Allen v. Sch. Bd. For Santa Rosa County
| Decision Date | 21 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:10cv00142/MCR/CJK. |
| Citation | 782 F.Supp.2d 1304,271 Ed. Law Rep. 185 |
| Parties | Mary E. ALLEN, et al., Plaintiffs,v.SCHOOL BOARD FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Anita Leigh Staver, Mathew D. Staver, Liberty Counsel, Maitland, FL, Horatio G. Mihet, Liberty Counsel, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiffs.Michael Patrick Spellman, Robert Jacob Sniffen, Todd David Engelhardt, Sniffen & Spellman PA, Tallahassee, FL, Paul R. Green, Johnson Green & Miller PA, Milton, FL, Benjamin James Stevenson, Benjamin Stevenson Esq., Pensacola, FL, Glenn Michael Katon, ACLU of Florida, Tampa, FL, Maria Kayanan, Randall C. Marshall, ACLU of Florida, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
In this lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, twenty-four individuals, including teachers and staff of the Santa Rosa County School District (“School District”), current and former students, parents, and community clergy members allege constitutional violations against the defendants as a result of a consent decree entered into by the School Board to address longstanding and widespread Establishment Clause violations in the school district, and implementing school policies.1 The plaintiffs seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as well as damages. 2 Currently pending before the court is plaintiffs' renewed motion for preliminary injunctive relief 3 (doc. 66), which the defendants oppose (docs. 28, 79, 83), and defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6) (docs. 22, 23, 56, 64), which plaintiffs oppose (docs. 35, 63, 82). Plaintiffs each filed a declaration in support of their motion for preliminary injunction, setting forth their claims, and asserting generally that their First Amendment rights are being violated and chilled every day by the consent decree and the School Board's implementation of related school policies.4 In response, the defendants have challenged plaintiffs' standing on the grounds that plaintiffs cannot show an injury because the speech and conduct that are the focus of the plaintiffs' complaints either are not in fact restricted or are properly restricted under the consent decree and Constitutional principles and thus cause no redressable injury. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). They also seek dismissal on grounds that plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The court, having carefully considered the motions and the arguments of the parties,5 now denies the motions to dismiss and grants the motion for a hearing on the preliminary injunction.
On May 6, 2009, in a prior lawsuit, the School Board, superintendent, and principal of Pace High School voluntarily admitted liability for claims of widespread Establishment Clause violations in the School District and entered into a consent decree with certain unnamed student plaintiffs in an effort to craft a remedy and avoid further litigation expenses.6 The consent decree was “designed to ensure that the School District's practices do not violate, either currently or in the future, the First Amendment rights of students in the School District.” 7 (Doc. 1–1.) It generally states that school officials are prohibited from promoting or engaging in prayer in their official capacity at a school event, attending a baccalaureate service in their official capacity, or advancing their personal religious beliefs to students during school events.8 Also, the consent decree explicitly provides that conduct not expressly prohibited “is permitted as authorized by law.” (Doc. 1–1.)
On July 1, 2009, after final judgment had been entered in the Doe litigation, an organization known as Christian Educators' Association International (“CEAI”), sought to intervene in the case. The court denied intervention on the grounds that CEAI lacked associational standing,9 because the claims asserted were speculative and also because the motion to intervene was untimely.10See Minor I Doe v. School Board for Santa Rosa County, Fla., 264 F.R.D. 670 (N.D.Fla.2010) (appeal pending). The court acknowledged that questions of overbreadth and vagueness could be cured through a case-by-case analysis and that employees could institute a separate lawsuit to assert specific violations of their individual rights. Id. at 687 n. 31 & 691 n. 37. The court also rejected CEAI's argument that the consent decree was moot due to subsequent events, concluding that, because the consent decree was filed on May 6, 2009, final judgment was entered on May 11, 2009, and no appeal was taken, it had become a final judgment prior to the named plaintiffs' graduation at the end of May 2009. See Minor I Doe v. School Board for Santa Rosa County, Fla., 711 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1328–29 & n. 9 (N.D.Fla.2010); Minor I Doe v. School Board for Santa Rosa County, Fla., 711 F.Supp.2d 1320 (N.D.Fla.2010).
Throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the School District offered training regarding its interpretation of the consent decree and developed policies to implement it.11 The plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit in May 2010, seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the consent decree and related policies. Their complaint consists of 312 separate paragraphs, 241 of which contain factual allegations in support of their claims that the consent decree and school policies violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal protection, and religion. The plaintiffs' factual assertions in support of these claims are many and varied.12 Teachers Gayle Lindsey, Vicki Kirsch, Jessica Barnes, Denise Gibson, Robert Metty, Deandrea Dawson, Martha Gough, Kace Browning, Sheila Bozeman, Rebekah Nolan, Nancy Lay, and Mittie Waller are employed in schools throughout the School District, and employee Michelle Winkler is a clerical assistant for the School Board. They generally assert that the consent decree combined with the School Board's policies, including some specific verbal threats of discipline, violate their constitutional rights by forcing them to engage in self-censorship of their own religious speech and conduct during school and school events and to engage in hostile censorship of others. Specifically, there are allegations that school officials threatened Plaintiff Metty with discipline if he wore school colors or sat next to other teachers at a private baccalaureate service, and the other plaintiff teachers now fear discipline for their personal participation in baccalaureate services. Allegations also include fear of keeping personal religious items on top of their desks; using common phrases or religious messages in communications on school grounds or in school email; discussing matters of religion with parents and students; and praying and engaging in Bible study with colleagues or students at school during noninstructional time due to school policies or inconsistencies between school policies and the consent decree. The plaintiffs complain that they are prohibited from leading and speaking at after-school student religious clubs; participating with students in prayers at after-school club meetings and at a community “See You at the Pole” event; and identifying themselves as followers of Christ on the School District's teacher web page.
Former students Mary Allen, Chaz Riley, H. H., and Falyn Martin; as well as current students H.J.H. and S.M.H., claim that the School Board has infringed on or threatened their constitutional rights by prohibiting their religious speech at graduation; censoring the phrase “God Bless” out of a letter to the student body from the student body president; restricting their speech in the lunchroom and other noninstructional time; and not permitting a student to act as a student prayer leader though voluntarily selected to that position by classmates. Additionally, they assert their rights are violated because they can no longer engage in religious discussions with teachers and that student religious clubs are prohibited from inviting regular outside guest speakers or having teacher supervisors.
Parent plaintiffs Mary Beckham and Philip Moon complain that the Pace High School Band Boosters' member policy is overly broad and restricts their free speech rights. Parent plaintiff Kristan Harley complains that the consent decree and School Board's policies have hindered her communications with her children's teachers. Additionally, two community clergy members, Joseph Rogers and James Waters, assert that their constitutional rights are being violated because the consent decree and School District policies infringe on the manner in which they conduct private baccalaureate services and prevent clergy from organizing and regularly attending after-school religious activities for students held on campus while school facilities are available to other private groups.
Because “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), a complaint must be dismissed if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Standing is a “ ‘threshold jurisdictional question’ ” that must be addressed and satisfied at each stage of the litigation.13See Fla. Family Policy Council v. Freeman, 561 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199,1204 (11th Cir.2006)); see also Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Ch. at the Univ. of Fla. v. Machen, 586 F.3d 908, 915 (11th Cir.2009). Article III of the United States Constitution permits the court to hear only “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The doctrine of standing identifies whether a dispute is a case or controversy that can be “appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”...
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