Dokes v. Safeway, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:15-cv-01157-TLN-DB,2:15-cv-01157-TLN-DB |
| Parties | DAVID DOKES, Plaintiff, v. SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment, or alternatively partial summary judgment, by Defendant Safeway, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Defendant"), which argues there is no genuine dispute as to material facts of the essential elements of each of Plaintiff David Dokes's ("Plaintiff") claims for relief, and as a matter of law, judgment should be entered for Defendant. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motion.1 (ECF No. 25.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 23.) The Court has carefully considered the arguments raised by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 11.)
The following facts are undisputed.2 Plaintiff Dokes, a member of United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (hereinafter "UFCW Local 8"), was employed by Defendant Safeway as the backup night crew manager in Safeway Store Number 1895-12 in Fair Oaks, California (hereinafter "the subject store"). (ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 1, 13.)
On June 29, 2014, then-employee Kevin Fairchild (hereinafter "Fairchild") was working after his normal shift had ended and was working under Plaintiff's supervision in the subject store. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 2.) At approximately 3:00 a.m., Fairchild gave a case of beer in the subject store to an individual named Fernando, who was known to both Plaintiff and Fairchild. (ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 3, 5.) Fairchild took twenty dollars from Fernando and made change at the register, but did not charge Fernando for the case of beer. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff observed Fairchild giving Fernando the case of beer, observed Fernando leaving the subject store with the beer without Fernando having paid for it, and Plaintiff did not intervene. (ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 6, 19.) Plaintiff's actions in allowing Fernando to obtain a case of beer after hours without paying for it was a violation of both store policy and state law. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 7.)
Safeway Loss Prevention Manager Tyler Patrick prepared a report of the incident and emailed it to Safeway District Manager John Cain. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 9.) After reviewing the report that Patrick prepared, Cain concluded that both Plaintiff and Fairchild committed and/or participated in violations of store policy, including employee theft and illegal sale of alcohol, and that both Fairchild and Plaintiff had not been truthful about the incident. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 9.) As a result, Cain made the decision to terminate the employment of both Plaintiff and Fairchild. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 10.) At the time that Cain made the decision to terminate both Plaintiff's and Fairchild'semployment, Cain had no knowledge of either employee's race and had no information or reason to believe that Plaintiff had been forced to participate in illegal activity. (ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 11-12.)
Plaintiff's union contract, which was between UFCW Local 8 and Defendant, was in effect when Plaintiff's employment was terminated in July 2014. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 14.) Under the union contract, the employer had the right to discharge any employee for just cause and if the discharged employee believed that he or she had been unjustly discharged, the employee had the right to appeal to the employer through the union within ten days of termination. (ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 14, 16.) Cain based his decision to terminate Plaintiff on just cause for purposes of the union contract. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 15.) Plaintiff filed a grievance through his union concerning his termination. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 17.) After reviewing the videotape of the incident, the union "informed Plaintiff that there was nothing that they could do because [from the] videotape . . . , it appeared to the union representative that [P]laintiff knew Fernando very well." (ECF No. 12 ¶ 18.)
On April 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2015-00178015. On May 22, 2015, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction, (ECF No. 1), and filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, (ECF No. 4). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following nine causes of action: (1) tortious discharge from employment in violation of public policy; (2) race discrimination violation under California Government Code § 12900 (); (3) whistleblower retaliation under California Labor Code § 1102.5(c); (4) retaliation violation under FEHA, California Government Code § 12940(h); (5) failure to prevent retaliation violation under FEHA, California Government Code § 12940(k); (6) breach of implied contract of continued employment; (7) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (9) negligent infliction of emotional distress. In response, Defendant filed an answer, denying Plaintiff's allegations and asserting nineteen affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 4.)
Defendant seeks summary judgment sub judice based on the pleadings, arguing that all nine of Plaintiff's causes of action lack a genuine dispute as to material facts, or in the alterative partial summary judgment for the causes of action this Court deems lack a genuine dispute as to material facts. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25), and Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff's opposition (ECF No. 23).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is [therefore] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970), superseded on other grounds. "[The] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Id. at 324 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In proving that the disputed fact is material, the opposing party must demonstrate the disputed fact "might affect theoutcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citation omitted). In proving that the dispute is genuine, the opposing party must demonstrate "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. " Id.
In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment).
In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts pleaded before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158-59). Nevertheless, it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which inferences may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's following nine...
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