Doremus v. Farrell

• Decision Date: 23 December 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 75-0-168,75-0-189,75-L-80.
• Citation: 407 F. Supp. 509
• Parties: Bruce DOREMUS, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Dr. C. H. FARRELL et al., Defendants. Stanley ROSENFIELD, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Virgil E. NORTHWALL et al., Defendants. Lucille PATTERSON, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, and Beth Deavers, Intervening Plaintiff, v. Robert R. CAMP et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

407 F. Supp. 509

Bruce DOREMUS, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Dr. C. H. FARRELL et al., Defendants.

Stanley ROSENFIELD, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Virgil E. NORTHWALL et al., Defendants.

Lucille PATTERSON, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, and Beth Deavers, Intervening Plaintiff, v. Robert R. CAMP et al., Defendants.

Civ. Nos. 75-0-168, 75-0-189, 75-L-80.

United States District Court, D. Nebraska.

December 23, 1975.

Terrence J. Ferguson, Legal Aid Society of Omaha-Council Bluffs; Ronald J. Palagi, Omaha, Neb.; David L. Piester and William H. Nollkamper, III, Legal Aid Society of Lincoln, Inc., Lincoln, Neb., for plaintiffs.

Henry L. Wendt, Deputy County Atty., Douglas County, Neb., Robert G. Gibson, Deputy County Atty., Lancaster County, Neb., for defendants.

Before LAY, Circuit Judge, and SCHATZ and DENNEY, District Judges.

DENNEY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of plaintiffs in these consolidated cases for summary judgment, declaring unconstitutional and enjoining the enforcement of Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 83-320, 83-322, 83-322.01, 83-325, 83-325.02-325.04, 83-326, 83-328 and 83-328.03 (1971) and 83-323, 328.02 and 337 (Supp.1974), which establish procedures for the adjudication and involuntary civil commitment of persons alleged to be mentally ill.¹ The cases were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) and the power to grant declaratory and injunctive relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

Plaintiffs, Stanley Rosenfield and Bruce Doremus, brought this action on their own behalf and as representatives of a class composed of persons who are now and will be detained by the Douglas County Board of Mental Health for examination or committed by the Douglas County Board of Mental Health to the Douglas County Hospital or the Nebraska State Mental Hospital, either temporarily or indefinitely, as a result of an information filed with the Douglas County Board of Mental Health by an interested third person or a finding of mental illness by the Douglas County Board of Mental Health. Plaintiff, Lucille Patterson, brought this action also as a class action on her own behalf and as representative of a class composed of persons who are now and will be detained by the Lancaster County Board of Mental Health for examination or committed by the Lancaster County Board of Mental Health to the Lincoln Regional Center, either temporarily or indefinitely as a result of an information filed with the Lancaster County Board of Mental Health by an interested third person or a finding of mental illness by the Lancaster County Board of Mental Health. The Court, in an unreported opinion, certified the consolidated cases as class actions pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), F.R.Civ.P.

The defendants are members of the Douglas County Board of Mental Health, the Hospital Administrator and Medical Director of Douglas County Hospital, members of the Lancaster County Board of Mental Health, the chief executive officer of the Lincoln Regional Center and the Sheriff of Lancaster County.

Plaintiffs contend that the Nebraska civil commitment scheme is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Because an injunction is sought against the state statutes, the three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.²

While the facts of each plaintiff's detention or commitment is not at issue here³, a brief recitation of the relevant history of one of the plaintiffs will facilitate an understanding of the Nebraska civil commitment procedures. On May 5, 1975, plaintiff, Stanley Rosenfield, was taken to the Douglas County Hospital by officers of the Omaha Police Division and admitted to the hospital without his consent. Two doctors attended Rosenfield at the hospital and certified him as mentally ill. On the same day, a nurse requested involuntary hospitalization of Rosenfield upon the certification of the two licensed physicians that he was mentally ill, pursuant to Section 83-322.01. The basis for the certification was inappropriate behavior, i. e., waltzing about the motel in a bathing suit, calling the guests various names. The doctors diagnosed Rosenfield as a paranoid schizophreniac. We note also that Rosenfield had been previously committed twice by his wife.

Rosenfield was held involuntarily at the Douglas County Hospital on the basis of the doctors' certificate from May 5, 1975, until May 7, 1975. On May 7, an information was filed by a deputy county attorney stating his belief that Rosenfield was mentally ill and a fit subject for custody and treatment in a state hospital within Douglas County. On the same day, an order was entered by the Douglas County Board of Mental Health, finding that Rosenfield should have care and treatment in the Douglas County Hospital, and ordering that he be admitted for observation, care and treatment pending further order of the Board. The evidence upon which the Board based its order of May 7, 1975, was that contained in the information only.

Between May 7 and May 15, 1975, Rosenfield was kept in a locked room with leather restraints and given various drugs. On May 15, he was examined by a doctor on the Board who concluded that plaintiff was mentally ill. On the same day, the Board held a hearing at which they found Rosenfield to be mentally ill and ordered him committed for treatment and care for a period not to exceed sixty days. Rosenfield had been given no notice of this hearing, was not present nor represented by counsel, and no testimony was adduced by the Board. The Board based its decision upon the report of the examining doctor, who is a member of the Board, and upon the information filed by the deputy county attorney.

THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS

The Nebraska civil commitment scheme provides for three stages of involuntary commitment. The first stage may be termed emergency detention. Section 83-325 authorizes the Board to order a person against whom an information has been filed detained for examination and investigation before commencement of formal commitment proceedings. The Board members are the clerk of the district court, a practicing attorney and a licensed psychiatrist.

The second stage of detention may be termed temporary commitment and begins with the filing of the certificate of the examining physician pursuant to Section 83-326 that the person in question is mentally ill. The physician may or may not be a Board member, but, as a matter of practice, the physician on the Board conducts the examination. In accordance with Section 83-328, as soon as practicable after the certificate of the examining physician has been filed, the Board must conclude whether the person alleged to be mentally ill is mentally ill. In accordance with Section 83-325, the Board may hear testimony at a preliminary inquiry and determine in their discretion whether the presence of the proposed patient is necessary. After the Board enters its findings in accordance with Section 83-328, if the person is found to be mentally ill and should be admitted to a hospital, they order the superintendent of the state hospital to receive and keep the person as a patient for a period of observation not to exceed sixty days, at which time the hospital superintendent shall certify that the patient is or is not mentally ill.

The hospital superintendent's certification of the patient as mentally ill begins the third stage of commitment which may be termed indefinite commitment. Sections 83-328.02 and 328.03 provide for appeal from the findings of the Board to the district court by the person alleged to be mentally ill, any relative or immediate friend on his behalf, or the county attorney. Section 83-340 mandates the release of patients cured and Section 83-343 guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus will be available to any person confined in a state hospital for the mentally ill. Plaintiffs challenge the procedural facets of the first two stages of commitment, as well as the standard of commitment for mental illness which is the same for all three stages.

Defendants have extensively briefed and argued before the Court the appropriateness of abstention in this case. Although defendants are correct in their argument that a federal court should decline to pass on the constitutionality of a state statute where state court interpretation of the statute could eliminate the federal constitutional claims presented, the argument is inapposite to this case. Although the standards for commitment could possibly be construed so as to avoid doubt as to its constitutionality, the statute's procedural defects cannot be cured by interpretation. See Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F.Supp. 1192, 1195 (D.Md.1970). Defendants' reliance on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny is likewise misplaced, because plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin a state judicial proceeding. To retain jurisdiction in this case and require the plaintiffs first to seek redress in the courts of the state would be a usurpation of this Court's constitutional duty to protect federal rights.

The parties are in agreement that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to involuntary commitment proceedings. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975). The controversy centers around the minimal constitutional standards required and the proper standard for commitment. Defendants vigorously assert that the Nebraska procedure is constitutional both on its face and as applied. They attempt to justify the relaxed due process standards on the basis that (1) the state, as parens...