Dorchester Hugoton, Ltd. v. Dorchester Master Ltd. Partnership
| Decision Date | 07 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 3,No. 83565,83565,3 |
| Citation | 925 P.2d 1213 |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
| Parties | 1996 OK CIV APP 59, 136 Oil & Gas Rep. 619 DORCHESTER HUGOTON, LTD., a Texas Limited Partnership, Appellee, v. DORCHESTER MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Texas Limited Partnership; Parker & Parsley Gas Processing Co., Parker & Parsley Development Co. and Midland Gas Processing Co., Appellants. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division |
Appeal From the District Court of Texas County, Oklahoma; Honorable Greg A. Zigler, Judge.
Philip D. Hart, L. Vance Brown, Oklahoma City, for Appellants.
David K. Petty, Guymon, Mark D. Christiansen, Oklahoma City, for Appellee.
Appellants, Dorchester Master Limited Partnership ("DMLP"), Parker & Parsley Gas Processing Co. and Parker & Parsley Development Co. (collectively "P & P"), and Midland Gas Processing Co. ("Midland"), seek review of the trial court's order which granted a permanent injunction to Appellee Dorchester Hugoton, Ltd. ("Dorchester"). Dorchester sought a permanent injunction against DMLP, Midland and Parker and Parsley Gas Processing Company (collectively "Appellants"), to enjoin those entities from interfering with Dorchester's assumption of possession, operation and control of a gas gathering pipeline system, which is referred to as the Hooker Gas Plant Gas Gathering System. 1
Dorchester originally filed this action, Case No. C-89-34 in the District Court of Texas County, in 1989, against DMLP and Damson Oil Corporation, DMLP's general partner (collectively "Defendants"). The parties refer to this action as the "34 Case". Dorchester sought judgment for monetary damages based upon the fraudulent conduct of Defendants regarding the sale to Dorchester of certain oil and gas leasehold properties conveyed by the Defendants to Dorchester in a 1986 Assignment and Bill of Sale. Dorchester also sought to quiet title to these properties. On September 24, 1990, the trial court entered judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of Dorchester for $4,715,326.00 and then quieted title to the real and personal property acquired from Defendants in the 1986 Assignment. Defendants appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals in Case No. 76,515. The Court decided the appeal on November 2, 1993, affirming the quiet title portion of the judgment but reversing the judgment for actual and punitive damages for fraud. 2 The cause was remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the damage suit issues. 3
On April 20, 1994, Dorchester sought the permanent injunction here appealed. The same day, April 20, 1994, the trial court held a combined hearing to consider both the permanent injunction request of Dorchester in the 34 case and a request for a temporary injunction from Parker & Parsley Gas Processing Co. et al. in C-93-6 (hereafter "the 6 Case"). 4 It granted the permanent injunction to Dorchester on April 26, 1994. Appellants' subsequent motion to this Court to vacate the April 26, 1994, permanent injunction was severed from Appeal No. 76,515, assigned a number (# 83,565) and made a companion to Appeal No. 83,475, which is Appellants' appeal of the temporary injunction in the 6 Case. Although Dorchester's Petition for Writ of Certiorari in No. 76,515 was initially granted, same was withdrawn as improvidently granted on June 21, 1995, and mandate issued.
In support of its quest for permanent injunctive relief, Dorchester contended ownership of the gas gathering system had been adjudicated by the 34 judgment and that injunctive relief was appropriate to enforce the prior judgment. The trial court agreed. In granting the permanent injunction, the trial court relied on the doctrine of res judicata per the judgment in the 34 case and upon its own order which granted partial summary judgment on December 22, 1993, in the 6 Case. On appeal, Appellants contend the trial court erred in concluding that either the 34 Case judgment or the 6 Case partial summary judgment is res judicata as to ownership of the gathering system and that the injunction based thereon must be reversed. We agree.
This Court will not disturb an order granting or refusing an injunction unless there is a showing that the court abused its discretion or that the judgment is clearly against the weight of the evidence. First American Bank & Trust Co., Purcell, Oklahoma v. Sawyer, 865 P.2d 347 (Okla.App.1993). This Court may reverse, vacate or modify a judgment of the district court where our review of the nature of the case and the facts properly before the trial court reveals that the injunction should not have been granted. State ex rel. Schulte v. Hallco Environmental, Inc., 886 P.2d 994 (Okla.1994).
Appellants maintain the issue of ownership of the gas gathering system is not barred under the doctrine of res judicata because ownership of the gathering system was never an issue in the 34 Case in that Dorchester never claimed to own the gathering system in that action. Appellants assert P & P's predecessor in interest, DMLP, did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue. On the other hand, Dorchester maintains the issue of ownership of the gathering system was clearly in issue and decided by the 34 Case judgment.
Once a ruling has become final, either for want of an appeal or in consequence of an appellate court's decision, any controversy over the meaning and effect of that decision must be resolved by resort solely to the face of the judgment roll. Fent v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Company, a Division of Oneok Inc., 898 P.2d 126, 132 (Okla.1994). The judgment roll consists of the petition, process, return, pleadings subsequent thereto, reports, verdicts, orders, judgments and all material acts and proceedings of the court. Mills v. Mills, 841 P.2d 624 (Okla.App.1992); 12 O.S.1991, § 32.1. A judgment's meaning is to be divined from the terms expressed in its text, which is to be construed with the other parts of the judgment roll. Stork v. Stork, 898 P.2d 732 (Okla.1995).
Post-appeal construction of the meaning and effect of the 34 Case judgment, including a determination of what was or could have been adjudged thereby, must be garnered solely from the face of the district court's judgment roll viewed together with the appellate pronouncement in the case. Fent, at 132. The 34 Case judgment adopted the verdict of the jury and awarded Dorchester $4,715,326.00 against DMLP and Damson jointly and severally. The judgment further provided:
[P]laintiff's title to the real and personal property acquired from defendants on June 20, 1986, by Assignment and Bill of Sale recorded in Book 752 at page 288 in the records of the County Clerk of Texas County, Oklahoma is quieted against the defendants, Dorchester Master Limited Partnership and Damson Oil Corporation as prayed in plaintiff's petition, and said defendants are barred from claiming any right, title or interest in any of said real or personal property described in said Assignment and Bill of Sale except only as to the production payment described on page 2 and in Exhibit B to said Assignment and Bill of said (sic), and the right to participate in 25% of 20% in new wells drilled as described on page 2 and in Exhibit C to said Assignment and bill of Sale.
In its Petition in Case 34, Dorchester alleged it owned an undivided 80% working interest in certain oil and gas leaseholds in Texas County, Oklahoma and that DMLP and Damson owned the remaining leasehold interest. Dorchester alleged it had a preferential right, under an operating agreement, to buy the leasehold interests from any party owning an interest in the properties on the same basis as offered by any prospective purchaser. Dorchester alleged it received notice that DMLP and Damson had received a firm offer from Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. to purchase all of its interest in the properties and wells for $2.1 million dollars cash and other consideration. Dorchester exercised its preferential right to purchase Defendants' interest in the properties and paid defendants $2.1 million dollars. In consideration, Dorchester alleged, the Defendants assigned to Dorchester "all its interest in the properties subject of the offer to plaintiff" in the 1986 Assignment and Bill of Sale. Dorchester attached a copy of the Assignment as Exhibit E to its petition. Dorchester further alleged:
9. Pursuant to the terms of Exhibit E attached [the Assignment], plaintiff became the owner of 100 percent of the subject oil and gas leaseholds and all easements, permits, power lines and other rights and appurtenances relating to said oil and gas leaseholds and gas units and all tangible personal property, fixtures, improvements, easements, permits, licenses, servitudes and other appurtenances including but not by way of limitation, all wells, injection wells, salt water disposal facilities, well heads, casing tubing, pumps, motors, gauges, valves, heaters, treaters, flow lines, gas lines, water lines, vessels, tanks, boilers, separators, buildings, fixtures, platforms, machinery, tools and other equipment, pipelines, power lines, telephone and telegraph lines, transportation and communication facilities, and other appurtenances situated upon the said Exhibit A (to the Assignment) properties; together with other property and property rights described in the Assignment.
Dorchester alleged the true amount of cash consideration agreed upon between defendants and Kaiser-Francis for the properties was $1,325,674.00 and that defendants intentionally and willfully misrepresented to Dorchester, the amount of the Kaiser-Francis offer. Dorchester asked for compensatory and punitive damages and that "its title be quieted in and to all of the properties described in the conveyance from the defendant to plaintiff attached as Exhibit E".
Dorchester claims that the above-quoted language...
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