Doe v. Senechal
| Citation | 845 N.E.2d 418,66 Mass. App. Ct. 68 |
| Decision Date | 12 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-P-776.,04-P-776. |
| Parties | Jane DOE v. Jeffrey SENECHAL & others.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Leonard H. Kesten, Boston (Jocelyn M. Sedney with him) for the plaintiff.
John P. Ryan, Boston (Harry A. Pierce with him) for Robert Johnston & others.
Present: PERRETTA, SMITH, & BERRY, JJ.
In November of 1997, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Westlake Academy (Westlake); Health & Education Services, Inc. (HES); and Jeffrey Senechal.2 The plaintiff alleged that while she was civilly committed to Westlake, a facility located in North Grafton, Senechal, a supervisor there, sexually abused her and as a result, she became pregnant. At the time, HES owned Westlake and operated it under a contract with the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (DMH). The plaintiff asserted claims against Senechal for assault and battery, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. As to Westlake, the plaintiff alleged claims of negligence; negligent security; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Against HES, the plaintiff also alleged claims of negligence, negligent security, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In December of 1998, the plaintiff amended her complaint by adding Robert Johnston, Donald Mosher, and Ed Hovestadt as defendants,3 asserting negligence; negligent hiring, supervision and training; and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against each of them. In her amended complaint, the plaintiff also added claims for violations of her State and Federal civil rights as to all of the defendants.4
In April of 2000, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment. The motion was allowed as to all State and Federal civil rights claims against all of the defendants, the negligence claim against Senechal, and the claim of negligent hiring as to Johnston.
Before the jury trial commenced, the plaintiff stipulated that all of her claims against HES and Westlake were to be dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiff also stipulated that all of her negligent hiring claims against any and all remaining defendants were to be dismissed with prejudice. She also stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of her claim of assault and battery by Senechal, as well as the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress as to Johnston, Mosher, and Hovestadt. Furthermore, the plaintiff agreed orally on the first day of trial to dismiss her claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the latter three defendants, apparently reasoning that the same damages were recoverable on the other negligence claims against them. Also on the first day of trial, the judge allowed the plaintiff's unopposed motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence, by alleging that after June 23, Johnston, Mosher, and Hovestadt were negligent in failing to investigate the plaintiff's claims of abuse. After the defendants rested, the judge, over a timely defense objection asserting prejudice, allowed the plaintiff's oral motion to add back to her complaint the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress against Johnston and Mosher that she had waived on the first day of trial.
A jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiff against all of the defendants. According to the docket entries, the jury ordered Senechal to pay the plaintiff $1,250,000, Hovestadt to pay the plaintiff $750,000, and Johnston and Mosher to pay her $250,000.
The defendants (Senechal excepted) filed a motion for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Johnston and Mosher also filed a motion to amend the final judgment to clarify the nature and extent of the plaintiff's recovery against Senechal and Hovestadt. The plaintiff likewise filed a motion to amend the judgment, which was denied without a hearing. After a hearing, a Superior Court judge, who was the trial judge, denied the motion for a new trial, denied Hovestadt's motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict, and allowed Johnston and Mosher's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The judge also ordered that the final judgment be amended as follows: the plaintiff was to recover from Senechal the sum of $500,000 plus interest, and recover from Senechal and Hovestadt the amount of $750,000, plus interest.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that there was error in (1) allowing Mosher and Johnston's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (2) denying the plaintiff's motion and allowing the defendants' motion to amend the judgment, and (3) granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Hovestadt cross-appeals, claiming that the judge committed error in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and his motion for a new trial.
Facts. We recite the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We reserve certain facts for discussion in regard to particular issues.
Born in 1977, the plaintiff became mentally ill from long-term sexual abuse by several male family members. As a result, she became a ward of the State of Maine, which agreed to pay for her treatment until she reached the age of eighteen. By virtue of an interstate compact, she came under the care of DMH. At the age of sixteen, she was civilly committed to Westlake, a secure, intensive residential treatment center for mentally ill adolescents with a maximum capacity of thirteen residents. Teenagers admitted to the program were involuntarily committed for psychiatric treatment under civil commitment laws. HES, a private nonprofit company, operated Westlake under its contract with DMH from 1985 until 1995.
At the time of the alleged sexual misconduct by Senechal, the plaintiff was seventeen years old and was considered to be a "mentally ill adolescent," defined in 104 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.14(5) (1993) as "an adolescent whose mental illness is characterized by a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, but should not include alcoholism."
While at Westlake, the plaintiff manifested her mental problems by behaving in sexually provocative ways, especially toward males. That conduct was well known by Westlake's supervisors. To reduce her exposure to exploitive situations, she was not to be alone with a male staff member at any time.5 In fact, one of the reasons the plaintiff was confined to a locked facility was her inability to behave in an appropriate, safe and nonsexual manner toward males.
In May of 1995, as the plaintiff's eighteenth birthday approached (a date that would mark the termination by Maine of its funding of her commitment to Westlake), it was decided that she would leave Westlake on June 23 to spend a couple of months in a program in Maine, close to her mother's home. In advance of the plaintiff's transfer, Maine authorities requested that the plaintiff be allowed to spend some weekends with her mother in Maine. Westlake agreed to the request, and at the time of the first weekend visit, the plaintiff's mother drove from Maine and brought the plaintiff home for a weekend. At the end of that weekend, however, the mother, after bringing the plaintiff back to Westlake, informed the supervisors that she would be unable to drive the plaintiff to Maine in the future. As a result, it was decided that the plaintiff would take a bus from South Station in Boston to Portland, Maine, with Westlake assuming the responsibility of transporting the plaintiff to and from South Station.
Although Westlake's in-house regulations prohibited male staff members from transporting female residents alone, Hovestadt permitted Senechal to transport the plaintiff from Westlake to South Station by himself.6 The permission was granted even though Senechal had informed shift supervisors that the plaintiff was behaving in a sexually provocative manner toward him.
Senechal drove the plaintiff to South Station on June 9. He also drove her to South Station June 16 and back to Westlake on June 18. Senechal had sexual relations with the plaintiff on each occasion during the transports.
On June 23, the plaintiff was to leave Westlake for the program in Maine. On that date she gave a staff member a sealed envelope addressed to Senechal, together with a shirt. She asked the staff member to give the items to Senechal but not to open the letter. After the plaintiff left Westlake on June 23, the staff member opened and read the letter. It described sexual acts, including intercourse, that the plaintiff had engaged in with Senechal, and indicated an intention to see him again.
On June 26, Johnston, HES's director of residential services, was informed of the contents of the letter. On that date, a staff member reported the matter to the Department of Social Services, which refused to investigate in view of allegedly unfounded accusations the plaintiff had made in the past.
In July, the plaintiff discovered she was pregnant. When she called Senechal to inform him of her condition, he told her not to call him again. The plaintiff's mother called Westlake and confronted Senechal with the plaintiff's statement that he was the father of her child. Senechal denied it and suggested that another person not connected with Westlake was probably the father.
Mosher reported the matter to DMH which, in the course of its investigation, interviewed the plaintiff and Senechal. Senechal continued to deny the plaintiff's claim, and the investigator suggested that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of Senechal would supply the answer to the plaintiff's claim.
At the time of the investigator's report, Senechal was working at a different facility...
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