Doe v. Thurston Cnty.
| Decision Date | 20 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 48000-0-II,48000-0-II |
| Citation | 399 P.3d 1195,199 Wash.App. 280 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | John DOE P; John Doe Q; John Doe R; and John Doe S, as individuals and on behalf of others similarly situated, Respondents, v. THURSTON COUNTY, a municipal organization, and its departments the Thurston County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thurston County Sheriff, Respondents, Donna Zink, a married woman, Appellant. |
Donna Zink (Appearing Pro Se), P.O. Box 263, Mesa, WA, 99343, for Appellant.
John C. Skinder, Thurston County Superior Court, 2000 Lakeridge Dr. S.W., Olympia, WA, 98502-6045, Elizabeth Petrich, Attorney at Law, 2000 Lakeridge Dr. S.W., Bldg. 2, Olympia, WA, 98502-6001, Salvador Alejo Mungia II, Gordon Thomas Honeywell, P.O. Box 1157, Tacoma, WA, 98401-1157, Reuben Schutz, Gordon Thomas Honeywell, 1201 Pacific Ave., Ste. 2100, Tacoma, WA, 98402-4314, Vanessa Torres Hernandez, ACLU of Washington, 901 5th Ave., Ste. 630, Seattle, WA, 98164-2086, Prachi Vipinchandra Dave Esq., Attorney at Law, 901 5th Ave., Ste. 630, Seattle, WA, 98164-2086, for Respondents.
Johanson, J.¶1 In response to Donna Zink's Public Records Act1 (PRA) request, the John Does, four level I sex offenders, filed a class action lawsuit against Thurston County (the County). The John Does successfully enjoined the disclosure of unredacted level I sex offender records, including, as relevant to this appeal, special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) and special sex offender disposition alternative2 (SSODA) evaluations. Zink appeals the trial court's orders granting permission to proceed under pseudonym, certifying the class, and granting summary judgment in the John Does' favor. We hold that the trial court properly granted the John Does' summary judgment motion and enjoined the release of the unredacted evaluations. We further hold that Zink waived her arguments regarding the trial court's orders allowing the plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms and class certification when Zink failed to appear and object.
¶2 Zink also sought the release of sex offender registration records. We agree with the parties that the trial court erred when it enjoined the registration records' release under former RCW 4.24.550 (2011) in light of John Doe A. v. Wash. State Patrol (WSP ), 185 Wash.2d 363, 385, 374 P.3d 63 (2016). Thus, we hold that the registration records must be released. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's orders granting summary judgment and enjoining the unredacted evaluations' release, certifying the class action, and allowing the plaintiffs to proceed as John Does.
FACTS
¶3 In October 2014, under the PRA, Zink requested the following records from the County: all SSOSA and SSODA evaluations and victim impact statements for sex offenders prosecuted in Thurston County, registration forms of sex offenders registered in Thurston County, and a list or database of all sex offenders registered in Thurston County.3 The County responded that it was required to "provide third party notification to all of the registered sex offenders in our county" and that the first installment of records would be ready in March 2015. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 159. In December 2014, the County notified 723 sex offenders of Zink's request for SSOSA and SSODA evaluations and other information.
¶4 In January 2015, the John Does filed a class action complaint, which listed Zink as a party. They sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the County from disclosing all level I sex offender registration records4 and all SSOSA and SSODA evaluations. The John Does did not object to the victim impact statements' disclosure. The John Does identified themselves as Thurston County residents who had each been convicted of a sex offense, completed treatment, and had either registered as a sex offender or been excused from registration.
¶5 In January, the John Does moved for class certification, permission to proceed under pseudonyms, and a preliminary injunction preventing the release of the evaluations and registration records. The County did not challenge class certification or the use of pseudonyms, although the County opposed the preliminary injunction. Zink did not respond to the motions.5
CP at 92. The trial court explained that because there was no reason to place the John Does' names on the record, no portion of the record was sealed, and it was unnecessary to analyze the Ishikawa7 factors.
¶8 In June, the John Does moved for summary judgment on their request for a permanent injunction.8 The John Does first contended that the registration information was exempt from disclosure under public notification provisions of the "Community Protection Act" (CPA), former RCW 4.24.550, incorporated into the PRA as an "other statute."9 Second, the SSOSA and SSODA evaluations were exempt under the PRA's Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA), ch. 70.02 RCW, exemption. And third, the SSODA evaluations were exempt under the juvenile records statute, ch. 13.50 RCW, another "other statute" incorporated by the PRA. The John Does argued that they met the PRA's requirements for a permanent injunction because the records pertained to them and to the class and were exempt from production and because disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably harm the class.
¶9 In support of their argument that disclosure would irreparably harm the class and would not be in the public's interest, the John Does submitted their own declarations and those of attorneys and sex offender treatment and prevention organizations. These declarations explained the intimate details contained in the evaluations, including broad descriptions of an offender's sexual partners, activities, and preferences; the offender's mental health, personal life, and background; and any uncharged offenses.
Multiple declarations explained that the disclosure of the evaluations would hamper treatment and harm public safety because offenders would refuse to participate or fully respond to questions.
¶10 The County opposed the John Does' summary judgment motion and argued that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was not an "other statute" under the PRA and did not exempt the disclosure of level I sex offender registration information. Further, the County contended that the SSOSA and SSODA evaluations did not fit within the PRA's UHCIA exemption and that the SSODA evaluations could be redacted and released under the juvenile records statute, ch. 13.50 RCW.
¶11 Zink opposed the John Does' summary judgment motion. In particular, Zink claimed that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was not an "other statute" exemption, that the records were conviction records subject to dissemination under the Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act (CRPA), ch. 10.97 RCW, that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, RCW 9.94A.475, required the evaluations' release, and that the SSODA evaluations were juvenile records open to public inspection under ch. 13.50 RCW. Additionally, Zink contended that the John Does had not shown that they would suffer actual and substantial harm from disclosure or that the public had no interest in the requested records. In support of her summary judgment opposition, Zink submitted a variety of documents related to sex offenders,10 including several news articles about sex offenders, some of whom had received SSOSAs and one of whom had violated his SSOSA by failing to report.
¶12 Noting that the material facts were undisputed and that the questions to be resolved were solely questions of law, the trial court granted the John Does' summary judgment motion and request for a permanent injunction that enjoined the County from releasing unredacted records. The trial court found that the Does' "uncontested" declarations attested to substantial and irreparable harm that would result from unredacted disclosure and that "the record establishe[d] that unredacted disclosure would not be in the public interest." CP at 670. And the trial court determined that the records at issue fell within the PRA's UHCIA exemption and "other statute" exemption, incorporating the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, and the juvenile records statute, ch. 13.50 RCW. Thu...
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