Donnelly v. Donnelly
| Decision Date | 13 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 14-21-00592-CV |
| Parties | MARIA CRISTINA CHIROLLA DONNELLY, Appellant v. JOHN P. DONNELLY, ERIC DONNELLY, & MARK DONNELLY, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
MARIA CRISTINA CHIROLLA DONNELLY, Appellant
v.
JOHN P. DONNELLY, ERIC DONNELLY, & MARK DONNELLY, Appellees
No. 14-21-00592-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District
October 13, 2022
On Appeal from Probate Court No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 477195-401
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jerry Zimmerer, Justice
Maria Cristina Chirolla Donnelly appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of John P. Donnelly, Eric Donnelly, and Mark Donnelly. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Background
Maria and George Donnelly married in 2010. Appellees, John, Eric, and Mark
Donnelly were George's children from a previous marriage. Before George and Maria married, they executed a Premarital Property Agreement in which they agreed that all property each spouse owned before marriage would remain that spouse's separate property. Before George's death, he executed another will purporting to revoke all prior wills and the Premarital Property Agreement, leaving all his estate to Maria. George also designated Maria as the beneficiary on his life insurance policy.
George owned an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) at the time of his first wife's death. The proceeds of George's IRA are at the heart of the underlying action. In September 2007, after George's first wife died, he named his three sons, John, Mark, and Eric Donnelly as the beneficiaries of his IRA. It is undisputed that George did not change his beneficiary designation on his IRA before he died in May 2019.
After George's death Maria filed the underlying action to recover the proceeds of the IRA. In Maria's second-amended petition she requested a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA) declaring that she was the beneficiary of George's IRA. In seeking that declaration Maria alleged (1) the IRA was community property; (2) George intended that Maria be the beneficiary of the IRA; and (3) George was required to designate her as the beneficiary because the IRA had been rolled over from a 401(k) account.
Maria further asserted tort claims in which she alleged that John Donnelly, acting in his capacity as George's financial advisor, breached a fiduciary duty owed to George by failing to change the beneficiary designation on the IRA. Finally, Maria alleged that John had a duty to disclose to George that John had not changed the beneficiary designation on the IRA. Maria relied on statements made at a meeting held at the Briar Club while George was still alive. George, John, and Maria were at the meeting and, according to Maria's affidavit, George asked John to change the
beneficiary designation on his IRA from his sons to Maria.
Appellees answered Maria's petition, and later filed a motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment primarily on the grounds that Maria could not establish any interest in the IRA. Appellees asserted that George created the IRA before his marriage to Maria and made no contributions to the account during their marriage. Appellees asserted, therefore, that the IRA was George's separate property at the time of his death. Appellees attached to their motion for summary judgment the beneficiary designation forms signed by George naming appellees as the beneficiaries of the IRA. Appellees further relied on the Premarital Property Agreement signed as evidence that Maria agreed to the separate property characterization of the IRA.
John also asserted Maria failed to produce any evidence that John owed a fiduciary duty to George or that he breached such a duty. John asserted that Maria failed to produce any evidence of fraud by non-disclosure because there was no evidence that George intended to change the beneficiary designation on his IRA.
Maria filed several documents in response to appellees' motion for summary judgment including an affidavit in which she averred that George instructed John to change the beneficiary designation on his IRA at the Briar Club dinner. Appellees objected to Maria's affidavit on the grounds that it contained hearsay and that her recitations of statements made by George were not admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 601(b), otherwise known as the Dead Man's Rule.
The trial court sustained appellees' objections to Maria's affidavit and granted summary judgment dismissing all Maria's claims. Appellees subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to section 37.009 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009 (permitting trial court to award costs and attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action). After a hearing,
the trial court signed a final judgment dismissing all Maria's claims and awarding attorney's fees to appellees. This appeal followed.
In five issues Maria challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment on her claims seeking declaratory judgment and damages for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Maria further challenges the trial court's ruling excluding her affidavit and the trial court's award of attorney's fees. Finally, Maria asserts the trial court lacked authority to render summary judgment and award fees because the January order was a final judgment.
Analysis
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The DJA generally permits a person who is interested under a deed or other contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute or contract, to obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(a). In a declaratory-judgment action, a party who asserts an affirmative claim for relief has the burden of proving its allegations. See Saba Zi Expl., LP v. Vaughn, 448 S.W.3d 123, 129 n.11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (party seeking declaration bears burden of establishing entitlement to requested declaratory judgment). Because the trial court determined the challenged declaratory-judgment issue through summary judgment, we review the propriety of the trial court's declarations under the same standards we apply to summary judgments. Lidawi v. Progressive Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
We review a no-evidence summary judgment under a legal sufficiency standard. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003) ("A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, and we
apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict."). A no-evidence summary judgment will be sustained when: "(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact." Id. at 751 (citing Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)).
We review a trial court's order granting a traditional summary judgment de novo. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. 2007). To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, a movant must prove entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issues pled and set out in the motion for summary judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 607 (Tex. 2013).
If the trial court grants summary judgment without specifying the grounds, we affirm the judgment if any of the grounds presented are meritorious. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). We first review the trial court's no-evidence summary judgment under the standards of Rule 166a(i). See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). The nonmovant, here Maria, must produce summary-judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact to defeat the summary judgment under that provision. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i). If Maria failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence under that burden, then there is no need to analyze whether appellees' proof satisfied the Rule 166a(c) burden. See Ford Motor, 135 S.W.3d at 600; Walker v. Holmes, Diggs, Eames & Sadler,
No. 14-19-00234-CV, 2020 WL 2120295, at *3 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] May 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
II. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Maria's declaratory judgment claims.
In Maria's first issue she challenges the trial court's dismissal of her claims by summary judgment. Maria sought a declaratory judgment determining (1) the marital property character of the IRA; and (2) Maria was the beneficiary of the IRA. In the alternative, Maria sought declaratory judgment that George intended Maria to be the beneficiary of the IRA, or that George was required to designate Maria as the beneficiary.[1]
Maria also filed tort claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. The trial court's summary judgment dismissed all of Maria's claims. We first address Maria's issue challenging the trial court's dismissal of her claims for declaratory judgment. We address the dismissal of her tort claims below.
A. IRA Beneficiary Designation
Maria sought a declaratory judgment that she was the beneficiary of George's IRA. An IRA is a trust created or organized in the United States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries, but only if the written governing instrument meets certain requirements under the United States Code. 26 U.S.C.A. § 408(a). It is undisputed that George's IRA was funded before...
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