O'Donnell v. United Elec. Rys. Co.

Decision Date19 October 1926
Docket NumberNos. 6215, 6216.,s. 6215, 6216.
Citation134 A. 642
PartiesO'DONNELL v. UNITED ELECTRIC RYS. CO. (two cases).
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Edward W. Blodgett, Judge.

Separate actions by Anna O'Donnell and by John B. O'Donnell against the United Electric Railways Company. Directed verdicts for defendant, and each case transferred from superior court on plaintiffs' exceptions. Exceptions sustained, and cases remitted.

Flynn & Mahoney and James W. Leighton, all of Providence, for plaintiffs.

Clifford Whipple and Alonzo R, Williams, both of Providence, for defendant.

STEARNS, J. These are actions on the case for negligence to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiffs, caused by a collision between an electric trolley car and a Ford touring automobile owned and driven by the plaintiff, John, in which his wife, the plaintiff Anna, was a passenger. By agreement the cases were tried together. At the conclusion of the evidence the trial justice directed a verdict for the defendant in each case. The only questions presented by the plaintiffs' bill of exceptions are in regard to the direction of the verdicts.

The collision occurred at the corner of Franklin and Broad streets, in Providence, in the late afternoon of a clear day in June, 1922. Franklin street runs north and south, and intersects Broad street, which runs east and west. Both streets are wide. Defendant operates trolley cars on tracks on both streets. John O'Donnell, who was driving southerly along Franklin street, was stopped by a signal of a traffic officer when he reached the junction of Broad street, as was also the electric car of defendant, which was behind the automobile. The traffic was heavy. After he had allowed the traffic on Broad street to proceed for a time, the officer stopped the traffic on Broad street and signaled for O'Donnell and the trolley car to move forward. The trolley car was a Riverpoint car and its route was along Franklin street to the corner, and thence to the right and west along Broad street. O'Donnell's destination was across Broad street and on through Beacon avenue, which is a continuation in a straight line of Franklin street on the south of Broad street. Mrs. Fox, a friend of the O'Donnells, sat on the front seat beside the driver. Mrs. O'Donnell, mith two children, sat on the rear sent.

O'Donnell, at the signal of the officer, started slowly to cross Broad street; after moving forward a short distance, O'Donnell testified that he saw an automobile on Broad street approaching the intersection from the left, at high speed. Fearing that it could not or would not be stopped in time to avoid a collision, if he continued into Broad street, O'Donnell gave a signal with his hand that he was about to stop, and at or about the same time stopped his automobile; within a few seconds thereafter his automobile was struck from behind with considerable force. Mrs. Fox's testimony is to the same effect. The automobile was pushed ahead, the left rear mudguard was broken and a dent was made in the left side of the back of the automobile. The motorman testified that he had stopped the trolley car about 10 feet behind the automobile; the traffic officer signaled for the automobile to go ahead and then for the trolley car to proceed; the automobile started first, then the trolley car started; the trolley car was not going over 4 miles an hour when the automobile suddenly stopped on the crosswalk; the trolley car had not then gone more than 12 or 15 feet, and was then 5 or 6 feet behind the automobile, which had gone not more than 7 or 8 feet when it stopped; he applied the emergency brake, and did all he could to stop, but could not avoid hitting the automobile; the collision did not move the automobile at all; the driver of the automobile did not give any signal with his hand that he was about to stop.

The trial justice held that the plaintiff! John was guilty of negligence in stopping his automobile, because there was no necessity for stopping, although plaintiff thought there was, and that there was no negligence on the part of the motorman. The traffic officer testified that after the collision the motorman stated that he was sorry; that he thought he had room enough to make it. The motorman denied making any such statement.

The plaintiff Anna was a passenger, and in the circumstances her right of action was not affected by the negligence, if any, of the driver of the automobile. Hermann v. R. I. Co., 36 R. I. 447, 90 A. 813. On motion to direct a verdict, the weight of the evidence of negligence or the credibility of witnesses could not properly be considered by the trial court. If there was any evidence of defendant's negligence, the direction of the verdict in the case of Anna was improper, as the case then should have...

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22 cases
  • Goyette v. Sousa
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1959
    ...of special circumstances, negligence by the defendant is a reasonable inference from the occurrence of a mishap. O'Donnell v. United Electric Rys., 48 R.I. 18, 134 A. 642; Corbett v. Lymansville Co., R.I., 69 A. 69. In such cases the inference is warranted because the defendant is in exclus......
  • Kalify v. Udin
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1932
    ...on any reasonable view of the testimony, the plaintiff can recover. Douglas v. Matzner, 51 R. I. 1, 149 A. 861; O'Donnell v. United Electric Rys. Co., 48 R. I. 18, 134 A. 642; Gilbane v. Lent, 41 R. I. 462, 104 A. 77; Reddington v. Getchell, 40 R. I. 463, 101 A. 123, 125. The testimony for ......
  • Gillogly v. New England Transp. Co.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • February 26, 1948
    ...no error in the admission of Ricci's testimony to rebut such evidence. See Souza v. United Electric Rys., supra; O'Donnell v. United Electric Rys., 48 R.I. 18, 22, 134 A. 642. There is no merit in defendant's claim before us that it was prejudiced by the fact that its witnesses, with the ex......
  • Roy v. United Elec. Rys. Co.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • February 15, 1933
    ...the plaintiff can recover. Saunders v. Kenyon, 52 R. I. 221, 159 A. 824; Riley v. Tsagarakis, 50 R. I. 62, 145 A. 12; O'Donnell v. U. E. Rys. Co., 48 R. I. 18, 134 A. 642; Dawley v. Congdon, 42 R. I. 64, 105 A. 393; Reddington v. Getchell, 40 R. I. 463, 101 A. 123, 125. In the latter case w......
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