Dominguez v. Dominguez, 08-17-00118-CV

Decision Date16 August 2019
Docket NumberNo. 08-17-00118-CV,08-17-00118-CV
Citation583 S.W.3d 365
Parties Hector DOMINGUEZ, Appellant, v. Marvin DOMINGUEZ, Apellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT, Brock Benjamin, 747 E. San Antonio, Suite 203, El Paso, TX 79901.

APPELLEE, Marvin Dominguez, 11708 Gilmerton Dr., Riverview, FL 33579-3924.

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

OPINION

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

This case involves a dispute between Hector Dominguez (Appellant) and Marvin Dominguez (Appellee), father and son, respectively, regarding ownership of property located at 6948 Oveja, El Paso, Texas (the property). After Appellant filed a trespass to try title suit, Appellee countered with affirmative defenses and a tortious interference with contract claim. Following a bench trial, the trial court confirmed that Appellee owned the property in its entirety, declared the property free of any claim of Appellant, and entered judgment in favor of Appellee on his claim of tortious interference. In four issues, Appellant challenges the trial court's judgment. We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.

Factual Background and Procedural History

At trial, Appellant and Appellee admitted documents by agreement, and other than their own testimony, no other witnesses testified in the proceeding. Appellant began by describing that he and Appellee purchased the property on October 31, 2008. Appellant identified a Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien, executed on October 31, 2008, as proof that Francisco Z. Acosta and Alberto Acosta, acting in their capacities as successor co-trustees of the Zenaido Acosta and Cristina S. Acosta 2004 Living Trust (the sellers), granted, sold, and conveyed the property known as 6948 Oveja to Appellant and Appellee. Along with the deed, Appellant also identified his signature on the related Deed of Trust which provided a security lien to sellers for a principal loan of $107,000, owed by Appellant and Appellee, as borrowers of the debt.

Appellant further testified that he agreed to loan Appellee $13,000 for their down payment to buy the property. To fund the payment, Appellant testified that he borrowed funds from his bank credit card. Appellant claimed that Appellee promised he would make monthly payments on the property until fully paid, and additionally, he would pay a minimum payment of $109 per month to Appellant's credit card until the original loan of $13,000 was fully reimbursed.

Appellant further claimed that, about February 2014, he became suspicious when Appellee stopped answering his phone or his door when he went to his house to collect the credit card payment. His suspicions led him to the county courthouse where he discovered a Special Warranty Deed executed on March 11, 2013, which purportedly transferred title of the property from joint ownership of Appellant and Appellee, to sole ownership by Appellee. Although the newly discovered deed purportedly contained his signature, Appellant testified it was forged, and, in any case, he was in Mexico on the date the deed was executed. Once again, Appellant testified that Appellee would not answer his phone or open his door to speak with him when he tried to have a discussion. As for the credit card debt, Appellant described that Appellee made payments up to about $5,000, but he owed a balance of $8,000.

On cross-examination, Appellant acknowledged that the loan funded from his credit card was never documented in writing. When Appellant was next shown a Durable Power of Attorney dated March 11, 2013, which empowered Appellee to act as Appellant's agent for any transaction, Appellant denied he had signed the instrument even though, on its face, his signature showed it was acknowledged by a notary and two other witnesses. Lastly, when Appellant was shown a Warranty Deed dated June 2013, which purportedly displayed his own signature and that of Modesta Dominguez, his former wife, Appellant testified that both signatures were valid even though other evidence admitted at trial established that his wife had been deceased for over three years from the date of execution. Appellant completed his testimony stating that he had not been aware that Appellee was selling the property to another party until after he filed his lawsuit and later learned about the contracts for sale during a deposition.

When Appellee took the stand, he contradicted Appellant's testimony principally from the point that Appellant accused him of fraudulently transferring title from their joint ownership to his individual ownership. In his defense, Appellee testified that Appellant himself personally prepared the deed dated March 11, 2013, which conveyed title over the property from Appellant and Appellee, jointly, to Appellee in its entirety. Appellee testified he recognized his own signature, and that of Appellant's, as shown on the face of the deed that was entered of record. Appellee testified that he and Appellant had signed the deed at the same time on the trunk of his car. As for the later deed that followed, Appellee identified the deed at trial and testified that he received it from his father. Appellee explained that he had wanted to add his wife to the title of the property, but he did not want to spend money to hire an attorney. Instead, he asked his father for help, which he provided, but it took a while to get it. He and his wife signed the deed that Appellant provided on August 27 and they filed it the next day.

Appellee further testified that he never borrowed money from his father to purchase the property, and instead, he bought the property wholly on his own. He testified that he later lost two opportunities to sell the property. To establish proof, two contracts for sale were admitted into evidence. Appellee testified the first contract was signed by the purported buyer on October 2, 2014, for a purchase price of $139,000. The second had a prospective execution date of June 10, 2015, and a purchase price of $135,000. Appellee further testified he was unable to complete either transaction explaining that "[b]ecause of [Appellant's] lawsuit against me."

Appellee added, "I tried selling the property, title company came back, can't do it because of the lawsuit."

Pleadings of the Parties

On March 27, 2014, Appellant filed his original petition for trespass to try title against Appellee. Appellant's petition described that he and Appellee were initially granted title to the property by means of a Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien dated October 31, 2008, which he attached to his petition. Appellant's suit alleged that, after they had acquired the property, Appellee fraudulently transferred title into his own name by a Special Warranty Deed dated March 11, 2013. Appellant further claimed that Appellee later transferred the property a second time by means of a Special Warranty Deed dated August 27, 2013, by which he conveyed his sole ownership to joint ownership by himself and his wife, Perla Marisol Dominguez. By his suit, Appellant sought judgment to establish title and right to possession of the property and to remove Appellee as registered owner in the public records of El Paso County, Texas. In responding, Appellee denied Appellant's claim and filed his own counter suit against Appellant. Among other allegations, Appellee accused Appellant of disturbing his quiet possession of title, using fraudulent and forged documents, and tortiously interfering with an existing contract of sale of property.

At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court ruled in open court that Appellant did not carry his burden of proving his claim of trespass to try title, confirmed title in favor of Appellee, ordered the property be cleared of any cloud of title, and awarded $135,000 to Appellee on his counterclaim for tortious interference with a contract of sale. The trial judge plainly stated that Appellant's testimony was not credible. At a later hearing on the entry of judgment, the trial court added, "I didn't find that it was a frivolous claim. I just didn't believe him, as the trier of fact ... he was not credible and not believable and I did not give his testimony any weight."

The final judgment denied all of Appellant's claims, ordered that the Special Warranty Deed at issue evidenced a valid transfer of property from Appellant to Appellee, and removed any claims or cloud of title from the Oveja property. On the counterclaim of tortious interference with an existing contract, the judgment also awarded Appellee $135,000 as the principal amount due, $13,851.37 for pre-judgment interest to increase daily by $18.49 until the date the Judgment was signed, and post-judgment interest at a rate of 5 percent per annum. Thereafter, following entry of the judgment, Appellant filed an initial request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, a motion for new trial, and eventually, a notice of past-due findings and conclusions. After the trial court denied the motion for new trial, Appellant filed his notice of appeal. Later, the trial court signed an order setting a supersedeas bond of $150,000.

On appeal, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss with this Court based on Appellant's failure to post the supersedeas bond ordered by the trial court. In denying Appellee's motion to dismiss, we noted that Appellant's failure to supersede the judgment did not divest him of his right to appeal; but we also noted that the mere filing of the notice of appeal did not suspend enforcement of the trial court's judgment. Consequently, the order of this Court warned that "Appellee may enforce the judgment, and this may result in the appeal becoming moot which would subject it to dismissal at a later point in these proceedings."

DISCUSSION

By this appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his trespass to try title claim based on his assertion that fraudulent documents were used to transfer title of the property to Appellee; and he further challenges the court's judgment against him on Appellee's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • City of Georgetown v. Putnam
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 25 Marzo 2022
    ...98, 100-01 (Tex. 2006) ; Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones , 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) ; Dominguez v. Dominguez , 583 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2019, pet. denied) ("The mootness doctrine implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is essential t......
  • Antolik v. Antolik
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 7 Mayo 2021
    ...such issues related to separate claims for damages that do not depend on possession of the property." Dominguez v. Dominguez , 583 S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied). In Dominguez , for example, the appellant raised three issues regarding (1) the damage award, (2) the tri......
  • Allen v. Jungenberg
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 26 Marzo 2020
    ...to dismiss that her post-judgment sale of the property has mooted Allen's claim to quiet title. See Dominguez v. Dominguez, 583 S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (holding that the post-judgment sale of the property to a third party mooted the appellant's claim to quiet t......
  • In re Estate of Abraham
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 17 Julio 2020
    ...during an appeal can moot the appeal if the sale extinguishes a controversy regarding title. See Dominguez v. Dominguez, 583 S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2019, pet. denied)(portion of appeal dealing with title controversy mooted by sale of the property during pendency of appeal becaus......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT