Donley v. Hudsons Salvage, L.L.C.
| Decision Date | 20 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-31159,11-31159 |
| Parties | FLOYD P. DONLEY, SR., Plaintiff - Appellant v. HUDSONS SALVAGE, L.L.C.; LINDA COX; VELMA ELAINE HINGLE; ANGIE CARTER; LOIS PELTIER; JERRY HOLIFIELD; ALAN SPALLINGER; ALLEN ORDENEAUX, III; SERGEANT VARNADO; TED SIMMONS; JERRY TRABONA; CHARLES REID; AMITE CITY COUNCIL; JOEY PHILLIPS; DOMINIC CUTI; REGINALD GOLDSBY, Defendants - Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Summary Calendar
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before JONES, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
*
Before us on appeal is the fifth in a series of lawsuits filed by the plaintiff, Floyd Donley, in relation to a single incident. This suit rehashes claims already raised in prior suits against largely the same defendants, who can be divided into two groups: Ordeneaux, Phillips, Cuti, Trabona, Simmons, Varnado, Reid, Goldsby, and the Amite City Council (collectively, the "Amite Defendants") and Cox, Hingle, Spallinger, Peltier, Carter, Holifield, and Hudson's Salvage, LLC (collectively, the "Hudson's Defendants"). Because all of Donley's claims are precluded under res judicata, we AFFIRM the district court's decision.
In September 2008, Donley was in a store owned by Hudson's Salvage, LLC ("Hudson's Salvage") photographing what he believed to be safety violations. A store employee called the police, and Officer Ordeneaux was dispatched to the investigate the complaint that Donley refused to leave. When Ordeneaux arrived, Cox, a store manager, told him that Donley was verbally combative and refused to leave the store. Cox also told Ordeneaux that Donley struck Hingle, a store employee,1 and Spallinger, a private security officer on duty at the store. Cox had already called for ambulances for Hingle and Donley.2
Donley refused Ordeneaux's request for his driver's license and, according to affidavits from Ordeneaux and Officer Phillips, was verbally combative. Donley gestured sharply at Ordeneaux. Ordeneaux stated that Donley "lunged at me with a closed fist as if to strike me." Phillips stated that Donley "raised his arms above his head and walked toward Officer Ordeneaux in a threatening manner." Ordeneaux then handcuffed Donley. The store surveillance video does not show Donley lunging at Ordeneaux or raising his arms above his head, and it does not conclusively show whether Donley gestured with a closed fist, but itdoes show Donley abruptly gesturing and that Ordeneaux did not touch Donley prior to handcuffing him. The officers remained with Donley until the ambulance arrived.
Hospital staff examined and released Donley. The officers allowed him to visit his personal physician for a second opinion, but instructed him to surrender to the Amite City Police Department the next day. Donley surrendered to the police the next day and was booked for two counts of simple battery.
Donley was convicted of one count of simple battery on Hingle by Magistrate Reid in the Amite City Mayor's Court. The conviction was dismissed on appeal.
Donley has filed four prior civil actions based on his arrest and subsequent conviction.3 In his first suit, Donley filed a § 1983 complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana against a paramedic not named in this action and appellees Ordeneaux, Phillips, Cuti, Trabona, and Simmons in their capacities as employees of Amite City. The lower court granted summary judgment and dismissed Donley's claims on the basis of qualified immunity, and we affirmed. Donley v. Ordeneaux, 419 F. App'x 519, 520 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-149, 2011 WL 3420716 (Oct. 11, 2011). In his second suit, Donley sued Reid in state court in his capacity as City Attorney and Magistrate of Amite City. The trial court granted Reid's peremptory exception of no cause or right of action and dismissed Donley's suit on the ground that Reid enjoyed judicial immunity for all of his official acts as presiding officer of a major's court, and the appellate court affirmed. Donley v. Reid, No. 2010-1217, 2010 WL 5487149, at *1 (La. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 22, 2010), writ denied, 61 So. 3d 669 (La. 2011), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3712 (2011). In his third suit, Donley sued Hudson's Salvage, Cox, Hingle, Spallinger, Peltier, and Holifield "for personal injury, false arrest andimprisonment, defamation, malicious prosecution, and violation of his civil rights," arising out of his arrest and trial. Donley v. Hudson's Salvage, LLC, No. 2010-1315, 2010 WL 5480438, at *1 (La. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 22, 2010). The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in favor of the defendants for malicious prosecution and defamation and affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of the defendants on all other claims. The remaining claims for malicious prosecution and defamation are pending in Louisiana state court as of the filing of the Hudson's Defendants' brief.
The district court in this case held that the three prior judgments against Donley preclude all of his claims against the defendants who were parties to Donley's prior suits.4 The district court held that Donley's claims against the remaining defendants are also barred by claim preclusion.5 The district court also held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Donley's § 1983 claims because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983, the Hudson's Defendants are not state actors, and no cause of action for malicious prosecution exists under § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Donley's conspiracy claim under § 1983 because Donley produced no evidence of an agreement among any of the defendants to do an illegal act. The district court held that Donley's claims against Reid are barred by judicial immunity and that his defamation claims based on testimony by the defendants are barred by witness immunity. The district court held that all of Donley's state law claims, except for malicious prosecution, have prescribed and that, in regard to his malicious prosecution claim, Donley could not establish that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him.
DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
The Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, "'requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.'" Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson, 632 F. Supp. 2d 586, 594 (E.D. La. 2008) (quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982)). "In determining the preclusive effect of an earlier state court judgment, federal courts apply the preclusion law of the state that rendered the judgment." Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank N.A., No. 10-10835, 2011 WL 4910018, at *4 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2011) (citations omitted). As the Louisiana res judicata statute "is modeled on federal preclusion doctrine and the Restatement on Judgments, federal jurisprudence may be consulted when the relevant Louisiana cases leave doubt at to the meaning of the statute. Sevin, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 595. The federal common law of claim preclusion:
bars the litigation of claims that either have been litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit. The test for claim preclusion has four elements: (1) the parties in the subsequent action are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the same action; (2) the judgment in the prior case was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there has been a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action is involved in both suits. . . . When all four elements are present, claim preclusion prohibits a litigant from asserting any claim or defense in the later action that was or could have been raised in support of or in opposition to the cause of action asserted in the prior action.
Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362, 372 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
This court has held that res judicata is justified "where the non-party's interests were adequately represented by a party to the original suit." Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1990). "[A] non-party will be considered 'in privity, or sufficiently close to a party in the prior suit so as to justify preclusion,' where the party to the first suit is so closely aligned with the nonparty's interests as to be his 'virtual representative.'" Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 960 F.2d 1286, 1297 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Benson & Ford, Inc. v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 833 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1987)). Under Louisiana law, "the preclusive effect of an earlier judgment could bind a nonparty . . . whose interests were adequately represented by parties to the prior litigation." Williams v. Orleans Levee Dist., 31 So. 3d 1048, 1049 (La. 2010) (citing Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 738, 745 (2005)).
While we "liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants and apply less stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel, pro se parties must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the standards of Rule 28." Grant v. Cueller, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Donley lists eighteen separate issues in his appellate brief (two issues are labeled in Donley's brief as "Issue III"). For the sake of clarity, we will address each in turn.
1. Donley argues that Magistrate Judge Wilkinson was biased against him in his ruling granting the...
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