Doe v. Roe
Decision Date | 23 May 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 95,95 |
Parties | JAMES DOE v. MARY ROE |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
James Doe v. Mary Roe, No. 95, September Term 2010
WHERE A STATUTORY PROVISION EXTENDING A LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF CLAIMS IS APPLIED TO CLAIMS NOT-YET BARRED BY THE PRE-EXISTING LIMITATIONS PERIOD AND THE STATUTE DOES NOT CREATE A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION, SUCH A STATUTORY PROVISION IS REMEDIAL AND/OR PROCEDURAL, SUCH THAT, ABSENT CLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO THE CONTRARY, THE EXTENDED LIMITATIONS PERIOD IS GIVEN FULL RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION.
Case No. 04-C-08-001062
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 41.02 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Sutherland]; see Jeremy Bentham, Truth versus Ashhurst, in 5 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 235 (1863) () . This case presents the question of whether Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-117 - enacted in 2003 expressly to extend from three years to seven years the statute of limitations for civil1 claims stemming from alleged child sexual abuse - permits, at least under certain circumstances, a kicking of Bentham's dog, albeit in a procedural way.
James Doe challenges here the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Calvert County, the latter having reasoned that the Legislature intended § 5-117 to apply "partially retroactively" to sexual abuse claims filed against him that, as of the effective date of the extended limitations enactment, had not been barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period. We hold, for reasons to be explained more fully infra, that, assuming arguendo application of § 5-117 to theclaims in the present case represents a retrospective application of the statute, § 5-117 is a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it may be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period as of the extended period's effective date, 1 October 2003.
Mary Roe2 ("Respondent" or "Roe") was born on 29 September 1983. She reached the age of majority on 29 September 2001. See Maryland Code (1957, 2005 Repl. Vol.), Article 1, § 24 (). Roe alleges in her complaint in this litigation that James Doe ("Petitioner" or "Doe"), her grandfather, raped her on two separate occasions, the first of which occurred when Roe was either six or seven years of age, and the second incident when she was eight years of age.
At the time Roe reached the age of majority, the limitations period on the civil claims stemming from the alleged sexual assaults was governed by Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-101, which provided that "[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues . . . ." Chapter 360 of the Acts of 2003, effective 1 October 2003, however, added § 5-117 to the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, establishing the statute of limitations "for damages arising out of analleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor" as "7 years [from] the date that the victim attains the age of majority." Section 2 of Chapter 360, which remains uncodified, provides that "[t]his Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003."
On 3 September 2008, Roe filed a five-count complaint against Doe, alleging (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) negligence. Doe responded with a "Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Hearing," arguing that all of the claims were time-barred because Roe filed her complaint after 28 September 2004, one day shy of three years from the date on which Roe reached the age of majority. Doe asserted that the seven-year statute of limitations did not apply to Roe's claims against Doe, asserting that "[t]he [L]egislature made it clear that the new legislation was prospective only."
The Circuit Court, on 22 January 2009, heard oral argument on Doe's motion to dismiss and Roe's opposition, and took the matter under advisement. On 3 February 2009, the Circuit Court issued a three-page memorandum opinion, holding that all of Roe's claims3 were time-barred:
Alternatively, the Circuit Court held that even "[i]f the Court were to apply CJ § 5-117 retrospectively, [Doe]'s due process rights would be infringed because he has a vested right to be free from a suit where the statute of limitations has run."
Roe noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. A panel of our appellate brethren reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, explaining that:
Roe v. Doe, 193 Md. App. 558, 565, 998 A.2d 386, 387-88 (2010). Such a conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals explained, was consistent with § 5-117's legislative history and its pre-history. See Roe, 193 Md. App. at 566-69, 998 A.2d at 388-390. Finally, the intermediate appellate court held that:
[T]he General Assembly did not infringe any vested or substantial right of Defendant when it extended the period of limitations on claims of sexual abuse of minors and made thatextension applicable to claims that were not barred, as of the effective date of the new legislation, by expiration of the prior limitations period.
Roe, 193 Md. App. at 579, 998 A.2d at 395.
Doe filed a timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, Doe v. Roe, 416 Md. 272, 6 A.3d 904 (2010), to consider whether "§ 5-117 [may] be properly applied retroactively to permit a claim that arose before the effective date of § 5-117, and which is barred by the prior statute of limitations."5
As we explained in Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 747-48, 12 A.3d 153, 157 (2011):
In reviewing the Circuit Court's grant of a motion to dismiss, "our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss." Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 618, 994 A.2d 411, 418 (2010) (quoting Debbas v....
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