DOE V. WEISS
| Decision Date | 01 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-1071,NO. CIV-08-1287-1,09-1071,CIV-08-1287-1 |
| Citation | 2010 Ark. 150 |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOHN, JANE, & JUNIOR DOE, APPELLANTS, v. RICHARD WEISS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION, APPELLEE |
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
AFFIRMED
Appellants, John, Jane, andJunior Doe, appeal the order ofthe Benton County Circuit Court dismissing their complaint against appellee Richard Weiss, in his capacity as Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, after they failed to amend their complaint with their real names as the parties in interest. The Does argue on appeal that the circuit court erred by not allowing them to proceed anonymously by the use of pseudonyms. We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the appellants to proceed anonymously and dismissing their complaint.
The relevant facts are these. Jane Doe went to an Arkansas Revenue Office in Benton County to renew her driver's license. During the renewal process, an employee of therevenue office asked her to present evidence of her lawful immigration status. Jane Doe could not comply as she and her family are undocumented aliens. Therefore, the employee of the revenue office denied the renewal of her driver's license pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-16-1105(a)(1)(D) (Repl. 2008).
The Does sought to file an action to recover Jane Doe's driver's license and to prevent the eventual driver's license forfeiture of her husband, John Doe, and others similarly situated, and the eventual driver's license denial to their son, Junior Doe. However, because of their status as undocumented aliens, they did not wish to reveal their identities. Therefore, on May 23, 2008, under the pseudonyms ofJane, John, and Junior Doe, they filed a petition in the Benton County Circuit Court, challenging the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-16-1105(a)(1), which requires, among other things, proof of an individual's social security number and lawful immigration status before issuing a driver's license or identification card to that person. The Does amended the petition and filed it as an amended complaint on June 17, 2008.
Weiss moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that it should be dismissed pursuant to 12(b)(6) of the Arkansas Rules ofCivil Procedure because they failed to prosecute the action in the name of the real parties in interest as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 17(a) and failed to include their names in the pleadings as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 10(a). The Does filed a second amended complaint, and Weiss responded again with a motion to dismiss on the same basis.
On May 11, 2009, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and ruled from the bench that it denied the Does request to proceed anonymously and that the Does had thirty days to amend their complaint to name themselves as the real parties in interest. However, the Does failed to do so, and the circuit court entered an order of dismissal on July 10, 2009. The Does filed a timely notice of appeal and now argue that the circuit court erred by not allowing them to proceed anonymously.
When reviewing a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Biedenharn v. Thicksten, 361 Ark. 438, 206 S.W.3d 837 (2005). In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts should be liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor. See id. Our rules require fact pleading, and a complaint must state facts, not mere conclusions, in order to entitle the pleader to relief. See id. Our standard of review for the granting of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. See Arkansas Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Oil Producers of Arkansas, 2009 Ark. 297, _ S.W.3d_. Furthermore, an abuse-of-discretion standard has been applied by the federal courts when reviewing a decision on whether to allow a party to use a pseudonym. See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979).
While this court has never directly addressed the issue of permitting parties to proceed anonymously, the federal courts provide us with some guidance. Parties have been allowedto preserve their anonymity in judicial proceedings "in special circumstances when the party's need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public's interest in knowing the party's identity." Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). However, as stated by the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, there is Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
When evaluating the need for anonymity, the federal courts have considered the following factors: (1) whether the request for anonymity is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is for the protection of information of the utmost intimacy and to preserve privacy in a sensitive and highly personal matter, see Jacobson, supra; Southern Methodist University Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979); (2) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party by allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously, see Jacobson, supra; Southern Methodist, supra; (3) the risk and severity of any retaliatory harm, see Jacobson, supra; Stegall, supra; Southern Methodist, supra; (4) the vulnerability to such retaliation of the party seeking anonymity, including their age, seeJacobson, supra; Stegall, supra, or other status, see, e.g., U.S. v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1981) (...
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