Dollmann v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 30 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 02232/2014.,02232/2014.
• Citation: 997 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Table)
• Parties: Daniel D. DOLLMANN, Plaintiff(s), v. William CRAWFORD a/k/a William E. Crawford, Carl Siciliano, Philip Jacobs, and James Maybeck, Defendant(s).
• Court: New York Supreme Court

997 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Table)

Daniel D. DOLLMANN, Plaintiff(s)
v.
William CRAWFORD a/k/a William E. Crawford, Carl Siciliano, Philip Jacobs, and James Maybeck, Defendant(s).

No. 02232/2014.

Supreme Court, Suffolk County, New York.

June 30, 2014.

Daniel Dollman, pro se.

Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP, New York, Attorneys for Defendants.

Opinion

ANDREW G. TARANTINO JR., J.

Upon consideration of the Notice of Motion for an order dismissing the complaint by the defendants, William Crawford a/k/a William W. Crawford [“Crawford”], Carl Siciliano, Philip Jacobs, and James Maybeck [collectively “the defendants”], dated February 25, 2014, the supporting affirmation, the affidavit of William Crawford and exhibits A and B, the affidavit of the plaintiff Daniel D. Dollmann, Plaintiff, Pro Se, [“the plaintiff”], entitled “Plaintiff's Reply to Attorney Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss”, and supporting exhibits 1 through 4, the defendants' reply affirmation, the Reply Affidavit of Dirk Smith, and the plaintiff's “Answer to Reply Affirmation in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss”, it is now

ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted in part and denied in part in accordance herewith; and it is further

ORDERED that all self represented litigants and attorneys of record are directed to appear for a Preliminary Conference before this Court on AUGUST 11, 2014 at 9:30AM.

Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken from the complaint filed on January 31, 2014, which are presumed to be true for purposes of the motion to dismiss (Tanenbaum v. Molinoff, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 04186, 987 N.Y.S.2d 214, 2014 WL 2597924 [2d Dept.2014] ).

On or before August 19, 2013, the defendants collaborated or conspired to write a letter to the plaintiff signed by defendant William Crawford [“the Crawford letter”], which was “copied” to Boy Scouts of America Suffolk County Council representatives Joel Salinger and Michal Dluginski, and defendants Philip Jacobs and Joel Salinger, respectively. The letter recited as follows:

“Due to behavior reported to us that is inconsistent with the Scout Oath and Law and our own church's values we are informing you that your adult leader registration with the Boy Scouts of America is being revoked by St. Peter's by-the-Sea Episcopal Church and Boy Scout Troop 43. Kindly refrain from any participation in troop activities going forward. Thank you for your service to our church and its Scout troop.”

The complaint further alleges that the defendant and Trustee of St. Peter's Church, Carl Siciliano, sent an email to the plaintiff on or about September 18, 2013, advising that as per the advice of Suffolk County Council, BSA [Boys Scouts of America], Siciliano was requesting that the Scoutmaster Conference and Board of Review for elevation of the plaintiff's son to the designation of Life Scout be handled by Suffolk County Council, BSA. The BSA's recommendation was apparently based on at least one report by Siciliano to BSA members that the plaintiff had threatened legal action based on the Crawford letter.

The next day, on September 19, 2013, the plaintiff commenced an action for defamation and injunctive relief in Suffolk County Fourth District Court against the same named defendants here. Plaintiff's wife, Joan Mason, personally served the district court complaint on Crawford on September 22, 2013. At that time Crawford is alleged to have stated to Ms. Mason, “You don't have to do this your husband did very bad things.”

At a meeting on September 23, 2013, among the plaintiff, Crawford, the plaintiff's spouse, and Bishop Itty of the Episcopal Diocese, an agreement was reached that the dispute would be worked out “between the church family”. At the meeting, the plaintiff was still not advised about the nature of the allegations against him or who made them.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in the district court action, arguing that the Court there lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On January 27, 2014, the district court (Barbera–Dalli, J.), issued an order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cognizable cause of action for libel or slander and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction insofar as the plaintiff sought equitable relief. Notably, the district court complaint contained no allegations concerning the incident where Crawford is alleged to have made the statement to the plaintiff's wife, “You don't have to do this your husband did very bad things.” Four days after the district court case was dismissed, the plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court for similar, but not identical relief.

Here, the plaintiff seeks the following relief based on the facts alleged in the complaint:

“Wherefore as shown by the Defendants[ ] failure to seek truth or state truth or to allow the Plaintiff access to his human and civil rights, malice on the Defendants[ ] part is clearly present; and Wherefore the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court intervene on the Plaintiffs behalf to have his rights as a human, a citizen of the United States of America and as a resident of the Great State of New York be restored and that damages of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) and other costs and punitive damages be awarded to the Plaintiff as the Court sees fit.”

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511;Rabos v. R & R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851, 955 N.Y .S.2d 109). Nevertheless, “bare legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the record are not presumed to be true” (Parola, Gross & Marino, P.C. v. Susskind, 43 AD3d 1020, 1021–1022, 843 N.Y.S.2d 104;see Daub v. Future Tech Enter., Inc., 65 AD3d 1004, 1005, 885 N.Y.S.2d 115). Moreover, where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one, and unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a...