Fleming v. Metrish
Decision Date | 25 February 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 07-2311.,07-2311. |
Citation | 556 F.3d 520 |
Parties | Stephen Michael FLEMING, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Linda METRISH, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Janet A. VanCleve, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Douglas W. Baker, State Appellate Defender Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Raina I. Korbakis, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Douglas W. Baker, State Appellate Defender Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROGERS, J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 537-58), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Stephen Michael Fleming was convicted of second-degree murder and a related firearm offense. He was sentenced to life in prison on the two charges. Fleming then petitioned for state postconviction relief, but was turned down at all levels of the state judiciary. He subsequently sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, arguing that the state trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress his confession and by not allowing him to call a witness who purportedly would have aided his defense. The district court conditionally granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case with instructions to deny Fleming's petition.
Scott York was found dead in the woods of Moffat Township, Michigan on October 21, 1999. York had been shot both in the face and in the back of the head. In early November 1999, Fleming's brother provided Detective Robert Lesneski with information that led Lesneski to conclude that Fleming was involved in York's death. Fleming's brother persuaded Fleming to explain his connection with York to Lesneski. Lesneski subsequently arranged a meeting with Fleming.
During the meeting, Fleming told Detective Lesneski that he had picked up a hitchhiker on October 21, 1999. The hitchhiker and Fleming proceeded to a store to purchase alcoholic beverages and then left to drink together. Fleming told Lesneski that he later dropped off the hitchhiker somewhere near Sterling, Michigan. Lesneski showed Fleming a photograph of a man and asked whether it depicted the hitchhiker. After Fleming said that it did, Lesneski identified the man in the photo as York.
The police subsequently obtained a search warrant for Fleming's residence and other buildings on his farm in mid-November 1999. Upon arriving at Fleming's residence, Detective Lesneski said that Fleming was "very cooperative" and even told the officers about illegal drugs that were located on the property. After finding the drugs, Lesneski approached Fleming to "read him his rights" and to ask if Fleming would speak with him. Fleming refused to answer "questions about that fucking homicide or homosexual activity," and then said that he was "not going to be one of the guys that you hear about in 60 minutes, that went to jail for something he didn't do." Lesneski subsequently placed Fleming under arrest for possessing illegal drugs and had him put in the back seat of a police squad car. The detective estimated that Fleming was placed in the car between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. A search continued on Fleming's property for evidence relating to York's death.
Approximately one hour later, Fleming was taken from the squad car to a narcotics van to sit with Officer Robert Clayton, where Fleming would sit for roughly two hours. Fleming and Officer Clayton engaged in "small talk" until Detective Lesneski approached the van and smiled. Clayton surmised that something "positive" had happened. Indeed, the police had found the murder weapon and were therefore "quite excited."
Officer Clayton next told Fleming that things did not look good for him and that "maybe he needed to do the right thing." Fleming testified, on the other hand, that Clayton told him that "it's obviously not a good sign for you," and that "[i]f you have a chance at anything, . . . I would [ ] strongly recommend that you get with the program is my advice." Clayton denied ever telling Fleming "[t]o get with the program." There is no dispute, however, that between one and five minutes later Clayton asked whether Fleming wished to speak with Detective Lesneski. Fleming agreed to do so. Shortly thereafter, Lesneski took Clayton's place in the van.
Detective Lesneski testified that he did not ask any questions or begin an interrogation when he entered the van. He said that Fleming began to weep. Lesneski then moved the van out of view of the other officers who were in the vicinity because Fleming did not want them to see him crying. After Lesneski moved the van, Fleming said that he felt hot and nauseous. Lesneski opened the van's doors for Fleming so that he could get some air. After asking for "a couple of minutes" to "get [his] head straight," Fleming confessed to York's murder. Fleming then asked Lesneski whether the police had found the gun. Lesneski replied that they had.
Detective Leskneski maintains that he let Fleming speak without interruption until he was finished. Lesneski said that he then told Fleming the following:
I read you your rights once today, . . . and you didn't want to talk to me. . . . Now I am required by law to read you your rights. I have to protect you. My job is to protect you and I need to do that. I don't want you waking up tomorrow feeling sorry for something you did or didn't say.
Lesneski proceeded to read Fleming his Miranda rights for the second time. Fleming acknowledged that he understood his rights. Lesneski then questioned Fleming about York's death. In response, Fleming provided "far more information" about the circumstances surrounding the killing. Approximately an hour later, Detective Lesneski tape recorded Fleming's confession at a police station. Lesneski read Fleming his Miranda rights a third time before recording the statement. The recording was played for the jury at trial.
Fleming offered a different version of the conversation that took place inside the van with Detective Lesneski. According to Fleming, Lesneski initiated the conversation and claimed to have
found a weapon and that it [would] be within my best interests to cooperate. He told me that I did need to—he told me to be careful of what I say, that don't be sorry for — you don't want to be sorry for something you have or haven't said. I don't remember the exact words, but there was a conversation before I had— I didn't come right out and say, "Yeah, I done it."
Fleming's counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements Fleming made to Detective Lesneski. In April 2000, the trial court conducted a so-called Walker hearing, which under Michigan law refers to a "phase of motion practice in which all issues of admissibility of a defendant's statements are resolved." People v. Ray, 431 Mich. 260, 430 N.W.2d 626, 631 (1988) (discussing People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965)). Fleming's counsel framed the issues at stake in the hearing as follows: The prosecutor framed the issue, in contrast, as "nothing but voluntariness." Accepting the prosecutor's statement of the issue, the state trial court held, without explaining why, that "[t]he only issue . . . is whether or not [the confession] was voluntary."
In May 2000, Fleming stood trial in the state court. He maintained that he had killed York in self-defense, thinking that York was going to harm him. In support of this claim, Fleming testified that York bragged about robbing drug dealers and that he had asked Fleming for "a couple hundred dollars" to buy crack cocaine. Fleming also claimed that York became furious when he refused, telling Fleming that "I am going to kick your fucking teeth right through your head." He further alleged that he shot York twice before York hit the ground because York would not stop advancing toward him after Fleming warned him to stop. In addition to his own testimony, Fleming presented two witnesses who said that York had a reputation for being violent. The trial court refused, however, to allow Fleming to call a witness who allegedly saw York rob a drug dealer the week before York was killed.
After exhausting his state-court remedies, Fleming sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, alleging that he was being held in a state prison in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court conditionally granted Fleming's petition, holding that his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent had been violated and that he was denied his constitutional right to mount a defense because the trial court did not permit Fleming to call a witness who purportedly would have bolstered his self-defense claim. This timely appeal followed.
Ivory v. Jackson, 509 F.3d 284, 291 (6th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). AEDPA provides that a federal court
may not grant a writ of habeas to a petitioner in state custody with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the state court's decision `was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established...
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