Doerr v. Easter Seal of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 99-2858 (JBS) (D. N.J. 3/28/2000)
| Decision Date | 28 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 99-2858 (JBS) |
| Parties | FRED DOERR, Plaintiff, v. EASTER SEAL OF NEW JERSEY, TAMMY NORRIS, ALLISON RECCA-RYAN, WILLIAM WALLER, NATIONAL EASTER SEAL SOCIETY, INC., and JAMES E. WILLIAMS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Mr. Fred Doerr, Woodlynne, NJ for Plaintiff pro se.
Luanne M. Peterpaul, Esquire, Peterpaul, Clark, Corcoran & Costello, P.C., Springfield, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants Easter Seal of New Jersey, Tammy
Norris, Allison Recca-Ryan, William Waller and James E. Williams, Robert K. Neiman, Esquire (Pro Hac Vice), Lori A. Goldstein, Esquire (Pro Hac Vice), Holleb & Coff, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Defendants, National Easter Seal Society, Inc. National Easter Seal Society, Inc. & James E. Williams.
This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ.P., and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ.P.. In the underlying suit, plaintiff Fred Doerr, appearing pro se, alleges that defendants National Easter Seal Society, Inc. ("National"), James E. Williams, Jr. ("Williams"), Easter Seal of New Jersey ("ESNJ"), Tammy Norris ("Norris"), Alison Recca-Ryan "Recca-Ryan") and William Waller engaged in discriminatory conduct in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., when they refused to accredit him as an official foster care program participant.
Defendants National and Williams seek dismissal on the ground that Mr. Doerr did not file an administrative EEOC claim against them, nor did the filed claim make any reference to them nor charge them with actionable conduct, so that Mr. Doerr has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against them prior to filing suit, contrary to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1) & 12117.
All defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that this action was not timely filed within the 90-day period following Mr. Doerr's receipt of a right to sue letter from the EEOC, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) & 12117, so that this action would be time-barred.
All defendants seek dismissal on the additional ground that Mr. Doerr's complaint fails to state a claim under Title I' of the Americans with Disabilities Act based on the absence of any prospective or actual employment relationship between Mr. Doerr and these defendants.
For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the motion of defendants National and Williams to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to have filed an EEOC complaint, and will deny the motion of the remaining defendants to dismiss this case for untimely filing, and will deny the remaining defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion regarding lack of employment relationship, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate motion for summary judgment on this or other issues at the conclusion of discovery.
On April 1, 1998, the plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that ESNJ discriminated against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. when it denied his participation in its Therapeutic Foster Care/Shelter Care Program as a foster parent.1 Plaintiff claims that defendants ESNJ, Norris, Recca-Ryan and Waller participated in a scheme to deny his application for certification because he is disabled. In response, the EEOC mailed a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on March 10, 1999. (See Def.'s Mot. Ex. B.) The EEOC dismissed the case and notified plaintiff of his right to sue within ninety days of receipt of the notice, citing that "[n]o employer-employee relationship" existed between the charged entity (ESNJ) and the plaintiff.
Plaintiff brought suit by filing papers with this Court on June 18, 1999,2 alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. The plaintiff added defendants National and Williams to those defendants named or mentioned in his grievance with the EEOC. As relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $2 million.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants support their motion on three grounds. First, National and Williams assert that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") naming National and Williams as "charged defendants." (See Def.'s Reply Br. at 1-2.) Second, all defendants assert that the plaintiff did not comply with the ADA requirement that he timely file his complaint within ninety days of his receipt of the right to sue notice from the EEOC as required by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 12117. (Id. at 2.) Third, all defendants assert that the complaint is deficient because in it plaintiff does not allege, and cannot in good faith allege, that he enjoyed a prospective or actual employment relationship with the defendants. (Id.)
Defendants ESNJ, Norris, Recca-Ryan and Waller join in grounds two and three. Specifically, these defendants assert that the plaintiff has not timely filed his complaint and that he cannot allege a prospective or actual employment relationship between ESNJ, Waller, Norris, Recca-Ryan and himself. (See Def.'s Mot. at 2-3).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not attack the merits of the case, but merely tests the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the reviewing court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 876 F. Supp. 625, 628-29 (D.N.J. 1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995). In considering the motion, a district court must also accept as true any and all reasonable inferences derived from those facts. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1994); Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991); Glenside West Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 761 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J. 1991). A court may not dismiss the Complaint "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
The question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether he can prove any set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However, while the rules do not dictate that a "claimant set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that the pleadings give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n. 3 (1984) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
In considering a motion to dismiss, courts ordinarily consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178 (1194). However, a court may also consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Lit., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196.
Defendants National and Williams first move to dismiss the complaint as against them by asserting that the plaintiff, by failing to name National and Williams in his charge of discrimination with the EEOC, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Act. (See Def.'s Reply Br. at 1-2.)
A party alleging discrimination in the workplace under the ADA must follow the same administrative procedures set forth in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117; Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J. 1994). Although compliance with the filing period requirement is not jurisdictional, see Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982), a plaintiff seeking to file a lawsuit should completely exhaust his or her administrative remedies against a particular defendant prior to filing. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1977); Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 424.
As a general rule, a party who is not named in an EEOC charge cannot be sued in a Title VII or ADA action. See Ditzel v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 962 F. Supp. 595, 602 (D.N.J. 1997). See also Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1991); Secrest v. Burns. Intern. Sec. Servs., 926 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D. Wisc. 1996); Lane v. David P. Jacobson & Co., Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Va. 1995); Dreisbach v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 593, 595-96 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In recognizing that the purposes of the exhaustion requirement are to give notice to the charged party and provide an avenue for voluntary compliance without resort to litigation, the Third Circuit requires a district court to make an exception to the general rule in appropriate circumstances. See Glus, 562 F.2d at 888.
In Glus, the Third Circuit held that a district court should...
To continue reading
Request your trial