Doe v. University Of Mississippi, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-138-DPJ-FKB

• Decision Date: 16 January 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-138-DPJ-FKB
• Parties: Andrew DOE, Plaintiff v. The UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

361 F.Supp.3d 597

Andrew DOE, Plaintiff

v.The UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-138-DPJ-FKB

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division.

Signed January 16, 2019

J. Lawson Hester, Michelle Tolle High, Pettis, Barfield & Hester, PA, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff.

J. Cal Mayo, Jr., John Andrew Mauldin, Paul B. Watkins, Jr., Mayo Mallette PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Defendants.

ORDER

Daniel P. Jordan III, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendants in this sex-discrimination case ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Andrew Doe's Second Amended Complaint in its entirety. As detailed below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [33] is granted in part but otherwise denied.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This case centers around a December 2, 2016 sexual encounter between Plaintiff Andrew Doe and Bethany Roe, both undergraduate students at the University of Mississippi. While both participants were intoxicated at the time, Doe and Roe agree that they had sexual intercourse on December 2. Doe maintains that the encounter was consensual, but Roe's friends called law enforcement and reported the incident as a sexual assault. Roe underwent an examination at the hospital that evening. A representative of the University's Title IX Office appeared at the hospital and opened a Title IX investigation into the incident.

Defendant Honey Ussery, the University's Title IX Coordinator, conducted the Title IX investigation and submitted a report to Defendant Tracy Murry, the Director of the University's Office of Conflict Resolution and Student Conduct. Murry notified Doe of the charges and scheduled a disciplinary hearing before a panel of the University Judicial Council.

The Judicial Council held a hearing on March 31, 2017, and found Doe responsible. As punishment, the Judicial Council expelled Doe from the University. Doe appealed, and on April 27, 2017, the Appellate Consideration Board upheld the finding that Doe was responsible but changed the sanction levied from expulsion to suspension until fall 2020.

On March 5, 2018, Doe filed this lawsuit alleging discrimination claims under Title IX, due-process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state-law claim for breach of contract. He filed an Amended Complaint on April 4, 2018, and a Second Amended Complaint on May 16, 2018, to add new defendants. The Second Amended Complaint [9] asserts claims against the State of Mississippi; the University of Mississippi; the State Institutions of Higher Learning ("IHL"); the Board of Trustees of the IHL; the Commissioner and all members of the Board of Trustees of the IHL in their official capacities; Jeffrey S. Vitter, in his official capacity as the Chancellor of the University of Mississippi; and Murry and Ussery, in their official and individual capacities. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), and the matters raised have been fully briefed.¹

II. Standards

Defendants raise Eleventh Amendment immunity as to some claims, thus questioning the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). United States v. Tex. Tech. Univ. , 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999). "The party seeking relief [in federal court] bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction." Sawyer v. Wright , 471 F. App'x 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2012). "Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of Doe's pleading under Rule 12(b)(6). When considering a motion under that rule, the "court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ " Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit , 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger , 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ). But "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations and footnote omitted).

Generally, in considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter , 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). An exception to this rule exists for documents that "are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to h[is] claim." Id. at 499. Likewise, the Court may consider public records. Davis v. Bayless , 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).

In this case, Defendants have attached a number of documents to support their motion to dismiss. And, in his response, Doe incorporated additional documents he had previously filed to support his motion for preliminary injunction. The documents the parties submitted include various publications from the United States Department of Education, Ussery's investigative report, a transcript of the hearing, and other documents generated as part of the University's handling of the Title IX complaint against Doe. Some of these documents would be proper for the jurisdictional issues only. Others can be considered under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In sum, the Court concludes that it can rule on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting it under Rule 12(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.").

III. Analysis

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

"The Eleventh Amendment grants a state immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States and by its own citizens ...." Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. , 535 U.S. 613, 616, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002) (citation omitted). Immunity also extends to state agencies that are considered "arms of the state." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). And "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office." Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars Doe's § 1983 and breach-of-contract claims against the State, the University, IHL, the IHL Board Members and Commissioner, the Chancellor, and Murry and Ussery in their official capacities.

1. Section 1983 Claims

Starting with the § 1983 claims, Doe clarifies that he is not seeking monetary damages on those claims from the State or arms of the State. Instead, he says he "is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against these Defendants with respect to the Constitutional claims." Pl.'s Mem. [50] at 13. But "[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state entity, as opposed to a state official, regardless of whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought." Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry , 799 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1986). Because Doe offers no specific defense of his § 1983 claims against the State, the University, IHL, or the Board of Trustees of the IHL, Defendants' motion is granted as to those claims.

As to the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the individual defendants named in their official capacities, Doe invokes the Ex parte Young doctrine. 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). In Ex parte Young , the Supreme Court "created an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims for prospective relief against state officials who have been sued in their official capacities." Nelson v. Univ. of Tex. at Dall. , 535 F.3d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 2008). For a state officer to face liability under Ex parte Young , that officer must have "some connection" to the requested relief. Morris v. Livingston , 739 F.3d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2014). Thus, a defendant who "is not in a position to provide the requested relief" is not a proper party under the Ex parte Young doctrine. Fairley v. Stalder , 294 F. App'x 805, 812 (5th Cir. 2008).

Defendants seem to acknowledge that Doe's "requests for expungement, sealing [of his records,] and re-enrollment" qualify as appropriate prospective relief under Ex parte Young. Defs.' Mem. [34] at 7; see Nelson , 535 F.3d at 324 ("[A] request for reinstatement is sufficient to bring a claim within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as it is a claim for prospective relief designed to end a continuing violation of federal law."). But Defendants say "the only state official with any connection to such claim for relief is the Chancellor of the University." Defs.' Mem. [34] at 7; see Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Worker's Compensation , 851 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 2017) ("Thus, the Ex parte Young analysis turns on the complaint's context—including the challenged state law and defendants—to determine whether ‘the state officer, by virtue of his office, has some connection with the enforcement of the act.’ " (quoting Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441 ) ).

Doe responds by noting that he has alleged "the...