Dooley v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-0330-T.
| Decision Date | 02 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 91-0330-T. |
| Citation | 817 F. Supp. 245 |
| Parties | Jay DOOLEY v. PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION, Alias: Parker-Bertea Aerospace Group; Metal Bellows, Division of Parker-Bertea Group; and John Does I-X, alias. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Amato A. DeLuca, Mandell, Goodman, DeLuca & Schwartz, Providence, RI, for plaintiff.
Raymond A. LaFazia, Providence, RI, for defendants.
This is a products liability action, in which Jay Dooley seeks damages for personal injuries caused by a machine allegedly owned by Parker-Hannifin Corporation ("Parker-Hannifin"). Parker-Hannifin has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, that motion is granted.
In 1988, Dooley worked for Tubodyne Co., a company that produced metal tubing for industrial use. The tubing made for each customer was formed by a pressing machine fitted with a die specifically designed to satisfy the requirements of that customer. Dooley's job was to operate a pressing machine that produced tubing for Parker-Hannifin.
The machine that Dooley operated had been acquired by Tubodyne when it purchased the assets of American Tube Bending Co. ("American"), Parker-Hannifin's previous supplier. Apparently, the die on that machine had been designed and manufactured by American. Because the die was designed to meet Parker-Hannifin's needs, Parker-Hannifin was charged for the cost of creating it and had the right to take the die if and when it ceased being a customer of American or, later, of Tubodyne.
By early 1988, the die had become worn, making it difficult for the tubing to be held in place during the manufacturing process. Accordingly, Tubodyne asked Parker-Hannifin to underwrite the cost of replacing it. When Parker-Hannifin expressed reluctance to incur the expense of creating a new die, Tubodyne modified the existing die by adding an extension to it that would hold the tubes in place.
On the first day after the extension was added, a tube Dooley was cutting stuck to the underside of the die. As Dooley freed the tube with his left hand, he rested his right hand on the extension. When the machine assembly rose, Dooley's right thumb was crushed between the extension and a bolt on the machine.
Dooley contends that the extension caused his injury because it reduced the clearance between the die and the bolt to a distance that permitted his thumb to be crushed. He further contends that Parker-Hannifin is liable to him for negligence, breach of implied and express warranties and strict tort liability because it was the "owner" of the die. Parker-Hannifin seeks summary judgment on the ground that it did not design, manufacture, sell or distribute the die or extension.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1261 (1st Cir.1991). The burden is on the moving party to show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Once the moving party has met its burden, it is the nonmoving party's responsibility to set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is at least one genuine and material issue requiring a trial. Sheinkopf, 927 F.2d at 1261 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). In determining whether the case involves one or more disputed genuine and material issues, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sheinkopf, 927 F.2d at 1262 (citing Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)).
Dooley contends that Parker-Hannifin was the owner of the die and extension and, therefore, had a duty to warn Dooley of hazards associated with his use of the die and to provide adequate safeguards to protect him from these hazards.
Whether there is a legally enforceable duty to take precautions to prevent injury to another person is a question of law that must be decided on the basis of the facts of each case. See Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I.1987). Among the factors to be considered are 1) the foreseeability of harm to the Plaintiff; 2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and Plaintiff's injury; 3) the policy of preventing future harm; and 4) the extent of the burden to the Defendant and the consequences for the community of imposing a duty of care with its commensurate potential for liability. Id.
In this case, consideration of those factors compels the conclusion that Parker-Hannifin had no duty to protect Dooley from damages allegedly attributable to use of the die or the extension. As already noted, Parker-Hannifin played no role in the design or manufacture of the die or extension. Furthermore, neither the die nor the extension was ever in Parker-Hannifin's possession. Both were located at Tubodyne's facility, and both were used and maintained exclusively by Tubodyne. Finally, Dooley was employed by Tubodyne and not by Parker-Hannifin.
In short, Parker-Hannifin had no way of knowing the manner in which Dooley used the die or whether the extension was properly designed. Therefore, it could not be expected to foresee the likelihood that Dooley would be injured. Moreover, because Parker-Hannifin did not design, manufacture or possess the die and had nothing to do with how it was used, there was no connection between Parker-Hannifin's conduct and Dooley's injury. Parker-Hannifin was in no position to prevent future harm to those using the die. In addition, under these circumstances, holding Parker-Hannifin responsible for protecting Tubodyne's employees from risks of injury associated with the use of machines designed and controlled by Tubodyne would be unreasonable and would impose a substantial burden on Parker-Hannifin without any commensurate decrease in the risk of future injuries. Consequently, the Court finds that Parker-Hannifin owed no duty to protect Dooley and cannot be liable to him on a negligence theory.
Under Rhode Island Law, the "sale" of a product may create a variety of warranties regarding that product. Thus, a warranty of merchantability is implied in a contract for the "sale" of goods if the "seller" is a merchant with respect to goods of that type. R.I.Gen.Laws § 6A-2-314 (1992). Other kinds of express and/or implied warranties may be created when the "seller" makes representations relating to the product, see R.I.Gen.Laws § 6A-2-313 (1992), and/or when the "seller" has reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill and judgment to furnish suitable goods. See R.I.Gen.Laws § 6A-2-315 (1992). Breach of those warranties exposes the "seller" to liability for personal injury that proximately results from the breach. See R.I.Gen.Laws § 6A-2-715(2)(b) (1992). Responsibility for personal injury caused by a defective product also may be imposed on one who "sells" the product on the theory of strict liability in tort as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). See Ritter v. Narragansett Electric Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971).
In this case, Dooley concedes that Parker-Hannifin did not "sell" the die or the extension that allegedly caused his injury. However, Dooley asserts that Parker-Hannifin owned the die and extension and therefore is liable for injuries attributable to its alleged defects. In support of that contention, Dooley cites cases from other jurisdictions that have imposed liability on owners who lease...
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Bland v. Imco Recycling, SD23703
...by the person sought to be held liable, and was at one time in its control and possession." Id. at 33. See also Dooley v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 817 F.Supp. 245 (D.R.I. 1993)(refusing to impose liability on the owner of a defective die which was, and always had been, in the possession of an......
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...government never had possession nor control over the chattel. Id. at 33. Detroit Diesel also cites the case of Dooley v. Parker-Hannifin Corporation, 817 F.Supp. 245 (D.R.I.1993) affirmed at 7 F.3d 218 (1st Cir.1993), for the proposition that owners are not necessarily suppliers. In that ca......
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Bland v. Imco Recycling, SD23703
...by the person sought to be held liable, and was at one time in its control and possession." Id. at 33. See also Dooley v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 817 F.Supp. 245 (D.R.I. 1993)(refusing to impose liability on the owner of a defective die which was, and always had been, in the possession of an......
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Bland v. Imco Recycling, Inc.
...by the person sought to be held liable, and was at one time in its control and possession." Id. at 33. See also Dooley v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 817 F.Supp. 245 (D.R.I.1993)(refusing to impose liability on the owner of a defective die which was, and always had been, in the possession of ano......