Doe v. Sch. Bd. For Santa Rosa County

• Decision Date: 06 May 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:08cv361/MCR/EMT.
• Citation: 711 F.Supp.2d 1320
• Parties: Minor I DOE through parent Parent I DOE, and Minor II Doe through parent Parent II Doe, Plaintiffs,v.SCHOOL BOARD FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA; Tim Wyrosdick, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the School District of Santa Rosa County, Florida; H. Frank Lay, in his official capacity as Principal of Pace High School, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

711 F.Supp.2d 1320

Minor I DOE through parent Parent I DOE, and Minor II Doe through parent Parent II Doe, Plaintiffs,
v.
SCHOOL BOARD FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA; Tim Wyrosdick, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the School District of Santa Rosa County, Florida; H. Frank Lay, in his official capacity as Principal of Pace High School, Defendants.

Case No. 3:08cv361/MCR/EMT.

United States District Court,
N.D. Florida,
Pensacola Division.

May 6, 2010.

711 F.Supp.2d 1321

Benjamin James Stevenson, Benjamin Stevenson Esq., Pensacola, FL, Daniel Mach, Heather Weaver, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, DC, Glenn Michael Katon, ACLU of Florida, Orlando, FL, Maria Kayanan, Randall C. Marshall, ACLU of Florida, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.

John David Marsey, Robert Jacob Sniffen, Terry Joseph Harmon, Sniffen Law Firm PA, Matthew David Liebenhaut, Christopher Barkas, Carr Allison, Tallahassee, FL, Paul R. Green, Johnson Green & Miller PA, Milton, FL, for Defendants. ORDERM. CASEY RODGERS, District Judge.

By sua sponte order of this court, the parties have submitted memoranda of law regarding this court's continued jurisdiction over a mutually agreed consent decree (doc. 94). Based on prior repeated briefing on this issue by would-be intervenor

711 F.Supp.2d 1322

Christian Educators Association International (“CEAI”) this court deems it necessary to articulate the court's jurisdictional basis for continued enforcement jurisdiction over the consent decree.¹ The court has also considered CEAI's previously submitted legal arguments on this issue. This ruling is intended to memorialize the basis for the court's conclusion that it retains ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over the consent decree, a final order, pursuant to the parties' negotiated agreement.
Background

The court entered a jointly proposed consent decree in this case on May 6, 2009, resolving admitted Establishment Clause violations within the School District of Santa Rosa County, Florida, and retaining enforcement jurisdiction for a period of at least five years (doc. 94). The clerk's final judgment issued on May 11, 2009, and no appeal was taken. The consent decree expressly provides that if the school district fails to perform or otherwise violates the consent decree, each plaintiff or any affected student-present or future-may seek to enforce the consent decree by contacting the plaintiffs' counsel, who may then move the court for enforcement action if deemed appropriate. (Doc. 94, at 9.)

Following entry of the final consent decree, CEAI moved to intervene for the purpose of vacating the consent decree first and foremost, and alternatively, seeking a modification on grounds that the consent decree infringed on CEAI's members' constitutional rights and required them to infringe on the students' free exercise of religion and free speech rights. Shortly after CEAI filed its pleading in intervention, the court granted a motion to strike several affirmative defenses in the pleading that sought to vacate the entire consent decree, concluding that CEAI lacked standing to undo the final judgment between the parties.² (Doc. 190.) The court permitted CEAI to attempt to demonstrate it had standing to intervene for the purpose of seeking to modify the decree to avoid infringing on its members' constitutional rights. The court ultimately denied the motion to intervene, finding that CEAI lacked associational standing and the motion to intervene was untimely.³ CEAI has appealed the court's order denying intervention to the Eleventh Circuit, where it is currently pending.

Plaintiffs then filed a bill of costs and motion for attorneys' fees against CEAI in connection with the post-judgment intervention proceedings. In opposition, CEAI argued that neither fees nor costs were reasonably incurred by plaintiffs in resisting CEAI's motion to intervene because the dispute may be moot due to the possibility that the named plaintiffs had graduated from the school district at the end of May 2009, before the motion to intervene was filed.⁴ (Doc. 252.) The court denied

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plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, finding CEAI had intervened in good faith and had not been responsible for the violation of the plaintiffs' civil rights. (Doc. 256.) CEAI then moved for limited discovery on the question of whether the plaintiffs lack standing to obtain costs due to mootness, arguing again that if the plaintiffs have graduated from high school, they have no continued interest in this litigation or the consent decree; CEAI intends to challenge the bill of costs as unreasonably incurred on the basis of such discovery. (Doc. 259.) In light of CEAI's repeated assertion of a mootness problem with the consent decree and with this court's continued enforcement jurisdiction, the court deems it prudent to file this separate order articulating the court's reasoning.
Discussion

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). A court must evaluate its own jurisdiction over a pending dispute as “the first principle of federal jurisdiction.” Stillman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 911, 914 (11th Cir.1996) (internal marks omitted). “Standing ‘is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’ ” CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). Additionally, “[a] moot case is nonjusticiable and Article III courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it.” Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach County, Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir.2004). Article...