Doe v. Pierce Cnty.
| Decision Date | 23 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 48378-5-II,48378-5-II |
| Citation | 433 P.3d 838,7 Wash.App.2d 157 |
| Parties | John DOE L; John Doe M; John Doe N; and John Doe O, as Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated; John Doe D; John Doe G, Respondents, v. PIERCE COUNTY, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Donna Zink, a Married Woman, Appellant/Cross-Respondent John Doe C, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
William Richard Michelman, Attorney at Law, 7512 Bridgeport Way W # B, Lakewood, WA, 98499-8377, Harry Williams IV, Law Office of Harry Williams LLC, 707 E Harrison St., Seattle, WA, 98102-5410, Amy Irene Muth, Law Office of Amy Muth, PLLC, 1111 3rd Ave. Ste. 2220, Seattle, WA, 98101-3213, Salvador Alejo Mungia II, Reuben Schutz, Gordon Thomas Honeywell, 1201 Pacific Ave. Ste. 2100, Tacoma, WA, 98402-4314, Vanessa Torres Hernandez, ACLU of Washington, 901 5th Ave. Ste. 630, Seattle, WA, 98164-2086, for Respondents.
Donna Zink (Appearing Pro Se), Po Box 263, Mesa, WA, 99343, for Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
Michael Lee Sommerfeld, Pierce County Prosecutors Office, Michelle Luna-Green, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney, 955 Tacoma Ave. S Ste. 301, Tacoma, WA, 98402-2160, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
¶ 1 This case arose from Donna Zink’s 2014 Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56 RCW, request for level 1, 2, and 3 sex offender records held by Pierce County. After being notified of Zink’s request, sex offenders John Doe D, John Doe G, and John Does L-O initiated three lawsuits, two of which were class actions, to enjoin various records’ release. The County also brought suit to enjoin the release of juvenile records in its possession, and Zink brought counterclaims against the County for PRA violations.
¶ 2 After consolidating the cases, the superior court granted the offenders’ motions for summary judgment and permanent injunctions and denied Zink’s cross motion. The superior court also granted the County’s motion for summary judgment of Zink’s counterclaims and entered a permanent injunction barring the County from releasing unredacted juvenile records.
¶ 3 Zink and the County both appeal. Zink argues that the superior court erred when it granted the offenders’ and the County’s summary judgment motions, certified the offenders’ lawsuits as class actions, and allowed the offenders to proceed under pseudonyms. The County cross appeals and argues that the superior court erred when it entered summary judgment and permanent injunctions in the offenders’ lawsuits.
¶ 4 We affirm the orders granting class certification in Does L-O’s and D’s lawsuits. We reverse and remand the order allowing Does L-O to proceed under pseudonyms, but we do not address whether Does G and D were correctly allowed to proceed under pseudonyms because this issue is moot as to them. We affirm the order granting summary judgment dismissal of Zink’s counterclaims and a permanent injunction in the County’s lawsuit. Finally, we affirm in part and reverse in part the orders granting the offenders’ motions for summary judgment and permanent injunctions in Does L-O’s and D’s lawsuits, reverse the order granting Doe G’s motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction, and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 5 In October 2014, Zink made a PRA request to the Pierce County Sheriff’s Department (PCSD), Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office (PCPO), or "any office or department of Pierce County"1 for all special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), RCW 9.94A.670, and special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA), RCW 13.40.162, evaluations, victim impact statements, registration forms for "all sex offenders registered in Pierce County," and a "[l]ist and/or database of all sex offenders registered in Pierce County." Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 252. The PCSD began notifying the approximately 3,000 registered offenders who were the subjects of the requested records.
¶ 6 Zink later made two more PRA requests. In her second and third requests, Zink sought "any and all" judgment and sentences related to convicted sex offenders. CP at 1131.
¶ 7 Zink’s requests spawned lawsuits from four sets of plaintiffs—a group of level 1 offenders, a group of level 2 and 3 offenders, one individual level 3 offender, and the County on behalf of PCSD—to bar requested records’ release, as set forth below.
¶ 8 Does L-O, who identified themselves as level 1 sex offenders who were compliant with registration, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all the compliant level 1 sex offenders who were the requested records’ subjects, including both juvenile and adult offenders. Does L-O made three exemption arguments. First, they argued that all requested records were exempt from disclosure under a portion of the "Community Protection Act" (CPA), former RCW 4.24.550 (2011), as an "other statute" exemption2 to the PRA. Second, they argued that SSOSA/SSODA evaluations were exempt from disclosure under the PRA’s exemption incorporating the Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA), ch. 70.02 RCW. Third, they argued that juvenile SSODA evaluations were exempt from disclosure under ch. 13.50 RCW, pertaining to juvenile records, as another "other statute" exemption.
¶ 9 Doe D, who identified himself as a level 3 sex offender who was compliant with registration residing in Pierce County, filed suit to enjoin the release of "all" registration records and SSOSA evaluations. Doe D later moved to certify his lawsuit as a class action, representing level 2 and 3 sex offenders. Doe D made two exemption arguments: first, that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an "other statute" exemption that barred disclosure of registration forms, and second, that the SSOSA evaluations were exempt under the PRA’s UHCIA exemption.
¶ 10 Doe G, who identified himself as a level 3 sex offender who was compliant with registration conditions, individually brought suit against Pierce County. He argued that first, his registration forms were exempt from disclosure under the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, as an "other statute" exemption. And he argued that second, his SSOSA evaluations were exempt from disclosure under the UHCIA as a PRA exemption.
¶ 11 Doe G later explained that although he was included in Doe D’s class of level 2 and 3 sex offenders, he was "differently situated" because he had participated in a SSOSA evaluation but did not receive a SSOSA sentence. CP at 1204. He did not file a SSOSA evaluation with the sentencing court, and Pierce County could not locate Doe G’s SSOSA evaluation.
¶ 12 Pierce County filed a lawsuit in which it made one exemption argument: that ch. 13.50 RCW, was an "other statute" exemption to the PRA. Thus, records other than the official juvenile court file, such as SSODA evaluations, held by PCSD, a juvenile justice or care agency, could not be released under the PRA.
¶ 13 Zink brought counterclaims alleging various PRA violations by "Pierce County" and sought dismissal of the County’s action. CP at 1074. Specifically, she claimed that the PCPO violated the PRA because it (1) refused to provide documents electronically, (2) assessed excessive fees without applying the PRA’s factors for determining costs, (3) failed to identify an exemption or provide an exemption log, and (4) improperly notified third parties. And she claimed that the PCSD violated the PRA because it (1) assessed excessive fees without applying the PRA’s factors for determining costs, (2) failed to identify an exemption or provide an exemption log, and (3) improperly notified third parties.
¶ 14 Does L-O, the level 1 offenders, and Doe D, a level 3 offender, moved to certify their respective lawsuits as class actions. Over Zink’s objections, both lawsuits were certified as class actions. Does L-O represented all compliant level 1 sex offenders named in registration forms, a registration database, and SSOSA or SSODA evaluations in the County’s possession. Doe D represented all level 2 or 3 sex offenders whose registration forms or whose "psychosexual" evaluations were in the County’s possession. CP at 3080.
¶ 15 All offenders moved to proceed under pseudonyms and were allowed to do so. In Does L-O’s lawsuit, the superior court entered an order, in which it found that "[f]orcing Plaintiffs to disclose their identities to bring this action would eviscerate their ability to seek relief" and that they had "demonstrated a significant risk of physical, mental, economic, and emotional harm if their identities are disclosed." CP at 980. Further, allowing Does L-O to proceed under pseudonyms would not affect the defendant and would affect only the public’s ability to ascertain Does L-O’s names, which had "little bearing on the public’s interest in the dispute or its resolution." CP at 980. Thus, the Does L-O’s "interest in proceeding anonymously outweighs the public interest in knowing their names." CP at 980.
¶ 16 In Doe D’s lawsuit, by the time Doe D sought a preliminary injunction, his identity had been disclosed. He clarified that he no longer sought permission to proceed under a pseudonym.
¶ 17 The superior court consolidated all four lawsuits.
¶ 18 Does L-O moved for summary judgment and a permanent injunction to bar the release of level 1 sex offenders’ registration records and SSOSA/SSODA evaluations. They made three PRA exemption arguments. First, they argued that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an "other statute" that barred release of their SSOSA/SSODA evaluations and registration records. Second, they argued that ch. 13.50 RCW was an "other statute" that exempted just their juvenile SSODA evaluations...
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