at a "just, speedy and inexpensive" determination of the action, to be sought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 and its 1993 amendment (which adds the term "administered" to the duty of the courts that the Rules be "construed" to seek that goal).

While plaintiff objects to virtually all rulings denying any of his discovery requests, only two points appear to require discussion.

Complaint is made that the state officials had consented to some items not ordered by the Magistrate Judge to be produced. The court is not required to employ its authority to require a party to do everything that party may be willing to do. The defendants are free to produce any documents they were willing to produce, and may well do so as a matter of promoting reliance upon their representations. Not all stipulations of the parties are, however, "so ordered," and the Magistrate Judge is not required to order such compliance if not considered necessary to the proper conduct of the litigation.

The bulk of plaintiff's objections are based on the assumption that everything relevant to his complaint should be produced even if such information would not overcome the deficiencies noted above or show that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to those claims that are still pending. In particular, exploring plaintiff's removal from New York would serve no purpose unless it can be shown that this prevented him from presenting claims to New York courts.

If there were threshold indications that it was necessary to bring plaintiff to New York during his stay elsewhere because a personal appearance was the only way to present a matter required to be determined in state court, and if a writ for that purpose were requested and thereafter denied without good reason, discovery to assist the court in determining whether or not this occurred might be called for. The mere existence of a claim in a complaint does not automatically require discovery concerning all aspects of that claim if the court has determined that a crucial issue which may be dispositive is pending, and if discovery adequate to permit just resolution of that issue is permitted. Such structured discovery is, indeed, specifically encouraged by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Public Law 101-650, 104 Stat 5091, enacting 28 U.S.C. § 473.¹

SO ORDERED.

MEMORANDUM ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

I

This case was brought by a prisoner alleging that thirty-two city and state officers, in their individual and official capacities, violated a variety of plaintiff's civil, statutory and constitutional rights in connection with his arrest on December 11, 1985 and subsequent detention. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief.

By orders which adopted the Reports and Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald dated June 27, 1990, January 9, 1991, May 5, 1992 and March 24, 1994, I dismissed all claims except those related to plaintiff's allegation that he was denied prompt medical treatment immediately after his arrest.¹

Plaintiff has moved for reconsideration of the dismissed claims. I adhere to the orders of dismissal: only the claim of denial of access to the courts of New York concerning plaintiff's extradition to Massachusetts merits further discussion. See Doe v. Morgenthau, 871 F.Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y.1994).

As to the delayed medical treatment claim, I direct the parties to make further submissions as outlined below.²

II

Plaintiff was indicted on October 17, 1984 for grand larceny in the second degree and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. On July 11, 1985 this indictment was succeeded by an indictment charging plaintiff and five other individuals with conspiracy in the fifth degree, grand larceny in the second degree, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, and scheme to defraud in the first degree.

Following the indictment of October 17, 1984, plaintiff, who had been released on bail, caused an imposter take his place at all scheduled court appearances. Upon discovering this fraud, the state moved to rearrest the plaintiff. On December 11, 1985, when detectives arrived at plaintiff's apartment, plaintiff kicked an air conditioning unit out of a window and, in an attempt to escape, suffered a fracture of the fourth metatarsal bone in his right foot. There is no evidence that the officers inflicted plaintiff's injury. Following his arrest, plaintiff refused to identify himself to police by any name other than John Doe, a position continued as reflected in the caption of this lawsuit. Fingerprint records revealed his identity as Harold Jones, also known as Harold Adams.

Medical treatment for the plaintiff was not provided until plaintiff's arraignment on December 12. Plaintiff was given medical treatment on December 12 at Rikers Island Health Services, and on December 13 at Bellevue Hospital, and was given further treatment on December 25, 1985; February 9, 1986; February 11, 1986; February 17, 1986; February 19, 1986; and February 21, 1986. From February 27, 1986 through March 6, 1987, plaintiff was seen at the Rikers Island Medical Clinic more than two hundred times, almost exclusively for the treatment of his foot.

While the New York charges...