Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l

Decision Date01 May 2000
Docket NumberINTERNATIONAL-INDIAN,INCORPORATE,D,No. 99-1209,99-1209
Citation211 F.3d 392
Parties(7th Cir. 2000) RODNEY WAYNE SPATH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAYES WHEELSefendant-Appellee
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Before CUDAHY, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

From 1987 to 1997, Rodney Spath was a production worker for the Hayes Wheels International-Indiana, Incorporated (Hayes Wheels or employer) facility in Huntington, Indiana. On March 11, 1997, Hayes Wheels terminated Spath's employment because Spath filed a false worker's compensation claim. Thereafter, Spath filed suit against Hayes Wheels in the Northern District of Indiana, alleging that Hayes Wheels terminated him, not because he filed a false worker's compensation claim, but because of his epileptic disorder, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. sec.sec. 12101-12213.1 The trial judge concluded that Spath failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and granted Hayes Wheels' motion for summary judgment.

We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Spath's Disabilities

During his tenure at Hayes Wheels, Spath suffered at least eight epileptic seizures at his place of employment, and he concedes that Hayes Wheels accommodated his epileptic condition for nine years by transferring him to positions which involved less contact with machinery and routinely permitting him to return to work after receiving a physician's release. This all changed, according to Spath, after he had a seizure while on the job and was conveyed to a hospital on August 7, 1996. After this seizure, Spath received a release from the emergency room physician and attempted to report back to work the same day. But his employer refused to accept the emergency room physician's release and, insisted upon a release from Spath's personal physician, Dr. Matthew. On August 8, 1998, Spath provided a release from his personal physician, and again Hayes Wheels refused to accept this release; on this occasion Hayes Wheels demanded a release from Spath's neurologist Dr. Stevens.2 After Spath became aware that he would be unable to obtain an appointment for a consultation and examination with Dr. Stevens prior to October 14, 1996, he negotiated with his employer to permit him to return to work earlier. On August 18, 1996, Hayes Wheels permitted Spath to return to work, but refused to allow him to work any overtime until such time as he presented a release from his neurologist.3

Spath also argued, in support of his contention that his employer no longer wished to accommodate his disability, that Hayes Wheels restricted his overtime after a seizure on December 5, 1996, without any medical opinion stating that it was necessary. After Spath suffered the seizure on December 5, 1996, Spath's supervisor Mike Johnson restricted Spath from working any overtime hours in the future, explaining in an internal memorandum:

Due to the seizure that was experienced the other day by Rodney Spath, I am restricting Rodney to a maximum working day of no more than 8.5 hours until further notice.

I believe that most of the occurrences we see here in the plant seem to come when Rodney is working overtime. I must act on this to protect Rodney's safety. The significance of this action, Spath argues, lies in the fact that his employer does not impose work limitations unless ordered by a physician, and Spath did not see a physician for the December 5th seizure.

B. Spath's Termination

On January 4, 1997, Spath was working in the Heat Treat Department of Hayes Wheels with fellow employees Mike Shockome and John Helblig when he allegedly tripped, fell backwards onto the burn oven, and injured his back; this injury was not associated with his epileptic disorder. After determining that Spath was injured, Shockome and Helblig paged the department supervisor Richard Guenin. When Guenin arrived, he interviewed Spath, who informed Guenin that he was sweeping, tripped, and fell onto the burn oven. Based on this information, Guenin completed the "Supervisor's First Report of Injury," writing: "Rod tripped on paint line hinges on a skid and fell into [the] burn off oven." Guenin read Spath what he had written on the Report. Spath then reviewed the Report himself, and signed it. Afterwards, Spath went to the hospital for treatment of his injuries.

Before Spath left the plant on the day of his injury, Guenin gave him a blank "Employee's Incident Report." Spath took this form home with him in order that his wife might assist him in completing it. On his next day of work, January 6, 1997, Spath submitted the signed Employee's Incident Report on which he wrote: "I was sweeping the floor and triped [sic] over a broken edge of duning and fell into the Age Oven hitting my back." Based on this Employee's Incident Report, Hayes Wheels filed a worker's compensation claim on Spath's behalf.

Approximately two months after Spath's accident, employee Ted Johnson informed Hayes Wheels' Safety Manager, Wayne Desai, that Spath was injured while engaged in horseplay. Desai then interviewed Shockome and Helblig who confirmed Johnson's story, explaining that Spath was injured while attempting to catch a ball of duct tape that Helblig threw to him. Both Helblig and Shockome signed written statements which read:

On January 4, 1997, Rodney Spath, John Helblig, and Mike Shockome were back in the heat treat area. During their scheduled work time back there, they started throwing a ball of duct tape to each other. On one of the throws that John sent to Rodney, it went higher than Rodney could catch. Rodney tried to run back and catch the ball and tripped over his own feet and fell backwards onto the age oven.

After interviewing a total of five individuals, each of whom confirmed that Spath was injured while engaged in horseplay, Desai interviewed Spath. Despite the evidence to the contrary, Spath stuck to his original explanation: that he was sweeping when he injured his back. Desai confronted Spath with the statements of Shockome and Helblig, but Spath continued to deny that he was engaged in horseplay at the time he was injured.

Desai provided the results of his investigation to Rachel Wust, a Human Resources Specialist. Wust testified that, based on the statements of Shockome and Helblig, she believed that Spath was injured while playing with the duct tape ball and not while sweeping. Thus, she was convinced that Spath's claim that he was injured while sweeping was less than truthful. Wust concluded that Spath had violated Plant Rule 5 by filing a false report, and that he ought to be terminated for that violation.4 Wust then consulted with Rick Guernsey, the Plant Manager, and Rick Uecker, another Human Resource Specialist, who both concurred with her decision to terminate Spath.

Because of Spath's violation of Plant Rule 5, Wust placed Spath on suspension without pay beginning February 27, 1997, and scheduled a termination meeting for March 11, 1997, to present Spath with "the results of the investigation and the action that the company had to take based on that information." Wust, Desai, Uecker, Guernsey, Spath, and his wife, Linda, attended. At the meeting, Wust informed Spath that his employment was being terminated effective immediately for providing false information concerning his injury.

C. Spath's Lawsuit

On February 4, 1998, Spath filed suit against his employer in the Northern District of Indiana, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA, age discrimination under the ADEA, and state law retaliation. On October 26, 1998, Hayes Wheels filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Spath failed to present sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that his employer fired him either because of his disability or because of his age. On December 29, 1998, the trial judge agreed with Hayes Wheels and granted the defendant summary judgment. Spath appeals.

II. ISSUE

On appeal, Spath argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to his employer because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Hayes Wheels treated him differently from other employees because of his disability.5

III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we construe all facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, the mere existence of an alleged factual dispute between the parties is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 252. In this case, Spath is required to demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue of triable fact and that there is evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for him. See Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1999).

B. Spath's Disparate Treatment Claim

The ADA makes it unlawful to "discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability." 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). To establish a claim of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: "'(1) that [he was] disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that [his] work performance met [his] employer's legitimate...

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