Doe v. Roe

• Citation: 20 A.3d 787,419 Md. 687
• Decision Date: 23 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 95 Sept. Term,2010.,95 Sept. Term
• Parties: James DOEv.Mary ROE.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

419 Md. 687

20 A.3d 787

James DOE

v.Mary ROE.

No. 95 Sept. Term

2010.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 23, 2011.

Joseph M. Creed (Timothy F. Maloney and Levi S. Zaslow of Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A., Greenbelt, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.Anton L. Iamele (Iamele & Iamele, LLP, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.HARRELL, J.

“[Jeremy] Bentham stated the case against retroactivity most succinctly when he likened it to ‘dog law.’ He was referring to the age-old method of training dogs by waiting until they do what they are to be forbidden to do, and then kicking them.” Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 41.02 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Sutherland]; see Jeremy Bentham, Truth versus Ashhurst, in 5 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 235 (1863) ( “They won't tell a man beforehand what it is he should not do—they won't so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it. What way, then, has any man of coming at this dog-law?”). This case presents the question of whether Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5–117—enacted in 2003 expressly to extend from three years to seven years the statute of limitations for civil ¹ claims stemming from alleged child sexual abuse—permits, at least under certain circumstances, a kicking of Bentham's dog, albeit in a procedural way.

James Doe challenges here the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Calvert County, the latter having reasoned that the Legislature intended § 5–117 to apply “partially retroactively” to sexual abuse claims filed against him that, as of the effective date of the extended limitations enactment, had not been barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period. We hold, for reasons to be explained more fully infra, that, assuming arguendo application of § 5–117 to the claims in the present case represents a retrospective application of the statute, § 5–117 is a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it may be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period as of the extended period's effective date, 1 October 2003.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Mary Roe ² (“Respondent” or “Roe”) was born on 29 September 1983. She reached the age of majority on 29 September 2001. See Maryland Code (1957, 2005 Repl.Vol.), Article 1, § 24 (“Except ... as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a person eighteen years of age or more is an adult for all purposes whatsoever....”). Roe alleges in her complaint in this litigation that James Doe (“Petitioner” or “Doe”), her grandfather, raped her on two separate occasions, the first of which occurred when Roe was either six or seven years of age, and the second incident when she was eight years of age.

At the time Roe reached the age of majority, the limitations period on the civil claims stemming from the alleged sexual assaults was governed by Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5–101, which provided that “[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues....” Chapter 360 of the Acts of 2003, effective 1 October 2003, however, added § 5–117 to the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, establishing the statute of limitations “for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor” as “7 years [from] the date that the victim attains the age of majority.” Section 2 of Chapter 360, which remains uncodified, provides that “[t]his Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.”

On 3 September 2008, Roe filed a five-count complaint against Doe, alleging (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) negligence. Doe responded with a “Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Hearing,” arguing that all of the claims were time-barred because Roe filed her complaint after 28 September 2004, one day shy of three years from the date on which Roe reached the age of majority. Doe asserted that the seven-year statute of limitations did not apply to Roe's claims against Doe, asserting that “[t]he [L]egislature made it clear that the new legislation was prospective only.”

The Circuit Court, on 22 January 2009, heard oral argument on Doe's motion to dismiss and Roe's opposition, and took the matter under advisement. On 3 February 2009, the Circuit Court issued a three-page memorandum opinion, holding that all of Roe's claims ³ were time-barred:

The language is clear that [§ 5–117] cannot be applied retroactively. If the [L]egislature intended for CJ § 5–117 to apply to those actions still viable as of October 1, 2003, it would have had to explicitly enact such language. “A statute is presumed to operate prospectively from its effective date, absent clear language to the contrary, or unless the manifest intention of the Legislature indicates otherwise.” Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 555 (2001). Here, there is no clear language to contradict the presumption that the statute is prospective or has selective retroactivity, as [Roe] contends. Even the legislative history of CJ § 5–117 indicates that the statute is not retroactive. Since the enactment of Chapter 360, the Maryland Legislature has introduced, and rejected, numerous attempts to make § 5–117 retroactive.

* * *

Because [Roe]'s cause of action accrued in 2001, before the 2003 enactment of Chapter 360, the “period of limitations applicable” to her claims is three years. Therefore, [Roe] had until September 28, 2004 to file a complaint, and, thus her complaint, filed September [3], 2008, is time-barred.[[[⁴

Alternatively, the Circuit Court held that even “[i]f the Court were to apply CJ § 5–117 retrospectively, [Doe]'s due process rights would be infringed because he has a vested right to be free from a suit where the statute of limitations has run.”

Roe noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. A panel of our appellate brethren reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, explaining that:

SECTION 2 [i.e., the uncodified section] manifests the legislative intent that Chapter 360 have some retroactive application. If Chapter 360 were intended to apply purely prospectively, then it would have sufficed to enact only SECTION 3. In that way, the ordinary rule would apply under which legislation is presumed to operate only prospectively. But, here, it cannot be concluded that Chapter 360 operates only prospectively because, to do so, would render SECTION 2 surplusage, in its entirety. That reading violates a cardinal rule of statutory construction.

SECTION 2, by its plain language, prohibits a construction of CJ § 5–117 that would effect a fully retroactive application that revived causes of action that were barred, prior to the enactment of Chapter 360, under the previously applicable law of limitations. Once again, if the Legislature intended, in addition, that CJ § 5–117 also bar causes of action on which limitations had not run, as of October 1, 2003, under the prior limitations law, then the Legislature did not say so. Further, if that were the legislative intent, it could have been accomplished simply by enacting SECTION 3 and omitting SECTION 2.

Defendant's position seems to be that the prior limitations law continues to govern claims that arose prior to October 1, 2003, and that CJ § 5–117 governs only claims that arose on or after October 1, 2003. But, that is not what SECTION 2 says. Defendant's reading would have SECTION 2 state, “That this Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred or becomes barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.” Adding words to a statute to affect the meaning manifested by the statute's plain language is unsound statutory construction.

Roe v. Doe, 193 Md.App. 558, 565, 998 A.2d 383, 387–88 (2010). Such a conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals explained, was consistent with § 5–117's legislative history and its pre-history. See Roe, 193 Md.App. at 566–69, 998 A.2d at 388–390. Finally, the intermediate appellate court held that:

[T]he General Assembly did not infringe any vested or substantial right of Defendant when it extended the period of limitations on claims of sexual abuse of minors and made that extension applicable to claims that were not barred, as of the effective date of the new legislation, by expiration of the prior limitations period.

Roe, 193 Md.App. at 579, 998 A.2d at 395.

Doe filed a timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, Doe v. Roe, 416 Md. 272, 6 A.3d 904 (2010), to consider whether “§ 5–117 [may] be properly applied retroactively to permit a claim that arose before the effective date of § 5–117, and which is barred by the prior statute of limitations.” ⁵

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As we explained in Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 747–48, 12 A.3d 153, 157 (2011):

In reviewing the Circuit Court's grant of a motion to dismiss, “our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss.” Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 618, 994 A.2d 411, 418 (2010) (quoting Debbas v. Nelson, 389 Md. 364, 372, 885 A.2d 802, 807 (2005)); see Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 351 Md. 66, 71, 716 A.2d 258, 261 (1998); Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 334, 983 A.2d 408, 418 (2009) (“We review the grant of a motion to dismiss as a question of law.”); Price v. Upper Chesapeake Health Ventures, Inc., 192 Md.App....