Doe v. Sauer
| Decision Date | 14 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-4182,98-4182 |
| Citation | 186 F.3d 903 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 1999) JOHN DOE, AN IOWA STATE PRISONER, APPELLANT, v. WALTER SAUER, ET AL., APPELLEES. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
Martha M. McMinn, Sioux City, Iowa, argued, for appellant.
Jeffrey D. Farrell, Des Moines, Iowa, argued (Thomas J. Miller, on the brief), for appellee.
Before Hansen, Magill, Circuit Judges, and JONES,1 District Judge.
Plaintiff John Doe2 appeals from a final judgment entered by the district court3 granting the defendants, officials of the Iowa State Board of Parole (" parole board"), summary judgment on Doe's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. We affirm.
Doe was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in Iowa in 1991 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 25 years. Doe's conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court. The parole board first considered Doe for parole in 1992. Citing the seriousness of Doe's offense, the parole board denied Doe's request for parole. The parole board denied parole to Doe five additional times from 1993 to 1997, again citing the seriousness of Doe's offense as the reason for denial of parole. Beginning in 1993, the parole board recommended Doe enter a sexual offender treatment program (" SOTP") offered by the Iowa Department of Corrections. Doe testified in his deposition that he has refused to enter the SOTP because he refuses to admit guilt concerning any act of sexual abuse, including his offense of conviction. In order to successfully complete the SOTP, an inmate convicted of a sex offense must admit he has a sexual problem. Doe has never admitted that he is guilty of the sex offense for which he was convicted.
Doe alleges a prerequisite for successful completion of the SOTP is that an inmate admit guilt not only for the offense of conviction, but also for other acts of sexual abuse without any grant of immunity from prosecution for such admissions. Doe's contention is that the SOTP's asserted requirement that an offender admit offenses other than the offense of conviction violates his right against self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doe contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the parole board without affording him the opportunity for adequate discovery on the issue of whether completion of the SOTP is or is not a prerequisite for parole and on the issue of whether successful completion of the SOTP requires an inmate to admit guilt to offenses other than the offense of conviction.
The parole board contends no evidence exists in the record that it denied parole to Doe for any reason other than the seriousness of his crime. The denial letters sent to Doe from the parole board state "[i]n view of the seriousness of the crime for which you were convicted, the Board believes that a parole at this time would not be in the best interest of society." Beginning in 1993, the denial letters further state "[t]he Board would like to see your involvement during the coming year in recommended Sex Offender Treatment Program." Richard E. George, the Executive Director for the parole board, submitted an affidavit in support of the summary judgment motion. George explained acceptance of responsibility is an important step in inmate rehabilitation and Doe's participation in the recommended SOTP "would enhance his chance of being paroled, but is not a prerequisite of parole."
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the reason parole was denied to Doe. The district court concluded the record established that the parole board denied Doe parole because of the seriousness of his offense and not for any other reason, including refusal to participate in his rehabilitation or invoking his right against self-incrimination.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. See Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Although Doe contends he was denied parole for his refusal to participate in the SOTP, and not solely because of the seriousness of his offense, Doe has not offered any evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. Doe also alleges successful completion of the SOTP requires him to admit to sexual offenses other than the offense of conviction. There is no evidence in the record to support this allegation, other than Doe's conclusory statements. Doe contends that if he would have been given more time to conduct discovery, he would have been able to produce some evidence to support these allegations. Doe, however, did not ask the district court for additional time to conduct discovery.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court's determination that a claim is ripe for summary judgment and that no further discovery is needed. See Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (...
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