Hindman v. Transkrit Corp.

• Decision Date: 01 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-3491,97-3491
• Parties: 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 126, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,508 Keith HINDMAN, Appellant, v. TRANSKRIT CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 986

145 F.3d 986

77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 126,

74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,508

Keith HINDMAN, Appellant, v. TRANSKRIT CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 97-3491.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 17, 1998.

Decided June 1, 1998.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing Denied July 1, 1998.

Joe D. Byars, Jr., Fort Smith, AR, argued, for Appellant.

Charles W. Reynolds, Little Rock, AR, argued (Monte D. Estes, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, ¹ Chief Judge, LOKEN, Circuit Judge, and PRATT, ² District Judge.

PRATT, District Judge.

Keith Hindman appeals from a final judgment entered in the United States district court, granting summary judgment in favor of Transkrit Corporation, and thereby dismissing his claim that he was demoted in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994). Hindman argues that the district court erred in finding "no evidence from which to conclude that plaintiff was replaced by a younger worker." A review of the record persuades us that the district court erred on this issue. We therefore reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts reveal that on March 1, 1996, at age 52, Keith Hindman (hereinafter Hindman) was demoted ³ from his position as journeyman collator operator at Transkrit Corporation, a company which is in the business of manufacturing or printing multi-part business forms. ⁴ Hindman had worked at Transkrit's Fort Smith plant since the fall of 1984, worked as a journeyman collator operator for approximately eight years, and was the oldest worker holding his position at the time of his demotion. At all relevant times, Henry Eubanks (hereinafter Eubanks) was Hindman's direct foreman and Gunner Lewald (hereinafter Lewald) was the department manager for the collating department.

In his position as a journeyman collator operator, Hindman received performance reviews, at least annually. These reviews, written by Eubanks, demonstrate that in all areas, excluding productivity, Hindman was favorably reviewed. He worked safely, maintained a good attitude, produced good quality forms, was knowledgeable, and reliable. The reviews also demonstrate that from September 1986, while Hindman was still in the position of collator operator trainee, until the last review before his demotion, Eubanks consistently advised Hindman that his production rating needed to improve. ⁵ Despite this criticism, however, Hindman consistently received a regular raise, ⁶ and he was never punished for this low productivity rating.

In his resistance to Transkrit's motion for summary judgment, Hindman submitted additional evidence to support the ultimate issue of whether he was intentionally discriminated against based on his age. In his deposition, Hindman testified that between March and July of 1993, Eubanks regularly made age-derogatory statements to him. ⁷ Eubanks also periodically suggested that Hindman find work elsewhere, stating that he could not understand how at his age Hindman wanted to do the work he was currently doing. Hindman recalled two specific occasions where: (1) Eubanks suggested that he become a Wal-Mart greeter; and (2) Eubanks brought in a classified advertisement for a loan-officer position and stated "that would probably be a real good, easy job for you." ⁸ Hindman also testified by affidavit that in February 1996, after Hindman injured his ankle at home, Lewald commented "you are too old to be climbing around like that, you should let younger people do it." ⁹ Further, upon returning to work and saying to Eubanks that he hoped he would not need to have surgery, Eubanks responded, "at your age, I wouldn't do that." ¹⁰

The summary judgment record demonstrates that on or about February 23, 1996, precipitating Hindman's demotion, Lewald reviewed the operators' "L sheets" and "make-ready sheets," and discovered that Hindman had a zero-production ¹¹ day on the previous day. Lewald questioned Eubanks about this occurrence and Eubanks responded by sending a memorandum discussing two zero-production days and two "high spoilage" days which Hindman allegedly had in February 1996, and recommending that Hindman be demoted. As the circumstances surrounding the four days at issue are disputed, the court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to Hindman.

On February 1, 1996, Lewald instructed Hindman to re-work ¹² the front end crimp unit of a machine. This work took a great deal of time as Hindman had to search for many parts not existing on the machine, and thus Hindman did not have time to produce any forms during his shift. On February 22, 1996, Hindman came on after Dale Carter was half-way finished completing a changeover on a collator machine. Hindman finished the changeover and completed the make-ready for the job. He then ran a check pack ¹³ for the job and submitted it to Eubanks, with approximately four hours left on his shift. Hindman waited for approximately thirty minutes before Eubanks eventually declined approval, and instead instructed Hindman to "re-web the collator." ¹⁴ As a result, Hindman spent the rest of his shift doing what he considered to be an "unnecessary partial make-ready on the machine," ¹⁵ and again was unable to produce any forms. On February 24, 1996, Hollis Graham (a Trainer) put Hindman on machine number 2, a machine that had already been run during the previous shift, and directed him to complete the run. Hindman did not conduct a "check pack" on this machine prior to beginning production because it is "highly unusual for there to be defects since the prior run was acceptable." ¹⁶ Further, Hindman did not notice defects that occurred on the forms because he was working at the back of the machine. Finally, according to Hindman's affidavit, "the other spoilage ... was due to circumstances beyond my control. The fact of the matter is that we simply ran out of a part of the form which was necessary for completion." ¹⁷

Based on the memorandum from Eubanks, Lewald recommended to Dale Hixon that Hindman be demoted. Hindman was then demoted, effective March 1, 1996.

Subsequent to his demotion, no person was newly hired to replace Hindman. Hindman alleges, however, that he was effectively replaced by several younger workers already employed by Transkrit. In his affidavit, he testified that younger collator operators from other shifts stepped in to run machine number 4, the machine Hindman typically ran. He further testified that young trainees also operated machine number 4 after his demotion. Additionally, Hindman provided a list of individuals who worked on his shift, but who were not covering for someone on vacation or otherwise absent. This list contained specific names and dates. There is also deposition testimony by Hindman that "there were a number of people that replaced me ... some under thirty, some under forty." ¹⁸ For example, he named David Criswell, Tom Newman, and Shawn Hallum, and indicated that he believed each of these individuals to be under thirty. In his deposition, he also testified to the approximate number of times each named individual took over his duties.

Hindman initiated this suit against Transkrit in September of 1996, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. On July 30, 1997, the district court entered summary judgment against Hindman, finding that Hindman could not make out a prima facie case of age discrimination. Hindman appeals from this decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Hanenburg v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir.1997); Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 258 (8th Cir.1996). The court will find that summary judgment was properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. City of Columbia, Mo., 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1990); Woodsmith Publ'g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990).

This court has repeatedly cautioned that summary judgment should seldom be granted in the context of employment actions, as such actions are inherently fact based. See, e.g., Chock v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 113 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir.1997); Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262, 264 (8th Cir.1995); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is not appropriate unless all the evidence points one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party. See Hardin, 45 F.3d at 262; Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341.

III. DISCUSSION

The ADEA prohibits an employer from discharging "any individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA protects individuals who are at least forty years old. See 29 U.S.C. § 631.

To establish a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that he or she was intentionally discriminated against by the defendant, based on age. See Ziegler v. Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc., 133 F.3d 671, 675 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir.1995)); see also Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1996). To survive a summary judgment motion, in a case which is not based on direct evidence of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff must rely on the McDonnell Douglas three-stage order of proof and presumptions. ¹⁹ See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36...