Donaldson v. Reid
| Decision Date | 01 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:11CV1035 |
| Parties | LONNIE DONALDSON, PETITIONER, v. ROBERT REID, Sheriff, RESPONDENT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION& ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. 28) prepared by Magistrate Judge Greg White, who recommends dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Petitioner Lonnie Donaldson ("Petitioner" or "Donaldson"). Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 29), to which Respondent has replied. (Doc. 30.) The Court has conducted its de novo review of the matters raised in the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). For the reasons that follow, the objections are OVERRULED, the R&R is ACCEPTED, and the petition is DISMISSED.
The facts in this case are largely undisputed and are outlined thoroughly within the R&R issued by the Magistrate Judge. Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate's recitation of the facts, but only to his analysis thereof and his legal conclusions. Accordingly, the Court will ADOPT the factual and procedural background set forth in the R&R (Doc. 28 at 7-11) without alteration or addition.
In order to provide context for the discussion herein, however, the Court will briefly relate the basic procedural events that give rise to the Court's ruling. In October 2007, aCuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on one count of aggravated murder (Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01(A)) with a capital mass murder specification and a firearm specification (Ohio Rev. Code § 2941.145), and one count of attempted murder (Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02(A), 2923.02), also with a firearm specification (Ohio Rev. Code § 2941.145). (Doc. 21-2.)
On December 2, 2009, Petitioner was brought to trial. A jury was impaneled on December 4, 2009. On December 10, 2009, the trial prematurely ended because of the trial judge's sua sponte declaration of mistrial over Petitioner's objections. (Doc. 21-4.) The mistrial was precipitated by defense counsel's revelation—six days into trial—that they had failed to discover and review audio recordings made by their own investigator some twenty-two months before. What is more, defense counsel gave differing accounts to the court of what the recordings contained. Specifically, defense counsel initially asserted that the recordings contained exculpatory or impeachment evidence, but later recanted these assertions after listening to the recordings in their entirety. (Doc. 21-4 at 3.) Because of this revelation and counsel's contradictory statements, the Court sua sponte declared a mistrial over the defendant's objection in the interest of protecting the defendant's right to effective representation and a fair trial.
In declaring a mistrial, the trial court indicated that it had "conducted a scrupulous search for alternatives," but found that "declaring a mistrial [was] manifestly necessary [...] in order to ensure the guarantees of a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel as required by the Constitution." (Id. at 4-5.) The trial court declined to make an actual finding of ineffective assistance or prejudice to Petitioner pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because it found that such a conclusion could only be made in hindsight. (Id. at 2-3.)
On March 13, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a retrial. (Doc. 21-5.) The trial court denied the motion. (Doc. 21-7.) After a recusal by the trial judge, the case was transferred to a new judge, who considered Petitioner's renewed motion to dismiss the indictment on the same grounds. (Docs. 21-8, 21-10, 21-12.) On April 21, 2011, the newly assigned judge issued an opinion denying the motion. (Doc. 21-13.)
On May 20, 2011, Petitioner, who remained in state custody, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that a second trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1.) On September 1, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R, recommending that the Court deny Donaldson's petition. The Magistrate Judge concluded that the state trial court's sua sponte declaration of mistrial was occasioned by manifest necessity—the deficient performance of defense counsel and a lack of viable alternative courses of action. Petitioner raises six objections to the R&R, discussed below.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Because this action is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 rather than § 2254, the parties dispute whether the post-judgment standard of review of state court decisions adopted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( (the "AEDPA") applies in this case.
Section 2254 of the AEDPA provides that a federal court:
may not grant a writ of habeas to a petitioner in state custody with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the state court's decision 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court' or (2) the state court's decision 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.'
Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 524-25 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (citation omitted)). The Sixth Circuit has explained that ordinarily a pretrial detainee pursues habeas relief under § 2241 instead of § 2254 because § 2254 applies to a person held "pursuant to the judgment of a State court [...]." Klein v. Leis, 548 F.3d 425, 430 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)).1 The Sixth Circuit, however, has not made a definitive ruling as to whether a § 2241 petition should be converted to a § 2254 petition where the state court enters judgment during the pendency of the federal habeas petition.
Recognizing this lack of controlling authority, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that regardless of which standard applies, the trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial is entitled to some degree of discretion. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1863 (2010). The Magistrate Judge then proceeded to consider Donaldson's claim under § 2241 anddid not apply the deferential "unreasonable application of clearly established federal law" standard from § 2254.2 Neither party has objected to this determination; therefore, this Court will conduct a de novo review pursuant to § 2241 of those matters properly objected to by Petitioner. Rule 72(b)(3); see, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) ().
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957)). Embodied within this policy of finality is the accused's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal [...]." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); United States v. Cameron, 953 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1992). "The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, does not act as an absolute bar to reprosecution in every case." United States v. Gantley, 172 F.3d 422, 427 (6th Cir. 1999). In some circumstances, the defendant's right to have his caseresolved by a particular tribunal must "be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." Wade, 336 U.S. at 689 (). When a mistrial has been declared, a defendant may be retried if, and only if, there is a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial, or the defendant requests or consents to a mistrial. Pryor v. Bock, 261 F.Supp.2d 805, 808 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Cameron, 953 F.2d at 243.
The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the "manifest necessity" doctrine in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824). Pursuant to this doctrine, a mistrial should not be declared unless " 'there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.' " Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 329 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580). The Perez approach "abjures the application of any mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying and often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal trial." Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973). Instead, Perez prescribes a case-by-case approach, taking into account all the facts and circumstances to determine whether there was a manifest (i.e., a "high degree" of) necessity for the mistrial declaration. Harpster, 128 F.3d at 328 (...
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