O'Donovan v. Chatard

• Decision Date: 25 September 1884
• Docket Number: 11,507
• Citation: 97 Ind. 421
• Parties: O'Donovan v. Chatard
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

97 Ind. 421

O'Donovan v. Chatard

No. 11,507

Supreme Court of Indiana

September 25, 1884

From the Superior Court of Marion County.

R. Hill and J. W. Nichol, for appellant.

T. A Hendricks, A. W. Hendricks, C. Baker, O. B. Hord, A. Baker and E. Daniels, for appellee.

OPINION

Franklin C.

Appellant brought this action against appellee to recover damages alleging in his complaint, as a cause therefor, that appellee, as bishop in the Catholic church of the proper diocese, had, without jurisdiction and without just cause or provocation, removed appellant as priest in said church, at Brownsburg, Hendricks county, Indiana.

On motion of appellee parts of the complaint were stricken out, and then a demurrer was sustained to the remainder of the complaint, and judgment was rendered for appellee. On appeal to the general term of the court, the judgment of the special term was affirmed.

The question presented by counsel in this court is, can a priest in the Catholic church maintain an action in the civil courts against the bishop for simply removing him from office?

Appellant, in his brief, says: "Had appellant been charged with heresy in faith or practice, or the violation of any rule of the Catholic church, under well settled rules, civil courts would not have heard his complaint, but would have remitted him to his church judicatories, reminding him that when he became a priest in the Catholic church he had agreed to submit such controversies to the decision of these tribunals."

This being true, can the priest raise an issue with his bishop, and submit to the civil courts, whether the action of the bishop in matters of discipline and church government was right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, wise or unwise, and have the opinion of a jury upon that subject?

In the case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, it is said, on page 728: "In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for."

In the case of Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 254, (9 Am. R. 690) it was held: "That over the church, as such, the legal tribunals do not have, or profess to have, any jurisdiction whatever, except to protect the civil rights of others and to preserve the public peace. All questions relating to the faith and practice of the church and its members belong to the church judicatures to which they have voluntarily subjected themselves. But the civil courts will interfere with churches and religious associations, and determine upon questions of faith and practice of a church when rights of property and civil rights are involved."

In the case of Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509 (11 Am. R. 95), it was held, that the constitution guarantees "from all interference by the State, not only each man's religious faith, but his membership in the church, and the rights and discipline which might be adopted. The only exception to uncontrolled liberty is, that acts of licentiousness shall not be excused, and practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the State, shall not be justified. Freedom of religious profession and worship can not be maintained, if the civil courts trench upon the domain of the church, construe its canons and rules, dictate its discipline, and regulate its trials."

In the case of White Lick Quarterly Meeting v. White Lick Quarterly Meeting, 89 Ind. 136, it is said, on page 151: "Civil courts in this country have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They can not revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, and can only interfere in church controversies where civil rights or the rights of property are involved. Where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right, and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions, out of which the civil right has arisen, as it finds them, and accepting those decisions as matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction. The civil courts act upon the theory that the ecclesiastical courts are the best judges of merely ecclesiastical questions, and of all matters which concern the doctrines and discipline of the respective religious denominations to which they belong. When a person becomes a member of a church he becomes so upon the condition of submission to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and however much he may be dissatisfied with the exercise of that jurisdiction, he has no right to invoke the supervisory power of a civil court so long as none of his civil rights are invaded. This doctrine inevitably results from that total separation between church and state which exists within the limits of the United States, and is essential to the full enjoyment of the guaranteed rights of American citizenship. Very naturally a different rule prevails in England, where church and state are united."

In the case of German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282, it is said on page 291: "The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other judicial tribunal, are final; as they are the best judges of what constitutes an offence against the word of God and the discipline of the church. Any other than those courts must be incompetent judges of matters of faith, discipline and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction, would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt, which would do anything but improve either religion or good morals."

In the case of Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253, it is said: "This court, having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, can not revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline or excision. Our only judicial power in the case arises from the conflicting claims of the parties to the church property and the use of it. And these we must decide as we do all other civil controversies brought to this tribunal for ultimate decision. We can not decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut off from the body of the church. * * * The judicial eye of the civil authority of this land of religious liberty, can not penetrate the veil of the church, nor can the arm of this court either rend or touch that veil for the forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of the excinded members. When they became members they did so on the condition of continuing or not, as themselves and their church might determine. In that respect they voluntarily subjected themselves to the ecclesiastical power, and can not invoke the...