Doe v. Tobi Simone
| Decision Date | 17 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-5825 |
| Parties | JANE DOE Plaintiffs, v. TOBI SIMONE Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez
Now here before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Tobi Simone [Doc.No.10]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for default judgment will be granted in part.
On September 11, 2012, the Plaintiff, Jane Doe filed a Complaint alleging five separate causes of action for relief against the Defendant, Tobi Simone. Among these, Plaintiff has brought suit for (i) Defamation; (ii) Invasion of Privacy/ Intrusion Upon Solitude, Harassment and Stalking; (iii) Infliction of Emotional Distress; (iv) Assault; and (v) Battery. The Defendant is Plaintiff's estranged husband, who lived in Voorhees, New Jersey at the time of the Complaint in this action.
Plaintiff's Complaint outlines allegations of a history of abuse and physical violence committed by the Defendant. According to Plaintiff, the Defendant began verbally abusing her sometime in 2003, and soon thereafter began physically battering her. The Defendant is said to have kicked, punched, and slapped the Plaintiff on numerous occasions between 2003 and 2011. Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges that, between 2003 and 2012, the Defendant verbally abused her, accusing her of adultery,calling her names, and by making threats of death and serious bodily harm against her person.
In the years preceding this action the Defendant, both by phone and in person, contacted a variety of third parties associated with the plaintiff to either accuse them of having sexual relations with the Plaintiff, or to (falsely) inform them of her sexual behavior. These third party recipients included the Plaintiff's friends, co-workers, acquaintances, neighbors, and family members. Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleges that in 2011, the Defendant gained access to and stole private contact information and messages from her phone. The Defendant then used this information to contact the Plaintiff as well as other third parties with whom she was associated. Specifically, the information was used to continue contacting the Plaintiff's friends and associates to accuse her of infidelity and sexually promiscuous behavior.
The Plaintiff claims that she has suffered significantly as a result of the Defendant's conduct. She has suffered mental anguish, disruption to her existing relationships with others, humiliation, severe emotional distress, fear for the safety of both her and her children, as well as out-of-pocket expenses.1
The Defendant was personally served with copies of the Summons and Complaint at his place of employment in Ardmore, Pennsylvania on October 4, 2012. The Defendant failed to file a response or in any way litigate the present action. On January 14, 2013 the Plaintiff requested that the Clerk of the Court enter default against the Defendant. Following the Clerk's entry of default, on February 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed her instant motion for default judgment as to the Defendant, Tobi Simone.
Prior to the court's issuance of a default judgment against a defendant, the Clerk of the Court must make an entry of the defendant's default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); See also Heard v. Caruso, 351 Fed. Appx. 1, 15-16 (6th Cir. 2009). The entry of a default is primarily a matter of judicial discretion, and the Third Circuit has "repeatedly state[d] [its] preference that cases be disposed of on the merits whenever practicable." Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see also Super 8 Motels, Inc. v. Kumar, No. 06-5231, 2008 WL 878426 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) authorizes courts to enter a default judgment against "a properly served defendant who fails to plead or otherwise defend an action." La. Counseling and Family Servs. v. Makrygialos, LLC., 543 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Anchorage Assoc. v. Virgin Is. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 177 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1990) ().
A party is not entitled to the entry of a judgment of default as of right, because the entry of such a judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the district court. Hritz, 732 F.2d at 1180. Furthermore, defendants are deemed to have admitted the factual allegations of the Complaint by virtue of their default, except those factual allegations related to the amount of damages. See 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688, at 58-59 (3d ed. 1998 and Supp. 2013). Similarly, courts must accept the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not accept the plaintiff's factual allegations regarding damages as true.Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court need not accept Plaintiff's legal conclusions, because "[e]ven after default . . . it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law." Id. § 2688, at 63. See also DirecTV v. Decroce, 332 F. Supp. 2d 715, 717 (D.N.J. 2004).
Before entering a judgment of default, a court must consider: (1) whether there would be prejudice to the plaintiff if no default judgment was entered; and (2) whether a meritorious defense has been asserted by the defendant, and (3) whether the defendant's own culpable conduct caused his delay in responding to the Complaint. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). In considering these factors, a court must apply a standard of liberality so that any doubt is resolved in favor of hearing claims on their merits. Medunic v. Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1976)
In the absence of sufficient evidentiary support, the Court may order or permit the plaintiff to provide additional evidence to support his or her allegations, See, e.g., Rose Containerline, Inc. v. Omega Shipping Co., Inc., Civil No. 10-4345, 2011 WL 1564637, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2011) (); Bridges Fin. Group, Inc. v. Beech Hill Co., Inc., Civil No. 09-2686, 2011 WL 1485435, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011) (). The Court may also conduct hearings to ascertain the amount of damages owed to the plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
However, the Court is not required to conduct such hearings "as long as it ensures that there is a basis for the damages specified in the default judgment." Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc.-Pension Fund v. Caliber Auto Transfer, Inc., Civil No. 08-2782, 2009 WL 3584358, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2009) (quoting Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)). For example, courts have held that hearings are unnecessary where "detailed affidavits and documentary evidence" have been submitted to support the plaintiff's claim for damages. See Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, 13 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the damages are for a "sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, a further evidentiary inquiry is not necessary and a district court may enter final judgment." Bds. of Trs. Of the Operating Eng'rs Local 825 Welfare Fund v. Robert Silagy Landscaping, Inc., Civil No. 06-1795, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82475, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2006).
In the present case, the Court first addresses whether it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, and whether service effectuated on the Defendant was properly executed. The Court then addresses the other relevant factors in disposition for default judgment.
Turning first to the issue of personal jurisdiction, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant was served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint outside of NewJersey at his place of business in East Ardmore, Pennsylvania. (Mot. for Default ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that at the time that this action was instituted, the Defendant was still residing in New Jersey. However, the record also indicates that the Defendant moved to Pennsylvania sometime between the filing of the Complaint, and the time that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment was received by the court. The concern is that the Defendant, having changed his state of domicile, may have done so prior to his being served with the summons and Complaint.2 The record simply does not show when the Defendant moved, or if he was still a resident of New Jersey at the time of service. Given that the Defendant was served outside the State of New Jersey and may not have been a resident of the state at the time of service, the Court must consider whether or not hailing the Defendant into the Court's jurisdiction comports with the notions of substantial justice and fair play that are determinative of issues regarding personal jurisdiction. Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 701 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, (1945). The record is somewhat unclear as to when exactly the Defendant originally became a resident of New Jersey, or as noted, when he left the state. However, it is clear from the record that at least as early as 2004, the Plaintiff and the Defendant shared a home in New Jersey while also renting an apartment in New York. While a defendant who leaves the state in which he is domiciled is not physically present in that state, he isnot...
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