Dole Hawaii Division-Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Ramil
| Decision Date | 28 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 13981,DIVISION-CASTLE,13981 |
| Citation | 794 P.2d 1115,71 Haw. 419 |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
| Parties | DOLE HAWAII& COOKE, INC., Appellant-Appellee, v. Mario R. RAMIL, Director, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations for the State of Hawaii, Appellee-Appellee, and J. Ah You, R. Alesna, V. Atu, R.J. Austria, S. Balisacan, D. Baradi, F. Cabral, M. Cantorna, D. Castillo, Alden Cayetano, Allen Cayetano, B. Fagaragan, L. Fiesta, L. Gandia, A. Garania, A. Go, L. Hill, F. Ingan, S. Iwanaga, M. Kakiuchi, J. Kalaola, S. Kekoa, W.L. Koo, W. Kuhns, C. Kumukahi, A. Lakalo, F. Lamoya, F. Madeira, R. Martinez, R. Naholowaa, J. Nana, W. Okamoto, P. Oki, H.O. Park, B. Pascual, E. Ragasa, R. Raymundo, P. Rosa, J. Sato, K. Swart, R. Torres, W. Tugade, M. Valentin, S.S. Wise and D. Yokoi, Appellees-Appellants. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The law is well-settled in this jurisdiction that in an appeal from a circuit court's review of an administrative decision the appellate court will utilize identical standards applied by the circuit court. The clearly erroneous standard governs an agency's findings of fact whereas, the courts may freely review an agency's conclusions of law.
2. Where both mixed questions of fact and law are presented, deference will be given to the agency's expertise and experience in the particular field and the court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.
3. Where an employer seeks to disqualify an employee from unemployment benefits under HRS § 383-30, the employer has the burden of proving the requisite facts to bring the employee within the statutory deprivation of benefits.
4. Although not binding on the courts, great weight is given to the interpretation of the term "new work" within the meaning of the strikebreaker provision, HRS § 383-30(3)(B)(i), mandated by federal statutes, by the United States Department of Labor, the federal agency responsible for ensuring that state unemployment laws comply with mandatory federal criteria set out by Congress.
5. The term "new work" must be construed consistently within the different sections of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
6. An indefinite layoff with no reasonably ascertainable date of recall is a termination of employment and thus a recall offer to work is "new work" within the meaning of HRS § 383-30(3)(B).
7. The strikebreaker provision, HRS § 383-30(3)(B)(i), clearly manifests the legislative intent that unemployed workers should not be turned into strikebreakers or suffer a denial of unemployment benefits.
8. The unemployment compensation statute was enacted for the beneficent and humane purpose of relieving the stress of economic insecurity due to unemployment. It should therefore be liberally construed to promote the intended legislative policy.
9. Where employees were laid off for an indefinite period thereby terminating the employment relationship, recall offers to work were for "new work" vacant due to a labor dispute which could be refused without resulting in disqualification from benefits.
10. Upon determining that claimants' layoffs were for an indefinite period which terminated the employment relationship, recall offers were for "new work" to fill vacancies due to the strike, and therefore, the claimants are entitled to benefits under the strikebreaker statute regardless of their participation in the strike effort.
James A. King (King, Nakamura & Chun-Hoon, of counsel), Honolulu, for appellees-appellants.
Barry W. Marr and Patrick H. Jones (Carlsmith, Wichman, Case, Mukai & Ichiki of counsel), Honolulu, for appellant-appellee.
Wilfredo Tungol, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Labor and Industrial Relations, Honolulu, for appellee-appellee.
Before LUM, C.J., and PADGETT, HAYASHI, WAKATSUKI and MOON, JJ.
This is an appeal by employees (Claimants) of Dole Hawaii Division-Castle & Cooke, Inc. (Dole) from a circuit court order reversing an Employment Security Appeals Referee's decision granting unemployment compensation benefits for the period of a labor strike at Dole's premises. We reverse the trial court's order and hold that the Claimants are entitled to the benefits in question.
Claimants were employed at Dole's Honolulu can manufacturing plant. During December 1984 and January 1985, Claimants were laid off due to lack of work caused in part by the shutdown of the local tuna cannery to which Dole supplied cans. Claimants began receiving unemployment compensation benefits. As members of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 142 (Union), Claimants were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (bargaining agreement) which expired on January 31, 1985. Pursuant to the terms of the bargaining agreement, in the event of layoffs, Claimants retained seniority rights and were required to call Dole on a weekly basis to determine if work was available.
On February 5, 1985 in anticipation of a labor strike which was to commence on February 6th, Dole issued Claimants recall offers to work. Instead of reporting to work, Claimants participated in the Union's picket line. The strike ended on May 16, 1985 and the Claimants returned to work. However, in December 1985, the continuing effect of lost orders from the closure of the tuna cannery caused Dole again to layoff thirty (30) of the forty-four (44) Claimants, this time on a permanent basis.
The Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) denied Claimants' unemployment benefits for the period of the strike. At the hearing before the Employment Security Appeals Referee (Referee) evidence submitted included a stipulation by the parties to certain facts and conclusions of law. 1 The Referee reversed on the grounds that the "strikebreaker" provision of the Hawaii Employment Security Law (HESL), Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 383-30(3)(B)(i), 2 allowed Claimants to reject the recall offers to work without loss of their unemployment benefits based on the finding that said offers were for "new work" vacant due directly to the strike. The circuit court reversed holding that the strikebreaker provision was inapplicable and the Claimants were disqualified under the "labor dispute" provision, HRS § 383-30(4). 3
The law is well-settled in this jurisdiction that in an appeal from a circuit court's review of an administrative decision the appellate court will utilize identical standards applied by the circuit court. The clearly erroneous standard governs an agency's findings of fact whereas, the courts may freely review an agency's conclusions of law. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1357 v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 68 Haw. 316, 322, 713 P.2d 943, 950 (1986); Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 216, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984).
Where both mixed questions of fact and law are presented, deference will be given to the agency's expertise and experience in the particular field and the court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Camara, 67 Haw. at 216, 685 P.2d at 797.
Under the HESL, HRS Chapter 383, an individual is eligible to receive unemployment benefits unless disqualified for any one of six (6) grounds set forth in HRS § 383-30. Where an employer seeks to disqualify an employee from unemployment benefits under HRS § 383-30, " 'the [said] employer has the burden of proving the requisite facts to bring the employee within the statutory deprivation of benefits.' " National Tire of Hawaii, Ltd. v. Kauffman, 58 Haw. 265, 272, 567 P.2d 1233, 1238 (1977) (quoting Adelsman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 Minn. 116, 123, 125 N.W.2d 444, 449 (1963)).
Dole contends that when Claimants rejected the recall offers to work, lack of work ceased to be the basis for their unemployment. The cause of said unemployment then became the stoppage of work due to the labor dispute thereby disqualifying them from unemployment benefits during the strike period under HRS § 383-30(4).
Claimants admit they rejected the recall to work due to the labor dispute resulting in the stoppage of work, however, Claimants rely upon the exemption from disqualification set forth in the strikebreaker provision.
Claimants maintain and we agree that the Referee was correct in determining that the recall offers to work were for "new work" based on the finding that their layoffs were for an indefinite period which effectively terminated their employer-employee relationship. Therefore, Claimants were justified in refusing the recalls to work for positions made vacant due to the labor dispute without being disqualified under the labor dispute provision.
In construing the term "new work," the Referee gave great weight to the interpretation contained in the United States Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 984 (1968) (UIPL No. 984) as did the California Court of Appeals in Campos v. California Employment Development Department, 132 Cal.App.3d 961, 183 Cal.Rptr. 637 (1982), when considering the problem of interpreting "new work" within the meaning of the California strikebreaker provision which is almost identical to HRS § 383-30(3)(B)(i). The California court stated:
The United States Department of Labor is the federal agency responsible for ensuring that state unemployment laws comply with the mandatory federal criteria set out by Congress. (26 U.S.C. § 3304; 42 U.S.C. § 503.) Since section 1259 [strikebreaker provision] of the California Unemployment Insurance Code is mandated by the federal statute, interpretations of the federal statute by federal agencies such as the Department of Labor, although not binding on the courts, are entitled to great weight.
Id. at 966, 183 Cal.Rptr. at 640 (citation omitted). See also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1357, 68 Haw. at 329 n. 16, 713 P.2d at 954 n. 16 ().
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