Dooley v. United Indus. Corp.
| Decision Date | 24 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-cv-37-JPG |
| Parties | THOMAS DOOLEY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, SPECTRUM BRANDS, INC., EUGENE HOGE, and ALLISON FOLEY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
THOMAS DOOLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, SPECTRUM BRANDS, INC., EUGENE HOGE, and ALLISON FOLEY, Defendants.
Case No. 10-cv-37-JPG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DATED: August 24, 2011
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 117) and Memorandum (Doc. 118) in support thereof. Plaintiff Thomas Dooley ("Dooley") filed Responses (Docs. 123, 127) thereto, to which Defendants filed Replies (Docs. 134, 135). Dooley also filed Sur-Replies (Docs. 141, 142), to which Defendants filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 145). Because the Court's Local Rules absolutely forbid sur-reply briefs, SDIL-LR 7.1(c) ("Under no circumstances will sur-reply briefs be accepted.") (emphasis added), the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc. 145), DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to STRIKE Documents 141, 142, and 143 from the docket sheet, and assures the parties that it has not considered those filings in its consideration of the summary judgment motion.
For the following reasons, the Court, inter alia, GRANTS the instant motion.
I. Facts
In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the reviewing court must construe the
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evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Dooley, finds as follows:
Starting sometime in 2005, Defendant Spectrum Brands, Inc. ("Spectrum") and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Defendant United Industries Corporation ("UIC"), hired Dooley to work in their Bridgeton, Missouri, distribution facility. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant Allison Foley ("Foley") was Dooley's supervisor, and Rebeckah Long ("Long") was the human resources director at UIC. During his time with UIC, Dooley worked with Douglas Colvin ("Colvin"), another employee of the two companies. Colvin has a rap sheet with three felonies, has been sentenced to eight years imprisonment, and has been a suspect in at least one homicide.
On August 27, 2009, Dooley found Colvin in his previously-locked office and noticed his personal laptop computer was missing. Colvin did not routinely work in the vicinity of Dooley's office. After Dooley accused Colvin of stealing the computer, Colvin repeatedly threatened Dooley, stating "I'm going to fucking kill you motherfucker," or words to that effect. Colvin, who is known as "The Bull," weighs approximately 90 pounds more than Dooley.
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The two men made their way to Foley and another supervisor and provided written statements of the occurrence.1 Dooley was visibly shaken by the confrontation. Meanwhile, Colvin denied the accusations against him, maintaining that the office door was wide open despite an automatic close feature. No employees or other potential witnesses reported seeing or hearing the incident. Upon concluding its investigation, UIC decided not to terminate Colvin because there was not enough evidence proving he engaged in the alleged conduct.2 Likewise, the Bridgeton Police Department, which conducted interviews on the date of the incident, did not find sufficient evidence to arrest Colvin.
Due to stress and anxiety stemming from the August 27 incident, Dooley received and tendered to Foley and Long a doctor's note excusing him from work until September 10. Long thereafter sent Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") paperwork to Dooley, which he received on September 10. The cover letter to this paperwork, which Dooley did not read, noted that Dooley had fifteen calendar days to complete and return the enclosed forms. The letter also stated as follows: "Please . . . [i]nform Human Resources in writing of any changes in your leave status, your time needed for recovery, or of any intention, if applicable, not to return to work." Doc. 118-2, p. 72. Finally, the cover letter stated that a medical release certifying Dooley's ability to perform his job duties would have to be tendered to human resources before any return to work.
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On September 15, Dooley went to work but forgot to bring the requisite medical release; thus, Foley sent him home to retrieve it. Rather than immediately return to work with the release in hand, Dooley disappeared for several days and failed to inform his employer or superiors of his whereabouts. In fact, Dooley did not call Foley until September 21 to tell her that Colvin was a "murderer,"3 Doc. 118-2, p. 56, and he did not return to work until September 24.
Meanwhile, Defendants began to monitor and act on Dooley's absenteeism. UIC maintained a policy of terminating employees who missed work without calling in for three consecutive days. Dooley was aware of this policy, and others had been terminated for violating it. Since Dooley did not report his absences on the weekdays of September 16, 17, and 18 and because Dooley had presumably been cleared for work since September 10, Long opted to terminate his employment via certified letter dated September 23, 2009.4 On
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September 24, the day after Long sent out the termination letter, Dooley returned to UIC and produced a doctor's note excusing any absences from September 16 through September 23. This was the first time Defendants had seen this note.
Despite his best efforts, Dooley has been unable to find employment since his termination.
II. Relevant Procedural Posture
On December 18, 2009, Dooley filed suit in Madison County, Illinois, alleging claims of wrongful discharge (Count I), breach of good faith (Count II), negligent hiring (Count III), violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., (Count IV), civil conspiracy (Count V), and unsafe place to work (Count VI) against all Defendants. UIC and Spectrum removed the matter to this Court on January 19, 2010, asserting federal question jurisdiction existed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 due to the FMLA claim. Dooley eventually filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 23), which remains the operative complaint in this litigation. This complaint did not add any new claims but did add Foley as a defendant to all existing claims. After the Court partially granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 33, 44), only the wrongful discharge and FMLA claims remained. Defendants now move for summary judgment on those claims.
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I. Motions for Summary Judgment Generally
Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must typically present specific facts supported by the record to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26; Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
II. Wrongful Discharge
A. Preliminary Matters and Missouri's Adherence to the Doctrine of At-Will Employment
As discussed in its previous Memorandum and Order (Doc. 111), the Court has followed the guidance of the Second Restatement and finds that Missouri has the most significant contacts to this case. As such, its substantive law shall be applied. Additionally, because Dooley does not allege he had a traditional employment contract with specified
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terms, the Court continues to hold that he was an at-will employee at all times relevant to this litigation. Doc. 111, p. 9-10. See Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Adcock v. Newtec, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Mo. App. Ct. 1996) ("An essential element to an employment contract is a statement of duration. 'Without a statement of duration, an employment at will is created . . . .'") (citing McCoy v. Spelman Mem'l Hosp., 845 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Mo. App. Ct. 1993)).
"Generally, an employer can discharge an at-will employee for any reason." Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.98, 101 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). This principle is not absolute, as both a protected class exception and public...
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