LORE
C. J., and SPRUANCE, J., sitting.
OPINION
LORE, C. J.
The
declaration consists of three counts.
The
libellous matter set out in the first count is as follows:
"We
trust that the Democratic voters of the Fourth Representative
District of this city (meaning the said city of Wilmington)
will not make it necessary for us to further expose the
treachery of John P. Donahoe (meaning the said plaintiff)
with respect to his action at Dover last winter on the last
day of the legislative session (meaning the legislative
session of the State of Delaware held in the year 1899, in
which Legislature the said plaintiff was a Representative in
the General Assembly), nor do we wish to speak further of his
(the plaintiff's) ridiculous war record unless we are
compelled to do so. We cannot believe that the Democrats of
the Fourth will so far forget their own interests, and those
of their party, as to again confide them to the keeping of a
man (meaning the plaintiff) who has more than once proven
false to the faith reposed in him, and who is even now
suspected of having made a bargain with Addicks (meaning a
certain person thought to be a candidate for the office of
United States Senator from the State of Delaware) for
assistance in securing his return to the Legislature (meaning
the Legislature of the said State), where he will be expected
to cast his vote for the gas man (meaning the said Addicks)
for United States Senator. Only the fear of bodily harm
prevented Donahoe (meaning the plaintiff) at the last session
of the General Assembly from joining the ranks of Farlow,
Clark and King (meaning three members of the
said General Assemby of 1899) in a consummation of the
disgraceful conspiracy by which a seat in the highest
legislative body of a nation (meaning the United States
Senate) was to be handed over for so much cash in hand. Not
having the courage to face the storm of protest and
denunciation which he (meaning the plaintiff) saw had been
evoked by the votes of the other renegades, he (meaning the
plaintiff) resorted to the flimsy trick of feigning sickness,
and made repeated efforts to leave the House at the most
critical stage of the proceedings, in the hope of thus giving
his purchaser (meaning the said Addicks) the benefit of at
least half a vote by his absence. That he (meaning the
plaintiff) was not permitted to do even this much for his
master (meaning the said Addicks) was due entirely to the
determined stand taken by a few wrathful Democratic citizens
who went upon the floor of the House and compelled him
(meaning the plaintiff) by force to remain in his seat. Do
our Democratic friends of the Fourth want to take the risk of
having this scene repeated at the next Senatorial election
(meaning the election for United States Senators to be held
by the General Assembly of the State of Delaware at its next
session, to be held in the year 1901)? Do they want to send a
man to Dover who needs a bodyguard to prevent him from
betraying them to the enemy? Do they want to trust their
legislative interests to one who sells them out and cravenly
deserts his post on the pretense that he's got the
belly-ache? These charges against Donahoe (meaning the
plaintiff) have been made time and again, publicly and
privately, by reputable citizens and good Democrats, and he
(meaning the plaintiff) has never attempted to deny them, and
in his cringing silence we read an abject confession of his
guilt. And yet this man (meaning the plaintiff), steeped in
the mire of a foul conspiracy against his own party and
against public decency, has the hardihood to again offer
himself to the voters of his district as a fit person to be
entrusted with the honorable and responsible duties of a
legislator (meaning the then pending canvass being made by
the plaintiff to be renominated as a candidate for the
General Assembly to be voted for at the next
general election). It would be a disgrace to the Democratic
voters of the Fourth District (meaning the District as a
Representative from which in the General Assembly the
plaintiff was then a candidate), a disgrace to their party
and a lasting disgrac to Delaware to send a man of
Donahoe's (meaning the plaintiff) character to represent
any respectable community in the General Assembly. Surely the
Fourth District (meaning the said District) has within its
limits many Democrats of ability whose hands are not soiled
by the slime of Addicks' (meaning the said Addicks)
money, and who would be willing to serve their neigbors in a
public capacity."
The
libellous matter set out in the second count is as follows:
"Only
the fear of bodily harm prevented Donahoe (meaning the
plaintiff) at the last session of the General Assembly
(meaning the session of the said General Assembly in which
this plaintiff was a member as aforesaid) from joining the
ranks of Farlow, Clark and King (meaning three members of the
said General Assembly) in a consummation of the disgraceful
conspiracy by which a seat in the highest legislative body of
a nation (meaning the United States Senate) was to be handed
over for so much cash in hand (meaning that this plaintiff
had received while a member of the said General Assembly a
bribe in the way of a cash consideration to induce him to
cast his vote for a certain candidate for the United States
Senate before the said General Assembly)."
The
libellous matter set out in the third count is as follows:
That he
(the said plaintiff), while a member of the General Assembly
of the State of Delaware, had been paid and accepted a bribe
to vote for one John Edward Addicks as a Senator of the
United States from the State of Delaware.
These
counts respectively, state the defendant's malicious
intent; set out the alleged libellous matter, and state that
it refers to the plaintiff.
There
are no allegations in the declaration outside of the alleged libellous matter, specifying any particular
offense. The several counts merely designate the charges as
"the misconduct and offenses" as disclosed in the
alleged libellous matter.
To each
of these three counts the defendant demurs specially, naming
ten causes of demurrer to the first count, twelve to the
second and eleven to the third.
Counsel
for the plaintiff in their brief summarize these causes in
this language; the plaintiff "has merely set out the
words of the publication which he considered libellous, and
nowhere alleges the imputation of any specific grievance. The
publication is reproduced without innuendoes assigning any
specific libellous meaning to the words used. The defendant
is therefore unable to plead with certainty and safety to the
said counts." They contend also that "the
allegations must show not only that the words apply to the
plaintiff, but also in what sense they are used, and how they
are defamatory. The defendant is entitled to be informed by
the declaration what is imputed to him; what injury he is
said to have inflicted, and how he is said to have inflicted
it."
The
defendant claims that extrinsic to the alleged libellous
matter, the narr should allege what injury to the plaintiff
was imputed therein; what specific offense and misconduct was
so imputed, and upon what charges or statements therein the
plaintiff relies.
The
plaintiff replies that the alleged libellous matter is
sufficiently explicit upon all these points.
In
1 Chitty on Pleading, 400, the law is thus
stated:--"Where the libel or slander is prima
facie or per se actionable, a declaration
stating the defendant's malicious intent and the
defamatory matter, showing that it refers to the plaintiff,
is sufficient without any prefatory inducement of
the circumstances under which the words, etc., were spoken,
etc., and if unnecessarily an inducement be stated, it is not
material to prove it. But if the libel or words do not
naturally and per se convey the meaning the
plaintiff would wish to assign to them, or are ambiguous and
equivocal, and require explanation by reference
to some extrinsic matter to show that they are
actionable, it must be expressly shown that such matter
existed, and that the slander related thereto."
In
Carter vs. Andrews, 33 Mass. 1, Chief
Justice Shaw says: "When therefore, words are set forth
as having been spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, the
first question is whether they impute a charge of felony or
any other infamous crime punishable by law. If they do, an
innuendo undertaking to state the name in other words is
useless and superfluous."
"An innuendo must not introduce new matter, or enlarge
the natural meaning of the words. It must not put upon them a
construction that they will not bear. It cannot alter or
extend the sense of the defamatory words, or make that
certain which is in fact uncertain. Therefore if the meaning
of the language is plain no innuendo is needed."
Newell
on Defamation, etc., 619.
The
alleged libellous matter set out in each count of the
declaration in this case, is clearly libellous, and is stated
in language that is neither so ambiguous or equivocal, as in
our judgment to require explanation by reference to any
extrinsic matters to show that it is actionable. In each case
it clearly appears to be actionable per se.
Therefore
under the rule of law above stated, the plaintiff should not
be called upon to make allegations further than the supposed
libellous matter as to...
