Donnelly v. Minneapolis Manufacturing Company
| Decision Date | 12 December 1924 |
| Docket Number | 24,278 |
| Citation | 201 N.W. 305,161 Minn. 240 |
| Parties | D. J. DONNELLY v. MINNEAPOLIS MANUFACTURING COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $7,007.30. From an order, Salmon, J., sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
When employe under Compensation Act can sue employer for omission of statutory duty.
So far as it covers rights and remedies in the field of industrial accident and occupational disease, the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive of all common law remedies. But inasmuch as it allows compensation only for the occupational diseases expressly enumerated, an employe who has become afflicted with a disabling ailment, not among those so enumerated, through negligence of the employer amounting to the omission of a statutory duty, has an action at law for damages.
P. W Viesselman, for appellant.
K. A Campbell and B. Burness, for respondent.
In this case, plaintiff, an employe of defendant, seeks to recover damages because, as he alleges, plaintiff contracted "an occupational disease," known as "chronic bronchitis with chemical poisoning" on account of the negligence of defendant. A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained and plaintiff appeals. Taking the complaint at its face value, as we must for present purposes, plaintiff has become afflicted with the disease in question because defendant, a manufacturer among other things of flax straw products, violated the duty imposed upon it by section 4, chapter 491, p. 645, L. 1919, so to equip the factory or work room wherein plaintiff was employed, with "proper and sufficient means of ventilation" and so to "maintain proper and sufficient ventilation" as to prevent the unhealthful accumulation of dust to an extent "injurious to the health or safety" of employes. It is by reason of defendant's neglect of that duty, the complaint charges, that plaintiff is now a sufferer from bronchitis and chemical poisoning. Notwithstanding the insistence of counsel on both sides upon presenting the fact that plaintiff has made an unsuccessful effort to procure an award of compensation from the Industrial Commission, we decline to consider it, for the complaint is silent concerning it. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction, and therefore its refusal of an award is immaterial. We must indulge, however, the presumption created by section 11, p. 93, chapter 82, L. 1921 (the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act), that both plaintiff and defendant, during the former's employment, were subject to part 2 of the compensation law.
Plaintiff has no claim for accidental injury, even though he may have suffered his supposed disabling detriment by reason of and in the course of his employment, for it is not the result of accident as defined in section 66. "Accident" is there defined as "an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body." Plaintiff does not claim to have been a victim of a mischance of that kind.
Likewise, plaintiff is excluded from all advantage of the provisions of the compensation law furnishing relief on account of occupational disease, for it is provided in subdivision 9 of section 67, that "for the purpose of this act only the diseases enumerated * * * shall be deemed to be occupational diseases." Neither "chemical poisoning" nor "chronic bronchitis" is included in the enumeration. Therefore they are excluded, and plaintiff is wholly without remedy under the compensation law, although for present purposes it must be assumed that he has been grieviously injured in the course and by reason of his occupation, and through a fault of the employer amounting to a violation of statutory duty.
Defendant contends, and upon this theory the complaint was held bad, that although in a given case an employe may have contracted a noncompensable disease through the negligence of his employer, it is a wrong without a remedy, the purpose and effect of the compensation law being to take away from employes subject thereto all remedy except where they suffer accidental injury, or become afflicted with one of the occupational diseases for which compensation is allowed.
The argument is predicated upon Mathison v. M. St. Ry Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N.W. 71, L.R.A. 1916D, 412; Hyett v. Northwestern Hospital, 147 Minn. 413, 180 N.W. 552, and Novack v. Montgomery-Ward Co. 158 Minn. 505, 198 N.W. 294. But in none of these cases was the question involved or decided. In the Mathison case, a plaintiff injured by accident while in the employ of the defendant, disregarding the statute, attempted to recover for damages as for negligence. The effort failed because the situation was covered expressly by the statute, and the parties were limited to the rights and remedies thereby provided. The main question involved in the case was the constitutionality of the law. There is certainly nothing in the opinion warranting the argument now attempted, that it was the intention of the statute to take away from an employe, damaged by his employer's omission of a satutory duty, all right of action, the compensation law substituting nothing in its place. The last comment applies equally to the Hyett case wherein the holding was that the remedy of the compensation law "is exclusive of all other." Of course it is exclusive so far as it covers the field of industrial accident and occupational disease, but no farther. To the extent that the field is not touched by the statute, it must be considered that the legislature intentionally permitted it to remain under the common law so that either party, employer or employe, can resort to such action as it furnishes for the protection of a common law right. The first paragraph of the syllabus of the decision in the Hyett case is significant, for it so clearly indicates the intention to hold the compensation act exclusive of all other remedies "in so far as it provides compensation" to an employe accidentally or otherwise injured by the wrongful act of the employer in the course of his employment. It is a necessary corollary of that proposition, it would seem, that if the employe is injured by the wrongful act of the employer, in the...
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