Dollar v. State, 66473
Decision Date | 05 October 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 66473,66473 |
Citation | 168 Ga.App. 726,310 S.E.2d 236 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | DOLLAR v. The STATE. |
Harry J. Fox, Jr., Perry, for appellant.
G. Theron Finlayson, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Defendant was indicted for murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, defendant enumerates three errors in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's charge on his insanity defense, and the trial court's refusal to charge on involuntary manslaughter. Held:
1. "A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person ...." OCGA § 16-5-2(a) (formerly Code Ann. § 26-1102 (Ga.L.1968, pp 1249, 1276)). The evidence adduced at trial provided a more than sufficient basis upon which a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, defendant's attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.
2. The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving his alleged insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. "In Georgia it remains the rule that an accused who asserts insanity as a defense has the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence." Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 839, 842(5), 295 S.E.2d 74. See OCGA § 16-2-3 (formerly Code Ann. § 26-606 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1270)). Consequently, defendant's contention that the court's charge on insanity was unconstitutionally burden-shifting is without merit.
3. Defendant's remaining enumeration of error contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter after timely written request. OCGA § 16-5-3(a) (formerly Code Ann. § 26-1103(a) (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1276)) provides: "A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony." In Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 473, 265 S.E.2d 771 it was held Accordingly, we must examine the evidence to ascertain if such a charge was authorized and required.
The testimony disclosed that the defendant's mother had been married to the victim for about a year and had divorced the victim in 1972. During this marriage the victim allegedly assaulted defendant's mother, the defendant, and defendant's brothers and sisters. These alleged assaults took place at least 10 years prior to the date of the victim's death as a result of the beating with a claw hammer administered at the hands of the defendant on March 20, 1982.
The defendant testified: In response to the question by his counsel, "Now, Jimmy, did you plan to kill Randy Burns that evening?," defendant answered, "No, I did not." (Emphasis supplied.)
On cross-examination of the defendant the following transpired:
The state's evidence showed that the defendant administered several blows to the head of the victim with a claw hammer. These blows caused multiple lacerations and contusions about the head and ears of the victim with one laceration being "all the way through the jaw."
The transcript reflects that the trial court, in response to defense counsel's objection to the court's failure to charge on involuntary manslaughter, stated that "under the facts of this case ... involuntary manslaughter dealing with a lawful act is not in any way involved in this case ... that any unlawful act in this case on the part of the defendant would amount to a felony, and would not be a jury question as to whether it were a misdemeanor, as suggested by your charge."
In view of the totality of the evidence of the victim's injuries, the instrument (claw hammer) utilized in inflicting these serious injuries, had the victim survived and the jury rejected defendant's defense of insanity at the time of the crime, as the jury did in the case sub judice, the defendant would have been guilty not merely of simple battery but of aggravated assault, a felony.
The trial court did not err in declining to give a requested charge on involuntary manslaughter as the evidence did not warrant such a charge. See White v. State, 242 Ga. 21, 22(7), 247 S.E.2d 759; Cherry v. State, 242 Ga. 644, 250 S.E.2d 490; Booker v. State, 242 Ga. 773, 777(6), 251 S.E.2d 518. See also State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1, 2 [Rule (3) ], 222 S.E.2d 354.
Judgment affirmed.
There is no more fundamental principle governing trial and appellate practice than that preventing either the trial judges or appellate courts from weighing the evidence on issues of fact raised by the evidence in criminal cases. Thus, as the majority opinion recognizes, "where there is slight evidence warranting the charge" (emphasis supplied) (Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 473, 265...
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Rose v. State
...there is no merit in the enumeration." Cooper v. State, 163 Ga.App. 482, 485(4), 295 S.E.2d 161 (1982). Accord Dollar v. State, 168 Ga.App. 726(2), 310 S.E.2d 236 (1983); Kirk v. State, 168 Ga.App. 226, 231(11), 308 S.E.2d 592 (1983), aff'd 252 Ga. 133, 311 S.E.2d 821 (1984). Compare Butler......
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