Donahue v. Trial Court of Mass.

• Decision Date: 05 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-P-46,20-P-46
• Citation: 99 Mass.App.Ct. 180,164 N.E.3d 925
• Parties: William DONAHUE v. TRIAL COURT of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

99 Mass.App.Ct. 180

164 N.E.3d 925

William DONAHUE¹

v.TRIAL COURT of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

No. 20-P-46

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued December 10, 2020.

Decided February 5, 2021.

Christopher J. Trombetta, Mansfield, for the plaintiff.

Jesse M. Boodoo, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Present: Vuono, Meade, & Lemire, JJ.

MEADE, J.

In 2018, the plaintiff, William Donahue, commenced this putative class action on behalf of himself and all court officers and probation officers who have not been paid for wages and overtime earned. Thereafter, Donahue amended his complaint and moved to certify a class. The amended complaint alleged statutory claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (FLSA) ; the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 ; and the Massachusetts overtime statute, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, as well as purported "common-law" claims for unpaid wages and overtime.

The defendant, the Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Trial Court), moved to dismiss the amended complaint as barred by sovereign immunity, and for failure to state a claim. A Superior Court judge allowed the motion, and Donahue timely appealed the dismissal of the amended complaint. We affirm.

Background. Donahue is a court officer employed by the Trial Court.² Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between court officers, associate court officers, and probation officers and the Trial Court, court officers are not directly paid for the first seventy-five hours of accrued overtime, but instead receive compensatory time off in lieu of pay for overtime worked.³ Court officers are generally limited to accumulating seventy-five hours of such compensatory time, but they may exceed that cap based on special circumstances requiring additional overtime work. Although the Trial Court pays the officer for any unused compensatory time when a court officer's employment ends, the CBA does not establish how accrued overtime over the seventy-five hour limit is to be paid during a court officer's term of employment. Instead, the CBA contemplates a separate negotiation in which the Trial Court and the court officers’ union will develop a policy that will authorize "a limited amount of accrued compensatory time to be paid at the end of each fiscal year" to court officers who are over the seventy-five hour cap, if funds are available.⁴

Donahue's amended complaint alleges that the Trial Court failed to pay "more than $10 [million] in wages and overtime compensation" to him and other court officers and probation officers, but it does not specify the particular amounts of compensation at issue or the time periods during which such compensation accrued. Donahue appears to contend that he still has some compensatory time accrued from prior overtime work for which he has not been paid, and that he is entitled to be paid for this balance without regard to the terms of the CBA.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, and in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), "[w]e take as true ‘the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor.’ " Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45, 809 N.E.2d 1017 (2004), quoting Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 47, 691 N.E.2d 545 (1998). "What is required at the pleading stage are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief ...." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

2. Sovereign immunity. "Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine, which applies with full rigor today." New Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Markem Corp. 424 Mass. 344, 351, 676 N.E.2d 809 (1997). Sovereign immunity "protects the public treasury against money judgments and public administration from interference by the courts at the behest of litigants except in instances and by procedures the Legislature has authorized." Id. The Commonwealth "cannot be impleaded in its own courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded only in the manner and to the extent expressed in the statute" (citation omitted).

General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 664, 110 N.E.2d 101 (1953). See DeRoche v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1, 12, 848 N.E.2d 1197 (2006).

In counts II, III, and IV of the amended complaint, Donahue alleges that the Trial Court violated the FLSA; the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 ; and the Commonwealth's overtime statute, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, by allegedly failing to pay him, and others similarly situated, overtime wages and wages exceeding $10 million, entitling the plaintiffs to damages in excess of $30 million and attorney's fees. All three claims, which are discussed below, are barred by sovereign immunity, and were properly dismissed. See Vining v. Commonwealth, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 690, 696, 828 N.E.2d 576 (2005) (courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims barred by sovereign immunity). a. FLSA. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), a group of probation officers filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in State court.⁵ The officers alleged that the State had violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Id. at 711-712, 119 S.Ct. 2240. The United States Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity prevented a private party from suing a State in that State's court to enforce the FLSA. Id. at 754, 119 S.Ct. 2240. See Bergemann v. Rhode Island Dep't of Envtl. Mgt., 665 F.3d 336, 342 (1st Cir. 2011) ; Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 175, 811 N.E.2d 501 (2004). The same is true here. Donahue does not claim that the Trial Court waived its sovereign immunity or otherwise consented to be sued by its employees under the FLSA. In fact, Donahue offers nothing to counter the Trial Court's sovereign immunity claim. The motion judge properly dismissed Donahue's FLSA claim as barred by sovereign immunity.

b. Wage Act. "[S]tatutes regulating persons and corporations engaged in trade and industry are ordinarily construed not to apply to the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions unless the Legislature has expressly or by clear implication so provided." Grenier v. Hubbardston, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 911, 388 N.E.2d 718 (1979). The Wage Act is a statute that expressly applies to the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities. However, it does so only in certain limited circumstances. The Wage Act provides, in pertinent part:

"Every person having employees in his service shall pay weekly or bi-weekly each such employee the wages earned by him ... and the commonwealth, its departments, officers, boards and commissions shall so pay every mechanic, workman and laborer employed by it or them, and every person employed in any other capacity by it or them in any penal or charitable institution ..." (emphasis added).

G. L. c. 149, § 148.⁶ Donahue claims that as a court officer, he is a mechanic, workman, or laborer, or alternatively, that his work takes place in a penal institution. We disagree.

"The words ‘mechanic, workman and laborer’ and ‘penal or charitable institution’ are not defined in G. L. c. 149[, § 1]. In construing the words ‘mechanic, workman and laborer,’ we turn to the common meaning attributed to these words in other legislation pertaining to the rights of workers in this Commonwealth." Newton v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Youth Servs., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 347-348, 816 N.E.2d 993 (2004). A review of early workers’ compensation cases reveals the common meaning of "laborer" to describe "a person without particular training who is employed at manual labor ... while workmen and mechanics broadly embrace those who are skilled users of tools." Devney's Case, 223 Mass. 270, 272, 111 N.E. 788 (1916). As we noted in Newton, supra at 348, 816 N.E.2d 993, where these definitions were applied, the following were determined not to be workmen, laborers, or mechanics: a call firefighter, Randall's Case, 279 Mass. 85, 86-87, 180 N.E. 669 (1932) ; an industrial school teacher, Lesuer's Case, 227 Mass. 44, 46, 116 N.E. 483 (1917) ; and a supervisory janitor, White's Case, 226 Mass. 517, 521, 116 N.E. 481 (1917). Whether an individual fits the definition or classification of a "mechanic, laborer or workman" depends on the work performed by him or her. Tracy v. Cambridge Jr. College, 364 Mass. 367, 372, 304 N.E.2d 921 (1973).

Even though the amended complaint does not allege in any particular fashion the work Donahue performed, we have held that:

"The essential duties of court officers in all departments of the Trial Court include, but are not limited to, the provision of security for the public, jurors, parties, witnesses, attorneys, judges, court personnel, and prisoners, in the courtroom and in other designated areas of the courthouse; maintenance of order and response to disruptive events in the courtroom; custody, care, escort, and documentation of prisoners within the courthouse; confinement or release of defendants at the direction of the court; location and direction of trial participants; and the communication of information of court procedures to the public, litigants, witnesses, attorneys, jurors, and citizens summoned for jury service."

Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 375, 946 N.E.2d 704 (2011). Furthermore, many of the duties performed by court officers are set forth in various statutes. See, e.g., G. L. c. 185, § 13 ; G. L. c. 185C, § 15 ; G. L. c. 217, § 30 ; G. L. c. 221, § 69A.⁷ Also, pursuant to G. L. c. 221, § 70A, court officers "may perform police duties and have police powers in...