Dolphin v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 12 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1391,97-1391
• Citation: 983 S.W.2d 113,335 Ark. 113
• Parties: Beatrice DOLPHIN, Appellant, v. Jimmie L. WILSON and Henrietta J. Wilson, Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 113

983 S.W.2d 113

335 Ark. 113

Beatrice DOLPHIN, Appellant, v. Jimmie L. WILSON and Henrietta J. Wilson, Appellees.

No. 97-1391.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 12, 1998.

David Solomon, Helena, for Appellant.

E. Dion Wilson, Helena, for Appellees.

BROWN, Justice.

This is the second appeal we have had regarding the parties' dispute, which relates to an alleged oral contract for the sale of land. See Dolphin v. Wilson, 328 Ark. 1, 942 S.W.2d 815 (1997) (Wilson I ). The facts surrounding the dispute are sufficiently laid out in Wilson I. In the first case, we reversed the trial court's decree and held as follows:

When considering all the evidence, we conclude that the chancellor clearly erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that an agreement existed between the parties. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Wilsons' complaint was barred by the statute of frauds, and reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

Wilson I, 328 Ark. at 8, 942 S.W.2d at 819-820 (emphasis ours).

A mandate was subsequently issued by the Supreme Court Clerk after rehearing in the case had been denied, and that mandate read in pertinent part:

It is therefore ordered and decreed by the Court that the decree of said Chancery Court in this cause rendered be, and the same is hereby reversed, annulled and set aside with costs and that this cause be remanded to said Chancery Court for further proceedings to be therein had according to the principles of equity and consistent with the opinion herein delivered. (Emphasis ours.)

When the case returned to the trial court on remand, appellees Jimmie L. Wilson and Henrietta J. Wilson filed a Motion For Refund of Funds Expended wherein they claimed that appellant Beatrice Dolphin was unjustly enriched in the amounts of $13,200, which they had paid to the Farmers Home Administration for the removal of liens on the farm land, and $1,239.40, which they had paid to the United States Department of Justice for costs. They prayed that she be ordered to reimburse them in the amount of $14,439.40. Dolphin responded to the motion and asserted that the Wilsons had paid those amounts as volunteers, that the Supreme Court had decreed there was no contract that could be specifically performed, and that the trial court should enter an order placing into effect the Supreme Court mandate following Wilson I. The Wilsons replied that the expenses paid were for Dolphin's benefit and that Dolphin's response should be struck for lack of factual or legal support. Wilson then amended his reimbursement motion to claim relief under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit.

Legal briefs accompanied the parties' motion and response, and the trial court entered its order, granting Wilson judgment in the amount of $14,239.40 under the theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court relied on Arkansas Highway Commission v. Townsend, 317 Ark. 581, 879 S.W.2d 447 (1994), in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear the Wilsons's motion. We quote the pertinent part of the trial court's order on jurisdiction:

In Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Townsend, (Townsend I), 313 Ark. 702, 858 S.W.2d 66 (1993), the Arkansas Highway Commission petitioned this court for injunctive relief to have a structure removed from a right-of-way held by the Commission. This court denied the requested relief. The matter was appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and the denial of injunctive relief was reversed and the case "dismissed" by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In a later proceeding filed in the same case, the Commission petitioned this court to grant it the injunctive relief that it had originally requested and felt itself entitled because of the reversal by the Arkansas Supreme Court. This court declined to act on the matter because the Arkansas Supreme Courts mandate reflected that the case had been dismissed. According to the law, as it was understood by this court at that time, a dismissal removed jurisdiction from the trial court to act for any purpose. The Supreme Court, on the second appeal of this case, Townsend v. Arkansas Highway Commission [Arkansas Highway Commission v. Townsend], 317 Ark. 581, 879 S.W.2d 447, (1994) Townsend II, held otherwise. To quote the Arkansas Supreme Court in that case:

"When the Arkansas State Highway Commission petitioned for an injunction subsequent to our original decision, the chancellor could have treated it as a new case rather than as continuation under the aegis of the original filing. Under those circumstances, she would have assumed jurisdiction independently of the mandate from this court in Townsend I."

317 Ark. at 585, 879 S.W.2d 447.

Thus, although the opinion of this court would almost certainly have been different before the Arkansas Supreme Court's pronouncement in Townsend II, it is now of the opinion that it has the authority to render such further orders as may be necessary to fully effectuate the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court. If this court has the authority to act where the case has been "dismissed" by the Arkansas Supreme Court, surely it may act where, as here, the case has been remanded. This court has the authority to grant such relief as may be required under the Arkansas Supreme Court's mandate to fully and finally resolve the matter. Therefore, since the relief requested by the plaintiffs is entirely consonant with, and in no way conflicts with the Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling, this court finds that it has jurisdiction to treat this as "a new case" within the meaning of Townsend II.

The first issue raised by Dolphin on appeal is whether the trial court exceeded its authority in hearing and deciding the unjust-enrichment claim after our opinion in Wilson I had come down and the mandate had issued. We believe that it did.

It is instructive, initially, to turn once more to our decision in Wilson I. Our opinion in that case discussed the sole issue on appeal, which concerned the existence of an oral contract to sell farm land. An unjust-enrichment claim was not pled in Wilson I; nor was relief in the form of quantum meruit requested. Moreover, the Wilsons do not contend that the unjust-enrichment claim was tried by the express or implied consent of the parties during the first trial. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Also, the Wilsons did not make a motion in the first trial to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. Id. Because of this, the trial court did not consider a claim for unjust enrichment or address it as part of the decree. This being the case, the issue before us today is whether the Wilsons can raise a new cause of action after the case on appeal has been decided and when the opinion and mandate both require an order consistent with the opinion in Wilson I.

The history of the mandate rule was reviewed recently by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir.1994). In Casey, the Third Circuit observed:

Of these rules, the most compelling is the mandate rule. This fundamental rule binds every court to honor rulings in the case by superior courts. As the Supreme Court has stated, "In its earliest days this Court consistently held that an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court." Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 1040, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948).

Casey, 14 F.3d at 856. Quoting from Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir.1985), the Third Circuit went on to underscore the deference a trial court must give to the mandate:

A trial court must implement both the letter and spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces.

Casey, 14 F.3d at 857.

The Casey decision is in accord with the blackletter law on mandates which we garner from American Jurisprudence. See 5 AM. JUR .2d Appellate Review, §§ 776-794 (1995). We take this opportunity to cite with approval a few of the major precepts regarding mandates:

A "mandate" is the official notice of action of the appellate court, directed to the court below, advising that court of the action taken by the appellate court, and directing the lower court to have the appellate court's judgment duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

5 AM. JUR .2d, § 776.

However, the lower court is vested with jurisdiction only to the extent conferred by the appellate court's opinion and mandate. Therefore, the question of whether the lower court followed the mandate is not simply one of whether the lower court was correct in its construction of the case, but also involves a question of the lower court's jurisdiction.

5 AM. JUR .2d, § 784.

If an appellate court remands with specific instructions, those instructions must be followed exactly, to ensure that the lower court's decision is in accord with that of the appellate court.

Where a remand limits the issues for determination, the court on remand is precluded from considering other issues, or new matters, affecting the cause. Thus where the case is remanded for disposition of the remaining post-trial issues that were not addressed by the trial court, any issue the trial court had previously addressed may not be considered on remand. Similarly, when a case is remanded for a specific act, the entire case is not reopened, but rather the lower tribunal is only authorized to carry out the appellate court's mandate, and the trial court may be powerless to undertake any proceedings beyond those specified.

5 AM. JUR .2d, § 787.

Any proceedings on remand which are contrary to the directions contained in the mandate from the appellate court may be considered null and void.

5 AM. JUR .2d, § 791.

Two cases, in particular, have touched on this issue in Arkansas. See Little Red River Levee Dist. No. 2 v. Moore, 199 Ark. 946, 137 S.W.2d 234 (1940); Felker v. McKee, 154 Ark. 104, 241 S.W. 378 (1922). In...