Doris v. McFarland

• Decision Date: 29 July 1931
• Citation: 113 Conn. 594,156 A. 52
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DORIS v. McFARLAND et al.

156 A. 52

113 Conn. 594

DORIS v. McFARLAND et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 29, 1931

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Christopher L. Avery Judge.

Action by Ella S. Doris, administratrix of the estate of Emma Stokes Pilling, deceased, against David W. McFarland and wife alleging conspiracy and fraud, and the unjust enrichment of defendants from the estate of plaintiff's decedent, and claiming equitable relief, brought to the superior court in Fairfield county and tried to the court, facts found, and judgment rendered for defendants to recover their costs, and plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Raymond E. Hackett and John D. Walker, both of Stamford, for appellant.

William H. Comley, of Bridgeport, and Harry R. Sherwood, of Westport, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, DICKENSON, and JOHN RUFUS BOOTH, JJ.

HAINES, J.

The plaintiff is a sister and the administratrix of the estate of Emma Stokes Pilling, who died intestate on the 27th day of September, 1923, and the defendants, husband and wife, own, maintain, and conduct an institution at Westport in this state, known as the Halle Brooke, for the custody, care, and control of the insane, lunatics, feeble-minded, drug addicts, and so-called " nervous cases." Upon the application of the mother of the intestate and after hearing, the court of probate for the district of Westport on September 15, 1909, found the intestate to be insane, and so adjudicated and ordered that she be committed to the Halle Brooke and " confined while such insanity continues or until she shall be discharged in due course of law." and that the defendants take her into their care and custody. Theretofore on September 8, 1909, and after the application by her mother and after hearing the testimony of two physicians who had examined her, the court of probate had ordered that the defendant Dr. David W. McFarland should have immediate charge of the person of the intestate and exercise the necessary care and restraint of her during the pendency of the application. Pursuant to the judgment of September 15th, the defendants removed the intestate to the Halle Brooke and so kept her in their care, custody, and control. This judgment of the court of probate has never been specifically revoked or nullified by the court. By the same court on November 13, 1909, the intestate was adjudged incapable of managing her affairs, and her mother, Emma W. Stokes, was appointed conservator and qualified and acted as such until June 21, 1911, when she presented her resignation to the court and was discharged from her trust, and no conservator was thereafter named for the intestate. She remained in the Halle Brooke under the probate commitment until the summer of 1910, and on July 29, 1910, at the request of the plaintiff, she was permitted to leave the care and custody of the defendants and go with the plaintiff, her sister, to New York for the purpose of aiding the latter in attending to the affairs of their mother. She never returned to the care or custody of the Halle Brooke or the defendants, but was on January 1, 1911, officially discharged therefrom, an entry being then made by Dr. McFarland, the official in charge, on the books of the institution that she was on that date so discharged as recovered. For some years before and after this date the intestate was without substantial means of her own.

The first seven paragraphs of the complaint purport to recite the description of the parties, the adjudications of the court and the acts of the parties thereunder; the eighth, by way of résumé, asserts that the intestate was " incompetent and legally incapable of making disposition of her property." Paragraphs 9 to 16, inclusive, are a long and detailed statement of the claimed circumstances of building a house upon the land of Mrs. McFarland and the expenditure of her money therefor. The gist of these allegations is that, at every step in the proceedings, she was known by these defendants to be an incompetent, and was under their " domination, control and influence," " improper and fraudulent influence," " bidding and command," and that by such " improper acts, conspiracy and fraud" they succeeded in " unjustly enriching themselves and their real estate by the value of said dwelling house." The seventeenth and last paragraph of the complaint merely refers to certain liens on the property by third persons. The prayer for relief is twofold: That the court decree that the defendants have been unjustly enriched, and that they be declared trustees of the premises for the benefit of the plaintiff for the amount which their property has been enhanced in value by the house thereon, or that a receiver be appointed, the premises sold, and the proceeds first subjected to the plaintiff's demand for the enhanced value of the defendants' property.

The trial court upon the plaintiff's motion made a considerable addition in the way of details to the original finding. Those changes which were refused, and in doing which the plaintiff contends there was error, relate in part to the character of the mental disorder from which the intestate suffered and its curability. The trial court found that the intestate had been treated at a sanitarium in New York state for the morphine habit and had also been confined in the psychopathic ward at Bellevue where she was under observation for five days before she was committed to the Halle Brooke. At the time of her admission to the latter institution, Dr. McFarland thought her case to be " Drug habitue, with psychosis-Paranoiac." The trial court further finds that she was insane in consequence of prior addiction to the use of drugs and the mental disturbance resulting from the withdrawal of their use, and that " she was not permanently insane, nor suffering from any form of mental disease; and the mental disarrangement due to the withdrawal of the use of drugs *** was capable of treatment and complete cure." The plaintiff seeks to strike out these conclusions as to the character and cure of the intestate's mental disturbance as lacking support in the evidence, and asks that the diagnosis of Dr. McFarland above quoted be followed by a finding of fact that " an insane person suffering from paranoia never recovers and that that form of insanity is always regarded as incurable," asserting that this is " an admitted and undisputed fact." In support of the requests for changes in the finding, the appellant had certain portions of the evidence certified as exhibits, but, upon motion of the defendants, the court certified all the evidence for our consideration. A painstaking reading of all the evidence shows ample support for the finding made by the court above quoted, and indeed the record is entirely bare of any evidence to the contrary. The testimony from all witnesses as to the actual mental condition of the intestate is to the effect that she was of mental alertness and much more than ordinary intellectual capacity, during the time of the transactions which are the basis of this action. There is no evidence of any kind as to the cause of her commitment save the fact conclusively established by the evidence that she was then suffering from a previous addiction to drugs, and there is no denial by any witness of her complete recovery from those effects. We cannot strike out these paragraphs of the finding to which the plaintiff is now objecting. It is equally true that, when the intestate first came to the Halle Brooke, Dr. McFarland thought her to be a " Drug habitue, with psychosis-Paranoiac." He also said in his testimony, what is not anywhere disputed, that paranoia is always regarded as incurable. It follows that the plaintiff was entitled to have this latter statement included in the finding, and we so treat it, though its relevancy is not apparent, since it appears from the finding that she was not a paranoiac. In view, however, of the clear distinction made by the doctor between the terms " diagnosis" and " impression," we must assume that the use of the term " diagnosed" in the finding was inadvertent and erroneous. The obvious meaning was that it was his first impression, since he so stated in his testimony, and added that a diagnosis could not be made short of three to six months in such cases. We do not overlook the fact that the plaintiff sought a finding to the effect that the testimony of certain witnesses as to the mental soundness of the intestate, to which the plaintiff objected, was the basis of the court's conclusion that she was of sound mind. The court complied in part with this request, but added that its conclusion was based upon this evidence, " together with all the evidence in the case."

Other additions desired are either in substance included in it or cannot be regarded as stating admitted or undisputed facts, and some are not important.

The plaintiff seeks to strike out ten paragraphs of the finding; one of these, paragraph 10, covers the cause, character, and curability of the condition of the intestate, and has already been sufficiently noticed. The finding is supported by the evidence. All the remaining paragraphs are supported by evidence, mostly of a positive and direct character, which, though obviously not accepted as true by the plaintiff, was believed by the court. A few of the statements are inferences, but a careful reading of the evidence fully satisfies us that these are reasonable and proper inferences from direct evidence which the court was privileged to believe to be true. We cannot strike out any of these paragraphs. With these comments and the slight changes we have made, the finding stands.

The history of the financial transactions of the intestate which are brought in question by this...