Dominguez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 03 March 1999 |
Citation | 429 Mass. 112,706 N.E.2d 647 |
Parties | Ralph DOMINGUEZ v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Caroline M. O'Brien, for the plaintiff.
Robert G. Taylor, Boston (David R. Cain with him) for the defendant.
Edwin L. Wallace, Boston & Michael Najjar, Lowell, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
David I. Finnegan & John G. Ryan, Boston, for Domestic Automobile Insurers of Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: WILKINS, C.J., LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL and IRELAND, JJ.
We are concerned in this case with an interpretation of personal injury protection (PIP) coverage, G.L. c. 90, § 34A, the no-fault motor vehicle insurance law. The question is whether, under the last paragraph of § 34A, an automobile insurer must pay for medical expenses between $2,000 and $8,000 as PIP benefits, if the claimant's health insurer would have covered the medical services had the claimant sought treatment in accordance with his health insurer's plan. We conclude that the automobile insurer is not required to make such payments.
The facts are undisputed. On March 23, 1994, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident while driving his mother's car which was insured by the defendant under the standard Massachusetts automobile policy. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff belonged to a health maintenance organization, Harvard Community Health Plan (HCHP).
The plaintiff was treated for his injuries by a physician. By July 22, 1995, the plaintiff had received $2,785 worth of medical care, and the defendant had paid the plaintiff $2,000 pursuant to PIP coverage. The defendant, however, denied payment of the additional $785 because it exceeded $2,000. The defendant would not consider payment until the plaintiff had obtained a denial of payment from HCHP. The plaintiff submitted the outstanding balance to HCHP, which denied payment because the physician in question was not an authorized provider under HCHP. The plaintiff resubmitted the $785 claim to the defendant which again refused payment.
The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the Boston Municipal Court. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and a judge in that court granted the defendant's motion and denied the plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court entered an order dismissing the appeal, and the plaintiff appealed. We transferred the appeal here on our own motion and now affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
The dispute centers on the meaning to be given to the last paragraph of G.L. c. 90, § 34A, which was added to the statute by St.1988, c. 273, § 16. That paragraph reads in full as follows:
We said in Creswell v. Medical W. Community Health Plan, Inc., 419 Mass. 327, 330, 644 N.E.2d 970 (1995), with reference to the first three sentences of the provision, that The plaintiff maintains that the last sentence of the paragraph affirms his right to receive PIP benefits to pay for medical treatment rendered by any provider he chooses because of the language disclaiming that anything "in this subsection shall be construed ... to interfere in any way with [a] claimant's choice of physician or course of medical treatment."
In interpreting the last paragraph of § 34A, we apply the principle that "a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513, 333 N.E.2d 450 (1975), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975). Accepted principles of statutory construction also require that the last paragraph of § 34A be read with reference to the whole act of which it is a part.
The comprehensive scheme for compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance contained in G.L. c. 90, §§ 34A-34Q, was enacted not only to provide an inexpensive and uncomplicated procedure for obtaining compensation for injuries sustained in automobile accidents, but also to control costs of compulsory automobile insurance. See Flanagan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 195, 198, 417 N.E.2d 1216 (1981); Chipman v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 366 Mass. 253, 255 n. 3, 316 N.E.2d 725 (1974). Section 34A, by its terms, expresses a legislative recognition that available health insurance reduces the cost of motor vehicle insurance by eliminating the need for additional PIP coverage, and codifies a legislative mandate that claimants utilize existing health insurance for medical expenses which exceed the $2,000 limit on an automobile insurer's PIP liability.
With these goals and mandates in mind, the last paragraph of § 34A addresses two subjects. The first subject is covered by the first three sentences of the paragraph which in explicit terms limit the automobile insurer's obligation to pay PIP benefits to an amount of $2,000 (rather than $8,000) in circumstances where medical and other enumerated expenses "have been or will be compensated" by described types of health insurance. These sentences also contain mandates concerning the ability of health insurers providing the described coverages to coordinate benefits with PIP coverage and to subrogate against claimants and others.
The second subject dealt with by the paragraph is set out in the last three sentences which relate to a PIP insurer's option to finance continuance or renewal of health or disability insurance which a claimant might otherwise allow to lapse because of the claimant's inability or unwillingness to pay for the coverage. It is in connection with this subject that the last sentence states its limitation.
While the last paragraph of § 34A is not textually divided into subsections, a logical reading of the paragraph establishes that the limitation is confined solely to the second subject. There is some indication in the legislative history of the paragraph that this was meant to be the case. 1 To read the limitation differently, would confer on a claimant who is otherwise entitled to benefits under a health insurance plan, the ability to shift all of his medical expenses between $2,000 and $8,000 to the PIP carrier, thereby frustrating the goal of containing the costs of automobile insurance. Additionally, a claimant's decision to ignore his existing health insurance could have the same effect as a denial of coverage by the health insurer because of the existence of PIP benefits or as the assertion of a subrogation claim against the PIP claimant by the health insurer for medical expenses beyond $2,000--both of which are specifically prohibited to health insurers by the express language of the second and third sentences of the last paragraph of § 34A. See Creswell, supra at 330-331, 644 N.E.2d 970. Thus, if a claimant can ignore his existing health insurance, he would possess the power to...
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