State ex rel. Hatfield v. Cummins

• Decision Date: 02 July 1908
• Docket Number: No. 21,097.,21,097.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HATFIELD v. CUMMINS et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

171 Ind. 112

85 N.E. 359

STATE ex rel. HATFIELD

v.CUMMINS et al.

No. 21,097.^d1

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 2, 1908.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Huntington County; W. D. Hamer, Judge.

Mandamus by the state, on relation of James M. Hatfield, against J. Abijah Cummins and others, to require the appointment of arbiters to determine relator's right to be reinstated as a member of a certain church. From an order refusing a peremptory writ, relator appeals. Affirmed.J. T. Alexander, for appellant. Kenner & Kenner and C. K. Lucas, for appellees.

MONTGOMERY, J.

It is alleged that the relator was a member of the religious denomination known as the United Brethren in Christ Church, and of the local society thereof known as Huntington Mission Station, located at Huntington, Ind. That he was unjustly and irregularly expelled from such membership by the local society for “Disobedience to the Order of the Church.” That he duly appealed to the quarterly conference, in pursuance of the laws of the church; and that it is the law of said denomination that when such appeal is taken, the same shall first be reviewed by a board of arbiters composed of five persons, two of whom shall be chosen by the accused, two by the quarterly conference, and the fifth by these four. That his appeal was allowed by the quarterly conference, and that he designated his two members of such board of arbiters, and requested appellees, who composed said conference, to select two members thereof, which was their duty, but they refused so to do, although there were more than 100 available and eligible persons. That membership in said denomination is a valuable right, of which he has been wrongfully deprived, and for redress of which he will be without remedy, unless said board of arbiters be appointed to hear his appeal. Wherefore relator prayed the issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, commanding appellees to appoint two qualified members of said denomination to serve as such arbiters. An alternative writ reciting the above facts, in substance, was issued as prayed. Issues were joined thereon, and a trial by the court resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of appellees.

A number of intermediate questions have been suggested, which do not require consideration, since at all events the judgment below must be affirmed.

Under the statutes of this state “writs of mandate may be issued to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, or a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.” Section 1225, Burns' Ann. St. 1908. A proceeding by way of mandamus is a legal remedy; and to justify the issuance of this writ it is essential that the relator have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and that it be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. 19 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 725; 26 Cyc. 151. The thing sought to be compelled by this action is the taking of an intermediate step, looking ultimately toward the reinstatement of the relator in the church from which he is alleged to have been wrongfully expelled. There is no allegation that the church at large, the quarterly conference, or the local society has been incorporated under the law. The writ is directed, not against a corporate body, but against certain individuals, who, it is averred, compose the quarterly conference of the church. The statutes of this state do not authorize courts of law to issue writs of mandamus to restore a member who has been expelled from membership in a voluntary, unincorporated association, which does not hold or exercise any right, privilege, or franchise conferred by the sovereign power of the state. Merrill on Mandamus, § 157; Burt v. Grand Lodge F. & A. M., 66 Mich. 85, 33 N. W. 13;Weidenfeld v. Keppler, 84 App. Div. 235, 82 N. Y. Supp. 634;Fritz v. Muck, 62 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 69;People, etc., v. N. Y. Medical School, 29 App. Div. 244, 51 N. Y. Supp. 420;Wolf v. Com., 64 Pa. 252; Wolf v. United Daughters, etc., 1 Phila. (Pa.) 374.

The society from which the relator alleges that he was unjustly and arbitrarily excluded was purely of a religious character. The right lying at the foundation of this action is one of religious association and worship. No civil or property right is shown to be involved. The only relation, between the relator and other members of the congregation and church from which he was expelled, disclosed by the pleadings, was of a spiritual and ecclesiastical nature. Civil courts have no jurisdiction and will not pass upon such ecclesiastical matters as expulsion from church membership, in cases where no civil or temporal rights are involved. The settled character of this principle, and the fundamental ground upon which it rests, will be most clearly exhibited by a quotation from some of the adjudications of our own and other courts.

In the case of Grimes' Ex'rs v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am. Rep. 690, this court, in substance, held that, when rights of property, or civil rights as contradistinguished from ecclesiastical rights, are involved, and such rights depend upon religious faith or orthodoxy of citizens, or the rules, discipline, and practice of churches or religious denominations, the courts may entertain and determine judicially all such questions so far as they affect the rights of persons or religious denominations to property or civil rights.

In Gaff et al. v. Greer et al., 88 Ind. 122, 45 Am. Rep. 449, after citing a number of cases, the opinion at page 132 proceeds as follows: “These authorities establish the proposition that the decision of one of these judicatories is binding upon the courts where such questions arise. It is said, however, that appellants had no notice, and for that reason the order is a nullity. This was a question for the Presbytery. We cannot revise its judgment or determine its mode of procedure. This must be left to these bodies, otherwise they would be deprived of their power to construe the laws that govern them.”

The principle governing the jurisdictions of civil and ecclesiastical tribunals was well summed up in the case of White Lick, etc., v. White Lick, etc., 89 Ind. 136, where the court, speaking by Niblack, C. J., said: “Civil courts in this country have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They cannot revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, and can only interfere in church controversies where civil rights or the rights of property are involved. Where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right, and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions, out of which the civil right has arisen, as it finds them, and accepting those decisions as matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction. The civil courts act upon the theory that the ecclesiastical courts are the best judges of merely ecclesiastical questions, and of all matters which concern the doctrines and discipline of the respective religious denominations to which they belong. When a person becomes a member of a church, he becomes so upon the condition of submission to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and however much he may be dissatisfied with the exercise of that jurisdiction, he has no right to invoke the supervisory power of a civil court so long as none of his civil rights are invaded.”

The same principle was reaffirmed in the following cases: O'Donovan v. Chatard, 97 Ind. 421, 49 Am. Rep. 462;Dwenger et al. v. Geary et al., 113 Ind. 106, 14 N. E. 903;Lamb et al. v. Cain et al., 129 Ind. 486, 29 N. E. 13, 14 L. R. A. 518;Smith et al. v. Pedigo et al., 145 Ind. 361, 33 N. E. 777, 44 N. E. 363, 19 L. R. A. 433, 32 L. R. A. 838.

In the case of Dwenger v. Geary, supra, the court quoted, with apparent approval, the following language from Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511: “The court, having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, cannot revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline. Our only judicial power in the case arises from the conflicting claims of the parties to the church property and the use of it. We cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly, cut off from the body of the church.”

In the early case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 679, 20 L. Ed. 666, the court most aptly explained the underlying reasons for and declared the principle under consideration, in the following language: “In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma and establishment of no sect. The...