Menefee v. State

• Decision Date: 24 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 37,2010.,Sept. Term,37
• Citation: 12 A.3d 153,417 Md. 740
• Parties: John MENEFEE, et al.v.STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

417 Md. 740

12 A.3d 153

John MENEFEE, et al.

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 37

Sept. Term

2010.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 24, 2011.

Christopher T. Nace (Barry J. Nace and Jonathan B. Nace of Paulson & Nace, PLLC, Washington, D.C.), on brief, for appellants.Bradley J. Neitzel, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for appellee.Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.HARRELL, J.

This case presents the opportunity to reflect on the unique governmental relationship between the State of Maryland (the State) and the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).¹ John Menefee (“Menefee”), on his behalf and for his son, John Damien Menefee, appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County—dismissing the suit the Menefees filed against the State—which reasoned that the State was not a proper party to the civil suit for damages based on alleged tortious conduct by DHHS employees. Specifically, Menefee alleged that two employees of the Montgomery County DHHS and/or Child Protective Services (“CPS”) ² negligently failed to investigate Menefee's claims regarding abuse suffered by his son and the boy's mother, Sheila Menefee (divorced from Menefee), who was murdered ultimately in the presence of John Damien, by her boyfriend. It was this failure, the Menefees claim, that was the proximate and actual cause of John Damien's Posttraumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD),³ which developed assertedly as a result of direct child abuse by the boyfriend and witnessing his mother's murder.

We hold, for reasons to be explained more fully infra, that the State is a proper party to the present litigation, because: (1) pursuant to the State Government Article of the Maryland Code, in considering the Montgomery County DHHS as a “state unit,” and its employees as “state personnel,” the Legislature intended for the State to waive sovereign and governmental immunity, and assume liability for negligence arising from the administration of social service programming under Title 3, Subtitle 4 of the Human Services Article, see Maryland Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article, § 12–101(a)(7), (b); ⁴ and (2) the State funds and maintains a degree of oversight and control over the Montgomery County DHHS for providing state services to Montgomery County residents. See Md.Code (2007), Human Services Art., §§ 3–403, 3–405. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and remand to that court to consider the remaining, unaddressed arguments advanced by the State in its motion to dismiss.

FACTS ⁵ AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

As a result of earlier divorce proceedings, Menefee and Sheila Menefee (Sheila) shared joint legal and physical custody of their only child, John Damien. On 13 March 2004, Menefee met Sheila to exchange custody of John Damien and, while changing the boy's diaper, noticed bruises on the child's back and buttocks. He flagged down a police officer, who instructed him to take John Damien to Holy Cross Hospital.

Thereafter, CPS and/or DHHS were called. The agency determined that the bruising was several days old and, therefore, had been caused some time before Menefee picked up John Damien from Sheila. The case was referred ultimately to W. Don Thorne and LaVoyce Reed, a social worker, both employed by CPS.⁶ Apparently, Thorne and Reed concluded that no determination could be made as to the source of the abuse or what would be the most appropriate way to protect John Damien prospectively. Thorne allegedly directed Menefee and Sheila to participate in a parenting program and decided to leave the investigation open, in order to interview additional witnesses. Menefee contends that Thorne and Reed conducted no further investigation, in fact, and the case was deemed closed sometime between mid-March and mid-May 2004.

According to Menefee, he became aware at some point of the violent nature of Sheila's boyfriend, Ruben Diaz. Menefee apparently reported to CPS and/or DHHS on several occasions that he suspected Diaz to be the source of the physical and mental abuse suffered not only by John Damien, but Sheila as well, even telling CPS that Sheila told him that Diaz had cut her arm with a knife. Menefee reports that none of these claims were investigated or reported to other relevant authorities by CPS or DHHS.

On 6 September 2004, following an altercation which resulted in the grant of a temporary restraining order in favor of Sheila against Diaz, Diaz broke into Sheila's home and stabbed her to death. When the police arrived, they found John Damien—then two years of age—in the room with Diaz and his now-deceased mother. On 23 October 2007, the boy was diagnosed with PTSD,⁷ at the age of five.

Pursuant to State Government § 12–106, Menefee and John Damien, through counsel, submitted, on 25 August 2008, a written claim to Nancy K. Kopp, Maryland State Treasurer.⁸ On 22 September 2008, a claims adjuster from Treasurer Kopp's office notified the Menefees' counsel that, “ [s]ince your claim was not filed within the 1 year period, the claim may not be considered.” ⁹ Thereafter, on 4 March 2009, Menefee filed a four-count complaint against the State of Maryland in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.¹⁰ Generally, Menefee claimed that the State, through Thorne, Reed, and CPS/DHHS; failed to perform a reasonable investigation of the first incident of suspected abuse (the bruising of John Damien); failed to find that the abuse occurred while in the physical custody of Sheila; and failed to investigate and/or report each of Menefee's complaints subsequent to the initial investigation; and, that such failures were the proximate and actual cause of John Damien's PTSD.

On 20 April 2009, the State filed a “Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment,” claiming, among other things, that (1) “the State of Maryland is not a proper party to this action.” In its motion, the State relied first on language from Md.Code (2007), Human Servs. Art., § 3–402(a), which provides that, “[i]n Montgomery County, the Montgomery County Government shall administer State social service ... programs that in other counties are administered by a local department....” Further, the State relied on State Government § 12–103.2(b), which provides that “a tort claim ¹¹ shall be considered, defended, settled, and paid in the same manner as any other claim covered by the Montgomery County Self–Insurance Fund.” In response, Menefee argued that the State was a proper party to the litigation, considering that the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) includes expressly an “employee of a county who is assigned to a local department of social services, including a Montgomery County employee” in the definition of “state personnel.” See § 12–101(a)(7).

After hearing oral arguments, the Circuit Court granted the State's motion, explaining that “I think clearly the intent of the legislature was that in this particular instance, with this set of facts, that the proper party in this case would be Montgomery County, not the State of Maryland.” Menefee noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On our initiative, we issued a writ of certiorari, Menefee v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 38, 997 A.2d 789 (2010), before the intermediate appellate court decided the appeal. We consider here Appellants' question—which we have rephrased—whether the State of Maryland is a proper party to a suit alleging negligence and negligence per se stemming from the alleged acts (or lack thereof) of Montgomery County DHHS employees in administering social service programming under Title 3, Subtitle 4 of the Human Services Article.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the Circuit Court's grant of a motion to dismiss, “our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss.” Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 618, 994 A.2d 411, 418 (2010) (quoting Debbas v. Nelson, 389 Md. 364, 372, 885 A.2d 802, 807 (2005)); see Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 351 Md. 66, 71, 716 A.2d 258, 261 (1998); Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 334, 983 A.2d 408, 418 (2009) (“We review the grant of a motion to dismiss as a question of law.”); Price v. Upper Chesapeake Health Ventures, Inc., 192 Md.App. 695, 702, 995 A.2d 1054, 1058 (2010), cert. denied, 415 Md. 609, 4 A.3d 514 (2010).

ANALYSIS

I. What is Meant by a “Proper Party” Defendant?

It is well settled that “[t]he duty of this [C]ourt, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies....” Thom v. Cook, 113 Md. 85, 88, 77 A. 120, 120 (1910) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 133, 40 L.Ed. 293, 293 (1895)). Further, “[a] general principle of law is that for a court to have jurisdiction it must have before it a justiciable issue.” Harford County v. Schultz, 280 Md. 77, 80, 371 A.2d 428, 429 (1977). In Maryland, a case is justiciable “when there are interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded.” Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 288, 380 A.2d 12, 17 (1977) (quoting 1 W. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments 67 (2d ed.1951)) (emphasis added). It stands to reason, then, that a court is not presented with an “actual controversy,” and does not decide a “justiciable issue” when the named defendant is not a proper party in the action.

In other contexts, this Court has defined a “party” as “all persons who have a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit....” Ugast v. LaFontaine, 189 Md. 227, 232, 55 A.2d 705, 708 (1947). Further, in a tort action such as this, we think “[t]he defendant should be he ... who, by reason of the relation between...