Doe v. Trumbull County Children Services Bd.

• Decision Date: 24 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1359,85-1359
• Parties: , 28 O.B.R. 225 DOE, a Minor, Appellee, et al., v. TRUMBULL COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 128

28 Ohio St.3d 128

502 N.E.2d 605, 28 O.B.R. 225

DOE, a Minor, Appellee, et al., v. TRUMBULL COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD, Appellant.

No. 85-1359.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 24, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A subsequent change in the controlling case law in an unrelated proceeding does not constitute grounds for obtaining relief from final judgment under Civ.R. 60(B).

2. A party may not use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a substitute for a timely appeal.

This appeal arises as a result of the filing of a complaint on behalf of appellee, Jane Doe, ¹ a minor residing in Warren, Ohio, by her father and next friend against appellant, Trumbull County Children Services Board (hereinafter "board"). The complaint, which sought damages totaling $5,000,000, alleged that while Jane Doe was in the temporary custody of the board she became pregnant, due to the board's negligent supervision, and subsequently gave birth.

In April 1983, the trial court sustained the board's motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the trial court reasoned that the doctrine of governmental immunity operated as a bar to the allegations contained within the complaint. No appeal was taken from this judgment.

On November 17, 1983, appellee filed a motion for relief from judgment in the court of common pleas claiming that, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), relief should be afforded on the basis of this court's abrogation of governmental immunity. See, e.g., Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228, decided July 20, 1983. Finding appellee's motion not well-taken, it was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the abrogation of governmental immunity constituted a change in the law upon which a Rule 60(B) motion for vacation of judgment would lie.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Harshman, Waldman & Gervelis and Mark S. Gervelis, Youngstown, for appellee.

Pfau, Pfau & Pfau, William E. Pfau, Jr., Youngstown, Richards, Ambrosy & Fredericka, James A. Fredericka, Warren, and Craig H. Neuman, Youngstown, for appellant.

WRIGHT, Justice.

Appellant maintains the court of appeals erred by concluding that Civ.R. 60(B) authorizes relief from final judgment when a rule of law, upon which the trial court predicated its holding, is subsequently overruled, revised or modified in an unrelated proceeding. Conversely, appellee argues the rule allows for relief from final judgment where a post-judgment decisional change in the law occurs and the motion for relief from judgment is made within a reasonable time. For the reasons that follow, this court holds that a subsequent change in the controlling case law in an unrelated proceeding does not constitute grounds for obtaining relief from final judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) and, further, that a party may not use the motion as a substitute for a timely appeal.

Civ R. 60(B) provides:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

"The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules."

The application of Civ.R. 60(B) was discussed in GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 , wherein it was stated at paragraph two of the syllabus:

"To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken."

It is appellee's position that a subsequent change in the controlling case law constitutes grounds for a Rule 60(B) motion, in spite of the fact that the judgment from which relief is being sought has become final. ² Thus, according to appellee, once the time for appeal in the subject cause elapsed, ³ she could nevertheless utilize Rule 60(B) as an avenue to further pursue her claim based upon a subsequent change in the law brought about pursuant to a successful appeal by others in an unrelated case. An examination of various authorities demonstrates that appellee's argument, while imaginative, is not novel and must be rejected.

For instance, although a pre-Civil Rules case, an argument similar to that advanced by appellee was rejected in State, ex rel. Sylvania Home Tel. Co., v. Richards (1916), 94 Ohio St. 287, 114 N.E. 263, wherein the court stated at 295:

"It must be kept in mind that in each case the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked to adjudicate the rights of the parties in that particular controversy; and when a judgment has been rendered in due course by a court of final jurisdiction the parties should not be left in doubt as to its finality or be led to speculate on the possibility that a different court in a controversy between different parties may afterwards differently decide the legal questions involved. It frequently happens that a court of last resort overrules a reported decision formerly made by it, but no one would contend that the overruling operated to open afresh the controversy disposed of in the overruled case."

It is beyond debate that the principle recognized in Richards continues to retain vitality under Civ.R. 60(B). Thus, in Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Moraski (D.Mont.1981), 519 F.Supp. 643, the court reasoned at 647:

"Defendants['] view of the controlling case law is erroneous. There is simply no question that a change in the decisional law is not grounds for vacating a final judgment entered on the merits. As stated in 7 Moore's Federal Practice, Para. 60.26 at 325: 'It should be noted while [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 60(b)(5) authorizes relief from a judgment on the ground that the prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, it does not authorize relief from a judgment on the ground that the law applied by the court in making its adjudication has been subsequently overruled or declared erroneous in another unrelated proceeding.' " (Emphasis added.)

Accord Ackermann v. United States (1950), 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207; Parks v U.S. Life & Credit Corp. (C.A. 11, 1982), 677 F.2d 838; NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works (C.A. 2, 1982), 681 F.2d 130, 147; Carter v. Romines (C.A. 8, 1979), 593 F.2d 823; Marshall v. Bd. of Edn. (C.A. 3, 1978), 575 F.2d 417; De Filippis v. United States (C.A. 7, 1977), 567 F.2d 341; Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27 (C.A. 1, 1972), 453 F.2d 645; Burnside v. Eastern Airlines (C.A. 5, 1975), 519 F.2d 1127; Annat v. Beard (C.A. 5, 1960), 277 F.2d 554; Collins v. Wichita (C.A. 10, 1958), 254 F.2d 837; Title v. United States (C.A. 9, 1959), 263 F.2d 28; Berryhill v. United States (C.A. 6, 1952), 199 F.2d 217; Loucke v. United States (S.D.N.Y.1957), 21 F.R.D. 305; Schmidt v. Schubert (E.D.Wis.1978), 79 F.R.D. 128; Creedon v. Smith (E.D.Ohio 1948), 8 F.R.D. 162.

The rationale which compels the rejection of appellee's argument is clear--that being the strong interest in the finality of judgments. To hold otherwise would enable any unsuccessful...